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THE PEACE THAT FAILED

How Europe Sowed The Seeds of War

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by VARIAN FRY
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THE PEACE THAT FAILED

HOW EUROPE SOWED THE SEEDS OF WAR

by

VARIAN FRY

WITH FIFTEEN
ILLUSTRATIONS

THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY?



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I. The War to End War

When I was a boy we lived in the country. After the United States entered the war there was a big army camp near our town, where they shipped the drafted men for training. From all over the nation they came, from the prairies of the Middle West, the high plateaus of the Rockies, the cabins of the deep South, the steer lands of Texas—green, raw-boned and homesick. We used to drive over to the camp on Saturdays and pick up a batch of them and bring them home for the week-end. We got to know a lot of them that way, just feeding them and talking to them and giving them a good time. There was "Georgia," and "Texas," and Carl from Montana—who contemptuously called our eastern mountains "shelves"—and a hundred more—all homesick and all secretly scared. They used to call my mother "Mother." And some of them couldn't hold back the tears when they said goodbye for the last time.

Months later, some of them began coming back—to a big hospital camp that was also nearby. They were different now. Even I, a youngster, could see there was a difference. Many of them had lost a leg, or an arm, or a foot, or had a silver plate where a piece of the skull used to be. But it wasn't that. It was something else—they were so much *quieter*.

Instead of laughing and singing songs like "Over There" and "K-K-K-Katie," the way they had before, they would sit and talk to Dad in low tones about the war, and how they couldn't get out of their minds the look of the men they'd jabbed their bayonets into, the screech of the shells, the sight of a dead child face down in the mud outside a shattered farm house.

I was a bit too young then to take part in those half-whispered conversations, but I used to catch snatches of them from time to time, and I remember how they used to end.

"Well," somebody would say. "The Huns asked for it, and they're going to get it, good and plenty. And when the war's over we're going to see it can't happen again. No, sir, this war is going to end war forever. You can bet your bottom dollar on that."

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And everybody would agree. This was the war to end war.

After the Armistice they started going back home—"Texas," a legless ranchman now, back to Pecos; "Georgia," with a silver plate in his skull, back to the peach farm; Carl, minus his right arm, back to the mining town in Montana where he was born. Veterans. Some of them sent letters and postcards for a while, and one or two still send greeting cards at Christmas. But after a time we lost touch with most of them, and as the years passed the memories of those war days grew dimmer and even the names and faces faded.

GEORGE LAWRENCE

All except one—George Lawrence. Through the hard years of the early twenties and the boom years at the end of the decade, through the depression, the recovery, the new depression, George Lawrence kept sending us letters and postcards, reports on his progress from salesman in a second-hand car lot to partner in a big garage business in the Pennsylvania town where he lived, snapshots of his wife when he got married, snapshots of the babies as they came along, colored postcards from Monterey and Yosemite and Pike's Peak and the many other places he visited on his travels.

After I went away to college I lost touch with George Lawrence. But I used to hear of him occasionally through my mother, who still got letters and postcards from him exactly as though the war hadn't been over ten or fifteen years, and everybody else's lives hadn't long since taken new turns that more and more obscured the memories of those fast receding years.

Then I got married and started a home of my own, and forgot George Lawrence almost altogether.

So I was surprised one fall day in 1939 when a voice I didn't recognize called me up and suggested going to the New York World's Fair. It was George Lawrence. He was in town on business; he was going to the Fair that night; and he wanted company. Wouldn't I come along?

I said yes, you bet, I'd meet him at the Long Island Railroad

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at a quarter to five. My wife was away, and I was glad to have something to do to keep from being lonely.

It didn't take long to spot George, even in that crowd. He was a little heavier, and the lines in his face were a little deeper, but except for that he was the same good-natured fellow I remembered from twenty-two years back. He gripped my hand hard.

"Well, for the love of Mike," he said. "It's sure good to see you again. How are you, anyway?"

I said I was well, and asked about him and his family.

"All swell, swell," he said. And he told me about his wife and children and how they were all getting on.

CONVERSATION AT THE FAIR

We had a good time at the Fair, but they were putting out the lights in the commercial exhibits before we had seen a tenth of it. I asked George if he wanted to see the amusement area, but he said no, he'd rather sit down somewhere and talk. He wanted, he said, to talk about the new war.

We picked the Czechoslovak building: it seemed appropriate. We sat down in the garden at the back and had coffee and sandwiches made of Prague ham.

George was obviously deeply distressed by the news from Europe. He had mentioned it several times as we walked around the Fair grounds, and he came back to it now.

"Gosh," he said, "you know, this new war is terrible, terrible. I was in the last one, and I know what I'm talking about. I never thought they'd do it again. I swear I never did."

Then, after a moment's silence, during which he turned his glass thoughtfully between his fingers and stared at the ice water standing still inside:

"Say," he said, "you're in the business. Maybe you can tell me what happened. Why, when I lost my foot and they sent me back to the States, we all thought it couldn't happen again. And now look at it!"

He made a gesture of despair in the general direction of Europe.

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"What happened?" he asked. "What happened to the League? What happened to collective security? Why did France and Britain ever let that little guy with the mustache get where he is? Gosh," he said, "I'm all confused. You're in the business. Maybe you can tell me what happened."

"I don't know," I said. "It's a long, sad story, and a pretty complicated one. I don't know that I could explain it if I tried."

"Gosh," he said, "I wish you'd have a try, anyway. Honestly, I'd like to know. Take the time when Japan attacked Manchuria, for instance. Some people say that if only that Simon fellow had done what Stimson wanted, none of this would have happened. And then some other people say that it was when Italy attacked Ethiopia that the trouble really began. I don't know. All I know is I'd like to know."

"Well, if you really want me to, I'll see what I can do," I said. "But I warn you, it's a long, sad story."

"You bet I want you to," he said. "Shoot the works. I'm here to listen."

We went over the story of the Peace Conference and talked about the Versailles Treaty, out of which the new war grew. Then we discussed some of the other mistakes of the post-war years: the effort to collect reparations, the Ruhr episode, the failure to close the "gap" in the League Covenant, the failure to give France the security she demanded, the failure to disarm, the economic nationalism that spread like wildfire after 1929, the failure to extend a helping hand to the German Republic before it was too late, the failure to apply sanctions against Japan, the fiasco of the attempt to apply them against Italy, the folly of granting Hitler what the Allies had refused the German Republic.

"YOU OUGHT TO WRITE A BOOK"

When we got through, the waiters were putting out the lights.

"Gosh," George said, "that clears up a lot of things I never understood before. You ought to write a book about it."

"Well," I said, "maybe I will."

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I did. This is it. Needless to say, it is not an authoritative history. At times it reflects one man's opinion about what happened, or the significance of what happened, rather than any generally accepted verdict about it.

Yet the story needs to be told. For now that the Second World War has broken out, one task of those of us who are still far enough away from the shooting to retain our sense of balance is to find out, if we can, why the peace to end war failed. To the achieving of that task this little book is a modest—a very modest—contribution.

II. The Peace to End Peace

Somebody—I think it was in a saucy little book called *1066 and All That*—once called the Peace of Paris the "Peace to End Peace." How right he was we now know.

Broadly speaking, there are just two ways to treat a defeated enemy. You can so weaken him that he will not be able to strike back at you, at least for a long time. Or you can be fair, even generous, hand him back his sword, and say, in effect: "You fought hard and well. There were times, it's true, when we thought you were hitting below the belt. But probably there were also times when you thought we were doing the same thing. Anyway, it's over. Now let's shake hands and forget it."

In other words, you can make a severe peace, or a generous peace based on mutual understanding and trust.

The Peace of Paris was neither. Or, rather, it was both.

TWO WAYS TO END A WAR

Germany was so completely down that it would have been perfectly possible to impose on her the sort of peace which would have made it impossible for her to threaten anyone again for generations. And there are many people who are saying today that that is what ought to have been done. "Well," you hear

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them saying, "we ought to have gone right on to Berlin. We ought to have made the Germans feel the war, realize they were licked, come and beg for mercy. We ought to have split their country up into a lot of little countries that would have been too weak to do anything but beg for mercy. But instead we stopped at the Rhine, and we left Germany just about as strong as before the war began. That was our big mistake."

That is one view, and one possibility. The other possibility was to say that it was time to set up a new world order based on justice and fair play, abolish war for all time and set about learning to live by cooperation instead of competition. In fact, that was the kind of peace that was promised by President Wilson and accepted with reservations—important reservations—by the Allies. But when the time came, it wasn't realized, any more than the completely crushing kind of peace was.

For the peace that was made at Paris in 1919 (Versailles was only one of the treaties worked out there) was neither flesh, fowl nor good red herring. In some respects it was so drastic that it made even some of the Allied delegates gasp and shake their heads. In other respects it was probably the most idealistic peace that had ever been written. Unfortunately, the two kinds of peace mix about as well as fire and water: if you get enough of both together in a small space, the result is first steam pressure and then explosion. And that is exactly what happened with the Peace of Paris.

There were plenty of good reasons why the Peace of Paris was six of one and half-a-dozen of the other. For one thing, the intense hatreds stirred up by the long and extraordinarily bloody war that had just ended made it very difficult for people to see the wisdom of making a just peace. When you have been thinking of the Germans as "Boches" and "Huns" for more than four years, hearing and believing tales of the most atrocious barbarities which they have supposedly committed, when, perhaps, your wife or husband, your son or daughter, your mother or father has lost his or her life through some action of theirs, when your home has been wrecked, your farm destroyed, your hopes dashed, your future forever dark-

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"How can the world make peace with this thing?" asked the *Columbus* (Ohio) *Dispatch,* which printed this cartoon in the spring of 1918.

ened, it is pretty hard to be coldly rational and say, "Now, we must make a just peace."

HANG THE KAISER, MAKE GERMANY PAY

That is why it is so difficult ever to break the vicious circle of devastating wars and vindictive peace treaties. In 1919 there were millions of people the world over who had been hating the Germans and Germany's allies with an intense loathing for

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four long years. Even if the Allied delegates who met in Paris in the spring of 1919 had been coldly rational about the job ahead of them, it is not likely that the people back home would have let them write a wholly generous peace, a peace based entirely on the idea of creating a new world order through the united and willing cooperation of all nations, victorious and defeated alike. If the delegates had tried to write such a peace, there would have been a howl of protest.

As a matter of fact, the situation was even worse than that. For the Allied delegates to the Peace Conference were not themselves free of a wish to impose a hard peace. Some of them had actually made political capital back home by whipping up the desire for a hard peace. The head of the British delegation, for instance, Premier David Lloyd George, had just got his followers reëlected to office by staging an election campaign in which he called for punishing the German "war criminals," hanging the Kaiser, and presenting a reparation bill which would make Germany pay every penny the war had cost the Allies. Small wonder, then, that Paris produced a crushing peace!

SECURITY FOR "LA PATRIE"

There was another factor at least as powerful as these. The French demanded security. Forgetting how often, in the more distant past, their armies had invaded neighboring countries, they remembered only that German armies had invaded France three times in a century: in 1814, in 1870 and in 1914. The last time was the worst of all. The fiercest battles of the World War were fought on French soil. It was France that was devastated, France that was bled white by a struggle which, in the French view, she had not invited. So Frenchmen everywhere were determined on just one thing: it must not happen again. And most of them fervently believed that the way to make sure of that was to humble Germany in the dust, weaken her so she could never rise again.

France had a plan all worked out for this. French armies were to control the Rhine. Great Britain and the United States

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were to become France's allies and help her hold the Rhine. Other allies in Central Europe were to flank Germany on the east. Germany was to be pared down to a considerably smaller country than before the war. Her government was to be crippled. She was to be permanently disarmed. She was to be made to pay an indemnity so crushing that she could not recover from the burden for generations. She was to be deprived of her principal economic resources. At the same time commercial agreements were to be made which would strengthen France and keep Germany weak.

With the French going into the Peace Conference with a program like this, the wonder is that the peace was not much more vindictive than it was.

"SACRED EGOISM"

If the British crossed the Channel to Paris in 1918 with the idea of hanging the Kaiser and making Germany pay, and the French received them with the determination to grind their defeated enemy in the dust, the Italian delegation came with still another purpose. Italy had been an ally of Germany's when the war began. But instead of going in on the side of the Central Powers she had remained neutral for nearly a year and had then joined Britain and France.

Only, however, after she had used her bargaining position to get the British and French governments to sign a secret treaty—the so-called "Treaty of London"—in which they agreed to give her a number of things she very much wanted, including a part of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, then in the possession of Austria-Hungary, and African territory—some presumably at the expense of Ethiopia—in case Britain and France should take over the German colonies. The Italian delegates to the Paris Peace Conference came with the single-minded purpose of collecting this promissory note. No lofty ideals or long-term plans hindered them. They were working solely in the interests of what they quaintly called "sacred egoism"—their name for good old grab.

Other Allied delegations also arrived at the Peace Confer-

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ence to see what they could get. Rumania wanted territory formerly belonging to Hungary and Russia. Greece wanted the north shore of the Aegean. The South Slavs wanted a considerable slice of the Adriatic coast that had already been promised to Italy. Poland wanted Silesia and a corridor to the Baltic. Czechoslovakia wanted the rich industrial region of the Sudetenland. Japan wanted all the former German possessions in the Far East, many of which she had already seized at the outbreak of the war. And so on, and so on.

If these nations, or rather their official delegates to the Peace Conference, had been left to work out the peace unhampered by any ideals higher than the Italian ideal of "sacred egoism," the result would probably have been one of the most drastic peace treaties history has ever recorded. There would have been quarrels over the divisions of the spoils. But there would have been unanimous agreement on taking as much of them as possible. Germany would in all probability have been so weakened that it would have been fifty or a hundred years, instead of twenty, before she was able to threaten anyone again—if, indeed, she could have done so even then.

"VIVE WILSON!"

But there were other, and contrary, forces at work, forces which were strong enough to prevent the Paris Peace Conference from making a purely vindictive peace, and yet not strong enough to compel it to make a peace based wholly on concepts of a new world order.

Long even before the World War began, peace groups in many lands had been working out ideas for an international order that would abolish war and substitute international cooperation for international competition. The outbreak of the war knocked the breath out of these groups for a bit. But they soon recovered their forces and redoubled their efforts. As the war went on, and the numbers of the dead and wounded mounted like the fare in a taxicab meter on a top-speed trip to the moon, some of these groups began to plan for a league of nations that should put an end to such horrors forever.

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By the time the Armistice was signed the plans had not only been developed in detail but had been taken up by President Wilson and given world-wide prominence. And war-weary humanity everywhere had welcomed them as a chronic invalid welcomes the promise of a cure, however improbable. Everywhere—in the defeated nations as well as the victorious—there was a demand for the kind of peace that would abolish war forever and usher in a new order in which war would be as unlikely as the plague.

This demand was so insistent and so widespread that even the most cynical and hardened of the delegates had at least to pay lip service to it. When Woodrow Wilson arrived in France he was greeted as few men have ever been greeted by their fellow human beings. Millions saw in him the savior who had come to release Europe from the toils of power politics and war and set her on the straight, broad road of tolerance, mutual understanding and lasting peace. The wily old French Premier, Georges Clemenceau, was disgusted. "Lloyd George thinks he is Napoleon," he said, "but President Wilson believes himself to be Jesus Christ." Yet even Clemenceau had to bow to the power of the idea which Wilson represented to millions of humble men and women the world over.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

The League, moreover, was not the only thing Wilson stood for. In his "Fourteen Points," which he outlined in January 1918, and which the Central Powers finally accepted as the basis of the Armistice, Wilson called not only for the League but for a peace based on the principle of self-determination, an end to secret diplomacy, freedom of the seas in war and peace, free trade, disarmament and a "free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims." In accordance with the principle of self-determination—which simply means the right of each people to choose the government under which it is to live—he called specifically for the creating of a new Poland, with "a free and secure access to the sea," evacuation of Russia and Belgium, the return to France

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of Alsace and Lorraine, autonomy for the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the evacuation and restoration of Serbia and Rumania, and freedom for the "nationalities now under Turkish rule."

In short, what Wilson stood for was a peace based on justice and understanding. There were to be no old-style annexations. Wherever a boundary had to be changed, it was to be changed in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants concerned. Even colonial transfers were to take the wishes of the population into account. Secret diplomacy, which had led to the outbreak of the war, was to be abolished. Trade barriers, which had retarded economic progress and contributed to the forces making for war, were to be lowered and eventually removed altogether. Armaments were to be drastically reduced. And a League of Nations was to be established in which the old business of alliances, counter-alliances and wars would be replaced by a united effort to keep the peace.

COMPROMISE

Here, then, were the two sets of ideas. On the one hand was the demand to punish Germany and weaken her so she could never do it again. Closely allied with this was the demand for loot. On the other hand was the demand to found a new world order in which war would have no place. Neither set of ideas would down. Neither could be ignored. Yet neither could be satisfied without denying the other. What to do?

The answer, of course, was compromise. Make a peace which punishes Germany severely, yet not as severely as the French demand, not severely enough to weaken her effectively for any long period. Give the victors the spoils they expect, but wrap them in fine phrases. Make a peace which *seems* to establish that new world order the public is crying for, but without going so far that your own country can't go to war if at some future date it thinks it has something to gain by doing so.

Of course, if anyone at the Peace Conference had had time to reflect, he might have realized that by punishing Germany severely for a war few Germans believed their country was

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responsible for, the delegates were jeopardizing the new world order they were pledged to establish. For they were making it almost a certainty that sooner or later Germany would seek, by war if necessary, to regain what had been taken from her. At the same time, by committing themselves publicly in the treaty to the kind of "new order" Wilson talked about and so many people evidently wanted and demanded, they were making it so much the harder to keep Germany weak. For that could only be done by ruthless use of force. And it was just such ruthless use of force that the "new order" was supposed to abolish.

HURRY

But there was no time for calm reflection at the Peace Conference. Everyone there worked under almost inhuman pressure. The atmosphere was feverish. There was a rush to get the job done. It had taken over four years to win the war. But people wanted the peace to be written quickly. Back home the newspapers were writing stinging editorials about the dawdlers at Paris. They wanted the peace to be written in a month.

Thus the peace was not only based on two mutually exclusive sets of ideas. It was also literally thrown together, with little or no thought of how the different sections added up. The result was a peace that was not only filled with contradictions but was far more drastic in sum total than anyone with the possible exception of the French had really intended it to be. But by that time the pressure to get the job done was so great that there was no time to revise and recast. So the monstrosity was presented to the defeated powers almost as it came from the various sections of the Peace Conference.

THE "VERSAILLES DIKTAT"

And it was *imposed* on them with no genuine negotiation at all. Hitler is perfectly right when he calls the treaty with Germany the "Versailles Diktat." It *was* a dictated peace. It was presented to the German delegation without discussion. They were given three weeks to consider it. If they had any com-

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plaints to make, they were told to make them in writing. No oral discussion was to be allowed. At the end of the three weeks the Germans submitted written objections twice as long as the treaty itself. A few changes were made, and then the treaty was submitted to the Germans again. They were given five days to sign or face invasion. At the end of the five days the grace period was extended two more. The Germans signed. They had no alternative. They had no strength left to resist invasion. They signed. "Yielding to overwhelming force," they explained, they signed. What else could they do? What indeed?

Thus was the "new order" ushered in. It was not a very hopeful beginning. In fact, the wonder is that we ever heard anything of it again.

One of the American delegates to the Peace Conference, General Tasker Bliss, made a prophetic statement about the settlement at the time.

"We are in for a low period," he said, "then a high period, then the devil will be to pay all over the world."

It was one of the shrewdest prophecies of the century.

III. The Terms of the Treaties

All told, more than a dozen treaties emerged from the Paris Peace Conference. But of these the most important were the treaties betwen the Allies and the five defeated Central Powers.

If you look at the terms of these treaties, you will see in all of them the marks of the conflict between the two sets of ideas which sought to dominate the Peace Conference. Because of that conflict, for instance, France did not get all she felt she needed to guarantee her security against another German attack. But she got a good deal of what she wanted, though in a form so modified that much of its value was problematical to her. Instead of French armies patrolling the Rhine, for instance, it was provided that a joint Allied army of occupation should patrol the Rhine for a period of five to fifteen years,

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

and that the area should be permanently demilitarized. Instead of Germany's being pared down to a relatively small country, she lost much less territory in Europe than many Germans had feared and many Frenchmen had hoped.

GERMANY RENOUNCES . . . .

Thus Alsace-Lorraine, which Germany had herself taken from France as recently as 1871, was returned to France. On the other hand, the coal mines in the rich mining district of the Saar were handed over to France, and the district itself was placed under an international commission for fifteen years. At the end of that time it was provided that a plebiscite should be held to decide if the Saar should remain under the international commission, go over to France, or revert to Germany. Relatively small districts on Germany's western border were handed over to Belgium after plebiscites which the inhabitants indignantly denounced as unfair. Part of Schleswig, which Prussia had captured from Denmark in 1864, was returned to Denmark. Along her eastern frontier Germany was forced to cede to the newly resurrected state of Poland not only the territory which Prussia had taken from Poland in the partitions of the

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eighteenth century, but also some areas which had never been part of Poland at all. In this latter category was included a considerable part of the valuable industrial area of Upper Silesia. Undoubtedly French influence was at work here, strengthening Poland as much as possible as a potential menace to Germany from the east.

Germany also had to give Poland a "corridor" to the sea—though to do so meant to cut off East Prussia from the main body of the German nation. And it had to allow Danzig to be set up as a "free city" under League guidance, and hand over Memel to the Allies, who apparently intended to give it to Lithuania. It was these territorial losses in the east, more than any other, which patriotic Germans resented. They felt, not without justice, that some if not all of them had been demanded because France wanted to keep Germany weak. Yet more still might have been demanded if France had not been hampered by the new principle of self-determination and the rights of subject peoples.

HAPSBURG COLLAPSE

French influence had its part to play, too, in the other territorial settlements made by the Peace Conference. Between the end of the war and the opening of the Conference, the various nationalities which had been ruled by the Hapsburgs in their conglomerate Austro-Hungarian Empire broke away from that unwelcome rule and set up separate states of their own. These new states the Peace Conference recognized in the name of self-determination. It did not create them; but it did much to settle their final boundaries.

On the whole, it did a very fair job of this. The problem was not an easy one by any means. Various factors had to be taken into consideration. Strategic, economic and historic claims had to be reckoned with as well as those of nationality. In many areas two or more nationalities were so inextricably mixed that no solution was possible on grounds of nationality alone. In others the Conference was confronted with situations which

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could be changed only by force of arms. So the delegates had to do the best they could.

What they did was to fix the boundaries of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece and Turkey. In a few cases the final boundary was left to negotiations between the countries involved or to the outcome of local wars still undecided when the Conference completed its work. For the most part, however, the Peace Conference did the job and did it well.

Perhaps its biggest failure in Central Europe was its failure to realize that, however unjustified the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been from the point of view of self-determination, economically it had been a unit. The so-called "succession" states—the states which "succeeded" to the Hapsburg lands—were not an economic unit—far from it. Probably they ought to have been grouped in a federal union. But instead they were allowed to go each its own way, with the result that each set up tariff barriers against the products of the others, to the common loss of all.

Austria was the most grotesque of the lot in this respect. Before the war Vienna had been the capital of a large empire. After the war it was "an enormous head on the body of a dwarf." Cut off from many of the agricultural and industrial areas on whose trade it had once flourished, it languished and sickened, suffered from hopeless depression and unemployment, and was prevented by the terms of the peace from doing anything effective to save itself. For, owing at least in part to the French insistence on "security," Austria and Germany were compelled to agree in the treaties never to unite without the permission of the League.

But the other new states of Central Europe suffered from the same disease as Austria. And it was of course their failure to unite which enabled Hitler to pick them off one by one: first Austria, then Czechoslovakia, then Poland. If they had been formed into a federal union at the outset, Hitler could hardly have achieved those conquests. It was because of a seri-

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ous omission on the part of the Paris Peace Conference that he was able to do so.

DIVIDING UP THE LOOT

A strange mixture of cynicism and idealism showed up in the colonial clauses of the peace. On the quite unjustified theory that her administration of them had been characterized by cruelty and even brutality, Germany was compelled to renounce her right to all her colonies; and much territory was taken also from Turkey. Later, these vast areas were divided up among France, Belgium, Great Britain, Japan and the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire.

They were not, however, taken over as outright spoils of war. Instead, they were assigned to these victor states as "mandates"—trusts—of the League of Nations. But the actual distribution of the territories was suspiciously in accord with the terms of the secret treaties the various Allied nations had signed during the war years.

Italy, however, was left out of the mandate system, and this was probably another major mistake of the Peace Conference. The Italian delegates to the Conference never quite caught on to the new note of idealism that was being sounded there. They kept demanding what they had been promised in the secret Treaty of London, and more besides, to the horror of Wilson and the embarrassment of the equally grasping but more subtle delegates of Britain and France.

In particular, they wanted Fiume—a district inhabited largely by Slavs. Wilson opposed this. When it became evident that they were not going to get everything they had been promised, the Italian delegates went home. So the Fiume question was left unsettled. But the former German colonies were distributed while the Italian delegates were away—and, of course, none went to Italy. Consequently, in the post-war years, Italy was found among the "dissatisfied" nations, along with Germany and Japan. A more farseeing statesmanship might have assigned Italy at least one of the former German colonies

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HOW GERMANS FELT ABOUT THE "WAR GUILT LIE"



"The old struggle against the war guilt lie must not be relaxed in the new year," commented *Kladderadatsch,* Berlin humorous weekly, which ran this cartoon early in 1931.

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as a mandate, and thus have kept her in the camp of the victors. But here again the basic cause of the trouble was the conflict between two sets of ideas: idealism, and good old grab.

MAKING GERMANY PAY

Not even the colonial clauses of the Peace were as vindictive as the reparation clauses, however. On the grounds that Germany and her allies were responsible for "causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals" had been put by the war, Germany was ordered to pay "reparation" of $5,000,000,000 within two years and the balance, to be determined by an Allied Reparation Commission, over a longer period.

The total bill was eventually fixed at the almost astronomical figure of nearly $33,000,000,000. But this was something like trying to get even with your next-door neighbor by putting typhoid germs in the town water supply. The effort to collect this huge sum (coupled with our own effort to collect the war debts) eventually disrupted international trade the world around, and undoubtedly had a part to play in causing the world depression which began in 1929—and which helped Hitler to power.

DISARMING THE ENEMY

In addition to these, there were also provisions to disarm the defeated states. Germany, for instance, was required to reduce her army to a mere police force of 100,000 men. Her navy similarly was reduced to insignificance. She was forbidden to have any military air force at all, any tanks, or any submarines. All fortifications in the territory west of the Rhine, as well as in a strip fifty kilometers wide east of the Rhine, were to be destroyed, and no German military forces were ever again to enter that territory.

Similar crippling disarmament provisions were included in the treaties with the other defeated powers. They were all represented, of course, as mere preliminaries to a general limitation of the armaments of all nations. But they served the imme-

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diate purpose of weakening the enemy. Thus, like so many other parts of the peace settlement, they satisfied both the "realists" and the "idealists"—though in the end they failed to bring the results either group had expected.

Among the other provisions of the peace settlement which rankled with the Germans were those in which it was arranged that the Kaiser and the German civil and military chiefs who had conducted the war should be tried by the Allies for "a supreme offence against international morality" and "acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." Along with the "war guilt" clause, which formed the basis of the reparation claims, and the "colonial lie," which was used to justify the taking of all Germany's colonies, these "hang the Kaiser" clauses hurt German pride. Fortunately, perhaps, the Netherlands, to which the Kaiser had escaped, refused to surrender him for punishment. In the end only a few "war criminals" were tried, and even they were tried by German, not Allied, courts. Needless to say, they were given light sentences.

All in all, then, it was a pretty vindictive peace. But it was not as vindictive as the French, at least, would have liked it to be. Nor was it as severe as it ought to have been if Germany was to have been kept permanently weak. Furthermore, in fairness to the Allies (and to ourselves, for we also had a hand in writing the treaties, remember), one has to admit that it was probably not as severe a peace as the peace Germany and her allies might have imposed if they had won.

GERMANS MAKING PEACE

We have a good example of what the Germans would have done in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which the Central Powers concluded with Russia in March 1918. That peace, too, was a dictated peace—dictated at bayonet points. It took from Russia a third of her population, a third of her agricultural land, over half of her industries, almost nine-tenths of her coal mines and nearly all her cotton and oil. And it virtually annexed all this outright to Germany. For the army commanders who were the real power in Germany at that time were not allow-

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ing any "nonsense" about "self-determination" to deflect them from their course. Their one thought was the aggrandizement of Germany.

Compared to Brest-Litovsk, the Treaty of Versailles looks tame indeed. It took little more than one-tenth of Germany's population in Europe, about a seventh of her agricultural land, a tenth of her industries and less than half of her coal wealth. For, as we have seen, at Paris the idea of creating a new world order based on justice and understanding interfered again and again with the designs of those who believed that Germany should be forever crippled.

LEAGUE AND WORLD COURT

President Wilson, of course, was not one of those who believed that Germany should be permanently weakened. To many of the provisions of the peace settlement he gave his consent only very reluctantly. He thought they were not only wrong but foolish. But he believed that the mistakes could be corrected through the League. And to make sure that they would be, he insisted on having the Covenant of the League included at the beginning of each of the five treaties as an integral part of the document. There was also to be a Permanent Court of International Justice.

The League was to consist of an Assembly, in which each member state would have one vote; and a Council, in which the Great Powers would always participate and the smaller states would share the remaining seats. In addition, there was to be a permanent Secretariat to assist both Council and Assembly. The Court, on the other hand, was to consist only of judges elected by the League and giving all their time to their work.

Together, it was hoped, the two organizations would make it possible for the nations of the world to modify the peace settlement by agreement as it became necessary and to settle peacefully any disputes that might arise between them.

The provisions of the League Covenant for settling disputes are somewhat complicated, and it's hardly necessary to go into

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the details now. The important thing to remember is that the Covenant of the League did *not* close the door to war altogether: it merely provided that, if they couldn't settle them in the usual way—by diplomacy—the members would submit their disputes to some form of public investigation, and would not go to war over them until three months after that. In other words, it provided for conference and for delay. The loophole this left for war came to be known as the "gap in the Covenant."

ILLEGAL WAR

But what if war started some other way? What about illegal war, for instance? What if one nation invaded another's territory without paying any attention to the provisions of the Covenant? What then?

Not long ago one of the largest and most respected of New York's newspapers wrote in its leading editorial that "the League of Nations members were pledged to fight any country which invaded another's territory."

Nothing could be further from the truth.

In case the war started after the three months' "cooling off" period was over, the members were not pledged to do anything at all. They could assist either party or not, as they saw fit. But in case the war started in some other way—say by a sudden invasion not preceded by any dispute—then they were pledged to apply economic sanctions against the "aggressor." The Council might recommend military action also, but the members were free to accept or reject the Council's recommendation to suit themselves. They were not under any circumstances obliged to wage war in defense of anything.

PEACEFUL CHANGE

All this seems a pretty feeble guarantee of peace, doesn't it? Yet at the time of the Peace Conference, and for a long time afterward, it was hoped that it would prevent war. Much of that hope was placed in Article 19 of the Covenant, which gave the Assembly the power to advise the members to recon-

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sider treaties or alter conditions which might lead to war if left unchanged. Wilson particularly pinned his faith in the ultimate salvation of the new order on this provision.

THE OLD AND THE NEW

Such, in the briefest kind of outline, were the terms of the peace treaties that ended the World War. A strange blend of idealism and cynicism; of the old idea of keeping your defeated enemy weak and the new idea of joining hands in a cooperative effort to build a new international order; of the high principle of the self-determination of peoples and the low purpose of helping yourself to the spoils; of vindictiveness and generosity; of short-sighted selfishness and long-range plans; of hope and of despair.

Such was the peace that was to last forever.

IV. Making Germany Eat Crow

Having made the sort of peace they had, the nations that won the World War could do one of two things in the years that followed. They could sit on Germany with all their weight, do everything in their power to keep her down, and meanwhile prepare alliances and armaments against the off-chance that somehow she might outwit them and once again challenge their hard-won supremacy. For a punitive peace can only be maintained by force. Or they could relieve Germany of the humiliations and the burdens they had heaped upon her and invite her to join them in a sincere effort to create a new world order.

But what they could not wisely or safely do was to try to do both things at once. If they did, they would be running the risk that the "new order" ideas would prevent them from being sufficiently ruthless with Germany to keep her weak. At the same time they would be taking the chance that these same ideas—among which was disarmament—might prevent

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the victors from making themselves sufficiently strong to meet a new German challenge. And—most dangerous of all—they would be running the very grave danger that sooner or later Germany and the other "dissatisfied" powers would decide that the whole "new order" idea was a hoax and would attempt to overthrow it.

That, of course, is exactly what happened. The Allies *did* try to follow both courses at once. The dissatisfied powers *did* decide that the "new order" was a fake. They *did* attempt to overthrow it. And—for the time being, at least—they succeeded.

Why did the victor nations behave as they did? Why didn't they choose one course or the other and stick resolutely to it? Why did they shift nervously from one to the other, so that in the end they realized the benefits of neither, and wound up in 1939 just about where they were in 1917?

The reasons were very much the same as those which prevented the Peace Conference from writing consistent treaties —consistently severe or consistently liberal.

EACH NATION FOR ITSELF

In the first place, each nation had its own national policy, and the various national policies did not mix. France, for instance, continued to be obsessed much of the time by fear of a new German threat and the necessity of gaining security against it. Of course, theoretically, at least, that security might have been obtained through the League. In fact the French supported the League when they thought it was to their interest to do so. But their faith in the League was not strong enough to make them stick to it through thick and thin. Consequently they sought security also through alliances. And when one of their allies—or potential allies—did something which the League ought to have stopped, they were not above using their influence to see that it didn't. In the end they came out with no League and precious few allies.

The British for the most part were not so much concerned about security, especially on the Continent of Europe, as they were with problems of empire, with economic and labor

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troubles, and with a strong desire to return to their island isolation. Germany was down in 1919—so far down that there seemed no need to worry about her for a long time to come. England is a green and pleasant land—a green and pleasant island. What more natural for an Englishman living in 1919 or 1920 than to want to retire to that island and forget Europe and its quarrels? So England kept out of Europe as much as possible and refused to commit herself in advance to any kind of action in European politics until it was too late to save the League and the "new order" by doing so.

Italy too had her own problems, and they were even more pressing than those of France or Britain. After a period of turmoil and upheaval her government fell into the hands of the Fascists, led by Mussolini, and Mussolini dedicated his country to a policy of militarism and conquest, bloodless or bloody, as the occasion demanded. He used the League when it suited his purpose to do so; and when it did not suit his purpose he defied it or ignored it. In the end he killed it, or helped to kill it.

Soviet Russia likewise pursued her own national interests as she saw them. For a long time she was excluded from the League and, for that matter, from all European affairs. Later she supported the League. During that time, in fact, she was perhaps its most enthusiastic supporter. But when the League had been discarded and she herself badly snubbed, she resumed a policy of naked power politics.

Japan, like Italy, pursued an opportunist course. In the twenties, under a liberal government, she seemed to cooperate with the League and to be a convinced supporter of League ideas. But in 1931 she attacked and invaded Manchuria, defying the League and the opinion of the world. When the League condemned her action, she simply resigned from it.

As for the United States, having entered the war, she withdrew from the peace, pursuing a policy even more isolationist than that of Britain. She refused to join the League or share in the experiment of building a new world order. She refused to have anything to do with the Versailles Treaty. But she

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CHANGING SIZE OF GERMANY'S POPULATION



insisted on collecting her war debts without being willing to accept goods for them—a policy that disturbed the world economy and helped Hitler to power.

Finally there was Germany. Her aims were to regain the equality that the Treaty of Versailles had taken from her; throw off the burden of reparations; get the foreign troops out of the Rhineland; rearm; "adjust" her eastern frontiers; get back her colonies. She would have been delighted to join the League at the outset. But she wasn't invited. By the time the other nations were ready to treat her as an equal it was already too late: Hitlerism was on the way. After it had arrived, every concession was taken as a sign of weakness, every concession led to new and bolder demands, every concession only further strengthened a Germany now apparently bent not merely on regaining what had been lost in 1919 but on subjecting other nations to much the same kind of humiliation and punishment to which Germany had been subjected earlier.

In addition to the Great Powers, there were also the lesser powers. And while they were often more willing than the Great Powers to subordinate their own national interests to what they believed to be broad international interests, they too were unable to agree on a common policy for peace and

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reconstruction in the post-war years. Even democratic Czechoslovakia failed at times to display the kind of willingness to cooperate with friends and former enemies alike that was needed if the "new order" was to succeed.

OTHER CAUSES OF CONFUSION

Besides these varying and often conflicting national interests, there were also other factors which made it difficult if not impossible for the nations to pursue a consistent common policy after the war. There was, for instance, a lack of agreement in almost every country under the sun on the question of what policy ought to be pursued. In other words, in every democratic country there were people who pushed the government to pursue a League policy; at the same time there were other people who clamored for a policy contrary to League principles. Most governments yielded to whichever pressure group seemed stronger at the moment. If the winds of public opinion shifted, so did their policies. And if the pressure was about equal from both sides, their policy was apt to be no policy at all.

This factor of shifts of opinion in democratic countries was particularly effective in preventing cooperation between Great Britain and France. Several times it happened that France had a liberal, pro-League government when Britain had a conservative, anti-League one, or vice versa. Consequently cooperation between the two countries was made doubly difficult.

Then, too, there was the economic nationalism which swept the world, more particularly after the depression which began in 1929, but also before that time. Nation after nation erected tariff barriers and established quotas to keep out imports. Nation after nation gave subsidies and used other devices to stimulate exports. The result, of course, was failure, for your imports are my exports, and your exports my imports. Yet the policy continued. And where there was so much economic competition political cooperation was difficult if not impossible.

Still another factor contributing to the general confusion was the widespread fear of communism which resulted from the

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Russian revolution of November 1917. That revolution shocked not only people with money, who knew that a similar revolution in their own country would mean that their wealth would be confiscated, but also millions without much to lose by such a revolution except their democratic liberties.

The first reaction was an attempt to "restore order" by sending in armies of intervention. When that attempt failed, many governments refused to "recognize" the Soviets, and those which did recognize them distrusted and feared them. Even after Russia had joined the League, there was a general tendency to see an ulterior motive in her every move.

What it all boiled down to was that cooperation between capitalist countries and the government of a country whose one political party was dedicated to the destruction of capitalism the world around was difficult if not impossible.

THE "LOW PERIOD"

When you consider all these things, you're hardly likely to be surprised that the early post-war years weren't exactly years of sweetness and light. General Bliss had predicted a "low period," and General Bliss had been only too right. The low period began the day the Versailles Treaty was signed. It lasted more than four years.

Far from ending war, the Peace Conference only put an official stop to the large-scale hostilities. Little wars continued for some time.

In 1919 the Italian writer and adventurer, Gabriele D'Annunzio, invaded Fiume, which the Peace Conference had decided to make part of Yugoslavia. In 1919-20 Soviet Russia was beset by "armies of intervention" from without and counter-revolutionary forces from within, both bent on destroying the Communist dictatorship. In 1920 Russia attacked Poland, driving all the way to Warsaw in a month. But Poland, aided by France, counter-attacked, and the war ended the next year with Poland holding considerable slices of Russian territory. In the fall of 1920 a Polish general seized Vilna from Lithuania. (By these two military operations Poland

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acquired much more territory than the Peace Conference had given her—territory, incidentally, in which Poles were in the minority.) From 1920 till the autumn of 1922 Greece and Turkey waged bloody war in Asia Minor. From 1920 until 1923 civil war raged in Ireland. In 1923 Lithuania seized Memel from the French forces which were holding it until the victor nations decided what to do with it. And in 1923 Italy shelled the Greek island of Corfu, causing a number of civilian casualties.

Plainly, the war to end war had not achieved immediate success!

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE SYSTEM

On the diplomatic front, too, the situation was anything but encouraging. Disappointed in her hopes of getting as "strong" a peace as she had looked for, France had sought to secure herself against another German attack by treaties of alliance with Great Britain and the United States. Two such treaties were actually signed at the Peace Conference. They provided that in case of unprovoked aggression on Germany's part, Great Britain and the United States would come to the aid of France immediately.

But the U. S. Senate would have nothing to do with the Franco-American treaty, and—probably unwisely—the British took advantage of this fact to invoke a clause in their own treaty with the French which provided that it should not come into operation unless the treaty with the United States did also.

Disappointed again, the French turned elsewhere for allies against the menace they feared most—the menace of a new German attack. In 1920 they signed a treaty of alliance with Belgium. In the same year a French military mission helped the Poles beat back the Russians, and in the following year Poland likewise became an ally of France. Throughout the spring of 1922 France tried to get Great Britain to renew the guarantee contained in the earlier Franco-British treaty. Failing in that, she continued her campaign for allies in Central Europe. By the opening of 1924 Czechoslovakia had joined

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the French camp. Rumania and Yugoslavia followed suit a few years later. Meanwhile, Rumania had allied herself with Poland against Russia, and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania had formed an alliance, known as the "Little Entente," against Hungary. These two groups of allies were in turn linked to France through the Franco-Polish and Franco-Czech treaties of mutual assistance.

"EINKREISUNG"—ENCIRCLEMENT

All this business of alliances, of course, had little or nothing in common with the principle of collective security. It was the old, old game of balance of power over again. And it made the Germans feel that they were being "encircled" by a ring of strong military states determined to hold the frontiers established by the "Versailles Diktat." Which was not far from the truth.

If the frontiers in question had been the western frontiers, not many Germans would have minded much. But they were also the eastern frontiers, and so hardly a German failed to resent the French encirclement policy.

Arguing that France might not have embarked on the encirclement policy if she had got the British and American guarantees, some people say that one of the earliest mistakes of the post-war years was the failure of the United States and Britain to ratify the guarantee treaties with France. It was this failure, they say, which forced France to ally herself with Poland and other Central European states, and it was those alliances which prevented peaceful revision of Germany's eastern frontiers. It was also those eastern alliances, they continue, which helped to keep Germans' nerves on edge long after the war ought to have been forgotten, and thus helped to prepare the Germans psychologically for Hitler.

ADVENTURE IN THE RUHR

The Germans' discomfiture was given a real basis in fact by the French and Belgian occupation of the German industrial section known as the Ruhr. That tragic episode in the sad history

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of post-war Europe was closely linked with the effort to collect reparations from Germany. But in reality it was an attempt on the part of France, under the premiership of a bitter enemy of Germany, Raymond Poincaré, to realize the hopes of smashing Germany forever that had been disappointed at the Peace Conference.

The essence of the tragedy was the fact that the Germany of the post-war years was not the Germany of the Kaiser, but a new, well-meaning and hopeful young cub of a republic. The Allies had refused to sign a peace with the Kaiser's government. So the Kaiser's government had gone, and in its place a new and more genuinely democratic government had been established. In July 1919, only a month after the Versailles Treaty was signed, that government adopted the "Weimar Constitution." Named after the city in central Germany in which it was signed, this constitution was and still is considered a model of its kind. Despite the crushing burdens of Versailles, many thousands of Germans hoped that the Weimar Constitution would form the basis of a lasting democratic republic. Many students of the history of post-war Germany think that, with half a chance, it would have.

Not even half a chance was given it, however.

TO THE ALLIED POWERS, DR.

As we have seen, the Allied Reparation Commission fixed Germany's total reparation bill at around $33,000,000,000. To pay it, and meet its other expenses, the German government would have had to take an average of almost half of every German's income indefinitely. In the circumstances, it isn't surprising that Germany hesitated to agree. But an ultimatum brought her to her knees. On May 11, 1921 she accepted the Allies' terms.

For the next year Germany met her reparation payments on the nail. But the effort caused a dizzy decline in the value of the German currency. So in 1922 the German government requested a moratorium on all cash reparations payments. This request split the Reparation Commission wide open. France was for refusing the request, evidently believing that a com-

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A GERMAN DIG AT BRITAIN



John Bull to Michel (Germany): "I assure you, Michel, there can be no question of encirclement." ——From *Kladderadatsch*, Berlin, 1936.

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plete German collapse would further her program of keeping Germany permanently down. Great Britain, on the other hand, had swung around to wanting to help Germany recover from the war.

Britain's motive was not unselfish. Before the war Germany had been her best customer. Now that the war was over, industrial depression and unemployment were gripping British industry and trade, and the British government was hoping that Germany might soon be able to resume her old place as Britain's best customer and thus help to relieve the economic depression at home. But if Germany were to do this, she would have to be given a chance to recover economically. This the British sought to help her do.

THE RESULTS OF THE RUHR EPISODE

The French won the argument. The Reparation Commission found Germany in default, and early in 1923 French and Belgian troops entered the Ruhr, heart of German industry. Unable to resist by force, the German government of the time elected to oppose the invasion by refusing to cooperate with the French and Belgian authorities in any way. This was probably a mistake. For the policy of passive resistance only made the situation worse, not only for France and Belgium, but also for Germany and the German people. There were strikes and lock-outs; there was unemployment and hunger. And the mark fell even more rapidly than before: by the middle of 1923 it was practically worthless. With it had gone the savings of thousands and thousands of thrifty Germans, who now found that what was once a sizable bank account would no longer buy even so much as a single loaf of bread.

Late in September 1923, Germany surrendered. France and Belgium had won the battle. But in doing so they had also won the lasting enmity even of those Germans who had previously been willing to give them the benefit of the doubt. Germans high and low, Nazi and non-Nazi, still remember the Ruhr today. I ran into a lot of them the last time I was in Germany. One man I remember particularly. He was a doc-

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tor, and we had a long talk on a train going from Regensburg to Dresden. He was not a Nazi, but he attempted to justify everything Hitler had done on the ground that it was all to prevent a repetition of the Ruhr episode!

But that was not the only effect of the Ruhr episode. It also split France and Great Britain wide apart, and virtually ended the "cordial understanding"—the so-called "Entente Cordiale" —which had existed between them since 1904. It would be a long time before they would be cooperating closely again.

BRAVE NEW WORLD

While Europe was taking these steps in the direction of making the peace even more severe than it was before, it was also taking the first faltering steps toward realizing in practice the "new order" the peace settlement had sketched out. The two organizations which were supposed to have charge of this development, the League and the World Court, were set up very early: the League in 1920, and the Court in 1921.

Even before the League held its first meeting, though, it had been dealt a body-blow by the decision of the United States not to join it. Some of the men who had had a hand in creating the League had hoped that those loopholes in the Covenant the diplomats had been so careful to insert might in time be plugged. More particularly, they had hoped that, in time, the League might actually grow into a world-wide alliance against aggression, and that League members might eventually accept the responsibility of fighting any state, member or non-member, which resorted to war in violation of the Covenant.

The decision of the United States not to join just about ended those hopes. Britain, which had been pretty wary of accepting League obligations anyway, now made the most of the loopholes. The result was that by the time it held its first meeting, in January 1920, the League was already even weaker than it had been on paper. Nor was it made any stronger by the decision not to invite Russia or the defeated powers to join it.

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EARLY LAURELS FOR THE LEAGUE

In spite of these handicaps, however, the League had some successes even in the early days—though the successes were overshadowed by the other and more spectacular events of the time. Its principal job, of course, was to prevent war, and it had a chance to try its strength in that direction in the first year of its existence. In that year it settled a scrap between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands. And before many more years had passed it had also found peaceful settlements of controversies between Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia, between Yugoslavia and Albania over their common border, and between Turkey and Iraq over Mosul.

LEAGUE FAILURES

On the other hand, the League's efforts to intervene in the quarrel between Poland and Lithuania over Vilna were not so successful. After the Peace Conference Vilna had been assigned to Lithuania, but in 1920 the two countries came to blows about it. The League arranged an armistice, but during the armistice a Polish general seized the city. After various attempts to settle the question, the League threw up its hands and drew a boundary which recognized the Polish conquest. When Lithuania attempted to reopen the question, the League turned deaf ears to her pleas. Thus Poland was allowed to remain in possession of the spoils until Russia took them away from her in September 1939. During almost all that time, Lithuania continued to consider herself at war with Poland and refused to accept the League's decision. Here, obviously, the League had failed.

The League also failed in its efforts to solve a conflict between Italy and Greece in 1923. In August of that year four Italians, including a general, were murdered on Greek soil. Italy immediately sent Greece a stiff ultimatum. Greece, however, declined to accept some of Italy's demands, and appealed the case to the League. But Italy bombarded the Greek island of Corfu, killing a number of civilians who were certainly entirely innocent of blame in the affair. When the League tried to mediate, Italy growled and showed her teeth. So the

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League tossed this hot potato to the diplomats of the Great Powers, and these gentlemen solved the problem by granting Italy very nearly all her demands. Faced with the choice of accepting the decision or being invaded by her more powerful neighbor, Greece capitulated. In due time Italy evacuated Corfu.

These early tests of the League are significant, because they show that there was no new magic in the League method after all. When both parties to a dispute were willing to accept a peaceful solution, then the League could find a peaceful solution. When a strong party was unwilling, then the League was stumped. It had to choose between accepting the situation as it found it and refusing to accept it. But in either case the situation remained the same. For the League had no force it could use to change it.

THE THORNY PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

The weakness of the League was high-lighted by what happened when it first tackled the thorny problem of disarmament. The peace treaties had declared that if peace were to be maintained it would be necessary to reduce armaments "to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." In ordinary language, that meant that each country was to disarm down to the point where it had just enough armed strength to defend itself and carry out any military action it might agree on in the League.

As early as 1921 the League Council appointed a commission to study the question of reducing armaments. But the commission soon decided that it would be well-nigh impossible to get nations to disarm until they were made to feel "secure." In other words, disarmament was the cart; the horse was security. So in September 1923 the commission submitted the draft of a "Treaty of Mutual Assistance."

If this treaty had gone into effect it would have obliged every state which was a member of the League to go to the defence of any member which was attacked *provided* the attacked mem-

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ber had reduced its armaments in accordance with whatever disarmament plan the League had adopted. In other words, the treaty would have plugged the "gap" in the Covenant and guaranteed the security of every nation willing to cooperate in disarmament. The treaty also provided that the League Council was to decide who the aggressor was, and should render its verdict within four days.

If this treaty had been generally adopted, the whole subsequent history of the world might have been very different. As a matter of fact, no fewer than sixteen states, including France, indicated their willingness to adopt it. But others—including Great Britain and the United States—were not willing to adopt it. The reason was that they were not willing to undertake the responsibilities involved. Instead of agreeing to cooperate in an effort to keep the world at peace and compel all nations to settle their disputes peacefully, they preferred to sit back and wait until their own safety was directly menaced. So the treaty of mutual assistance went the way of all vain hopes, and from that time on the cause of disarmament looked pretty dark.

WASHINGTON HORSE TRADE

Not that further efforts weren't made. Only that, in the light of what happened to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, they didn't seem to have much chance of success. In fact almost the only successful effort at disarmament that was ever made was made at the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

The Conference was called by President Harding because after the war the United States, Great Britain and Japan had embarked on a naval race that many people thought would lead to war if it wasn't stopped. The Conference got rid of that danger, and also settled a number of political questions in the Pacific area and the Far East. It limited the tonnage of the "capital ships" (battleships) and aircraft carriers of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to a ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67. In other words, to every five tons of battleships and aircraft carriers in the U. S. navy Great Britain was also to have five, while Japan was to have three and France

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"UNEASY STREET"



——From the *Evening Standard*, London, 1933.



"Better make it wide enough to hold yourself too, big boy."
——From the *Evening Standard*, London, 1932.

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and Italy each one and two-thirds. The five great naval powers also agreed not to build any new capital ships for ten years.

Another treaty signed at the Washington Conference outlawed poison gas and provided that submarines would not sink merchant ships without warning. Then in the famous Nine Power Treaty the great naval powers joined four other nations in agreeing to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of China. Still other treaties signed at the Washington Conference froze the status of the fortifications in the Pacific Ocean area by binding the signatories not to enlarge existing fortifications or build new ones.

Except for this, however, disarmament fared as badly as most other aspects of the promised "new order" in the first post-war period—the period General Bliss had said would be a "low" one. The General had certainly been right. By the time the period came to an end France had just about succeeded in smashing Germany completely, the German people were thoroughly exasperated, Britain had quarreled with France and was trying to help Germany back on her feet, Russia and the United States had become absorbed in their own problems, and Italy had traded democratic government for the noisy militaristic dictatorship of an ex-socialist named Benito Mussolini.

Of course there was also a profit column in the ledger, but so far there were very few entries in it. The League had been set up at Geneva and had had a number of minor successes. It had also had some failures. Of these the most momentous was the failure of its first effort at disarmament. By a complicated process of diplomatic horse-trading the Washington Conference had achieved a modest step toward limiting the size of the world's great navies. But by the time the leaves began to fall in the autumn of 1923 there were still precious few signs anywhere to encourage believers in the ultimate victory of the "new order."

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V. The False Dawn

Within two years the picture had changed almost beyond recognition, and General Bliss's "high period" was in full swing. One by one the little local wars which had persisted after the big war was over came to an end. One by one the remaining quarrels over frontiers were settled or allowed to die down. The question of German reparation payments was "solved" by an international commission on terms which were satisfactory to France and which Germany had at least accepted of her own free will. The French and Belgian forces were withdrawn from the Ruhr. Much progress was made with treaties for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Depression and unemployment gave way to prosperity and boom. Germany entered the League. Germany and France learned to live together as neighbors. There were few wars and few threats of wars anywhere. In fact, it actually seemed as though the "new order" had arrived, and that Utopia was just around the corner.

To a very large extent this amazing change was due to the influence of four men. Those men were Gustav Stresemann, Foreign Minister of Germany from 1923 until his death in 1929; Edouard Herriot, who succeeded Raymond Poincaré as Premier of France in 1924; Aristide Briand, French Foreign Minister in half-a-dozen Cabinets from 1925 to 1930; and Ramsay MacDonald, England's Prime Minister in 1924 (and again from 1929 to 1935).

It was Stresemann who started Europe off in the new direction. By the time he came to office, Germany's policy of passive resistance to the occupation of the Ruhr had just about ruined the country. Stresemann pursued the opposite policy. Instead of openly opposing the Allies, he believed that Germany should conciliate and appease them. He realized that when you are outnumbered and outclassed you stand a better chance of getting what you want if you ask politely for it than if you try to force people to give it to you by threatening to behave badly if they don't. Among the things Germany wanted right away were reduction of the reparation payments, evacuation

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THE MAKING & UNMAKING OF THE VERSAILL

Heavy lines in both maps show boundaries drawn by Versailles treaties and
settlements (1919–1924). Shaded areas in the first map show territorial
before Versailles; those in the second map show territorial divisions as of



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of the Ruhr and eventually of the Rhineland, a place in the League of Nations, equality in armaments. By his policy of conciliation Stresemann won all but the last of these in the six years between 1923 and 1929.

THE DAWES PLAN

Almost as soon as he took office, Stresemann admitted that passive resistance had failed. A little later he asked to have an impartial commission study Germany's capacity to pay reparations. The result was the appointment of the Dawes Commission. Headed by an American, Charles G. Dawes, the commission did not alter the total reparation bill but reduced the annual payments. At the same time the Ruhr was to be evacuated, the old German mark was to be left in the wastebasket where it belonged, and a new currency was to be issued, based on a substantial loan from the Allies. All this was known as the "Dawes Plan."

If Poincaré had remained in office, the fate of the Dawes Plan might have been dark. But Poincaré was defeated early in 1924, and Herriot became Premier of France in his place. Unlike Poincaré, Herriot was a "man of good will" who saw eye to eye with Ramsay MacDonald, Britain's Labor Prime Minister, on the need for improving the relations between Germany and the Allies. Shortly after Herriot took office the Dawes Plan was accepted. It came into operation on September 1, 1924 and remained in operation until it was replaced by the Young Plan in 1929. During all that time Germany met her payments on the dot. Meanwhile, as a part of the bargain, the last French and Belgian troops withdrew from the Ruhr in 1925.

THE LOCARNO AGREEMENTS

The Dawes Plan was a great triumph for Stresemann's policy of conciliation. It was followed almost immediately by an even greater one. That was the complicated series of agreements signed at Locarno in the autumn of 1925. Realizing that the French policy of keeping Germany weak had been due to fear of a new German attack, in 1925 Stresemann offered to

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conclude a treaty with France in which each nation would guarantee never in any circumstances to attack the other. As bait he offered also to keep the Rhineland demilitarized forever.

After much exchanging of notes, the French rose to the bait. But when the agreements were finally signed they had been broadened to include Great Britain, Italy and Belgium as well as Germany and France. In the agreements all five nations guaranteed the frontiers between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium. The three countries immediately involved also agreed not to attack or invade one another's territory except in self-defense, and to settle all their disputes peacefully. Included in the arrangement were arbitration treaties between Germany on the one hand and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the other. There were also treaties in which France and Czechoslovakia and France and Poland agreed to help one another in case either should be attacked by Germany. Finally, it was understood that Germany would be admitted to the League, and that the whole lot of treaties would come into effect only when she did.

Described this way, the Locarno treaties are a mouthful. But what they boiled down to was another diplomatic horse trade in which Germany voluntarily renounced the territory she had lost to France and Belgium in the World War, as well as her right ever again to fortify the Rhineland (or, for that matter, send her army into it), in return for a French agreement to renounce the dream of controlling the Rhineland and never to repeat anything like the occupation of the Ruhr.

For the Germany of that day this was a big stride toward the equality she had lost when she signed the Versailles Treaty. Furthermore, she achieved it without surrendering any of her claims to the territory she had lost in the east, for in the arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, Germany specifically exempted disputes arising *before* Locarno. In other words, even Stresemann refused to agree never to go to war over Germany's *eastern* borders. Those borders were one of the many "sore spots" which remained in Europe in spite of Locarno and all the other successes of the "high period."

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OTHER GERMAN SUCCESSES

Locarno was not the last notch Germany cut on her rifle in this period. On September 10, 1926, she took her place in one of the permanent seats of the League Council. By the next year the so-called "Inter-Allied Commissions of Control" which had been established by the Versailles Treaty to supervise German disarmament had all been abolished. Furthermore, throughout the prosperous years of the twenties American and European bankers vied with one another in lending money to the German government, German municipalities, and German business concerns. Between 1924 and 1931 Germany got the huge sum of $3,500,000,000 in this way. And it was largely thanks to this avalanche of foreign money that she was able to meet her reparation payments so regularly.

THE YOUNG PLAN

One of Stresemann's greatest victories was the Young Plan. The Dawes Plan had reduced and regularized the annual reparation payments. But it had not touched the total, which remained around $33,000,000,000. And the Dawes Plan payments hardly exceeded the interest on this sum, so that even under the favorable conditions of the Stresemann era Germany was making little or no progress toward paying off the principal of her debt.

In order to solve this problem, in September 1928 the nations concerned appointed a new commission, under another American, Owen D. Young, to decide what the new total should be. The Young Plan, which this commission submitted in June 1929, fixed Germany's total reparation bill at just about half what it had been before, and arranged to have the whole thing paid off in fifty-nine years. It also set up the Bank for International Settlements to handle the complicated business of collecting the reparation payments from Germany and distributing them to the nations which were entitled to get them. As part of this further effort at reconciliation it was agreed that the Allied armies of occupation in the Rhineland should withdraw altogether in 1930—five years ahead of schedule.

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The Young Plan went into effect as of September 1, 1929. If it hadn't been for the unforeseen economic collapse which began with the panic on the New York Stock Exchange the following month and soon spread around the world, the Young Plan might have endured a long time. For while it imposed heavy burdens on Germany, those burdens would not have been too heavy for Germany to bear if only prosperity had continued. Even as things turned out, the Young Plan marked another important step toward restoring Germany to a position of equality among the nations. Its chief faults were that it was not generous enough and that it came too late.

WHAT STRESEMANN'S POLICY ACHIEVED

By the time the golden age of Stresemann and Locarno came to a close, Germany was well on the way to recovering from the effects of the war and the peace. Reparations were on a more solid basis. The foreign armies had been withdrawn from German soil. The foreign commissions of control had also been withdrawn. Germany had been admitted to the League. She had obtained from France a solemn promise never again to invade German soil in order to impose French will by force. And she had achieved all this without renouncing her "right" to settle the question of her eastern borders in her own way when, as and if a favorable opportunity should come along.

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE HIGH PERIOD

But these were not the only steps that Europe took in that period toward revising the vengeful aspects of the peace settlement and trying to vitalize its "new order" side. For one thing, the League continued to have success in settling threatening disputes between small nations. A particularly nasty mess the League straightened out was the quarrel between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925. Greek troops had actually invaded Bulgaria when the League stepped in, and a Balkan war seemed imminent. But the League won new laurels for itself by solving the controversy and persuading both sides to accept its solution and stop shooting.

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TREATIES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Much progress was made, too, with treaties renouncing war and substituting peaceful methods of settling disputes. A great many nations, for instance, signed treaties in which they agreed to set up permanent committees ready to conciliate any quarrels between them they could not settle by diplomacy. Still other treaties signed in this period went further. They provided that all disputes between the signatories that could not be settled by direct negotiation should first be submitted to conciliation commissions. If the commissions did not succeed in finding solutions satisfactory to both sides, legal disputes were to be referred to the World Court and all others to arbitration. As decisions of the World Court and the awards of arbitrators are considered to be legally binding, this type of treaty left no loophole for war at all. Scores of such two-party treaties were signed, even by some of the Great Powers—France, Italy and Germany, to be specific. But none was signed by Japan or the United States, and very few by Great Britain. Evidently some people still wanted to keep a free hand to settle their disputes in their own way.

This "no-exceptions" type of treaty was broadened into a general convention open to all comers in the so-called "General Act," recommended by the League Assembly in 1928. The terms of the General Act were approximately the same as those of the separate two-party treaties: they left no "out" for war at all. But it is one thing to make a "no war" agreement with a particular nation—often a far-away one—with whom you can't imagine ever having an important difference anyway. It is another thing entirely to make such an agreement with everybody. Consequently the General Act never got as far as the individual treaties; by 1935 only twenty-two nations had signed it. Clearly war was still recognized as the final arbiter even in the "high period."

THE PACT OF PARIS

In spite of their reluctance to sign the General Act, however, almost every country in the world sooner or later adopted

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the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris. Concluded August 27, 1928, the Kellogg Pact condemned war as a method of solving international disputes and renounced it "as an instrument of national policy" (but not for self-defense). It also contained the sweeping provision that the nations which signed it would never attempt to solve any disputes whatever that might arise between them except by peaceful means.

The Kellogg-Briand Pact was the most complete and far-reaching attempt to "renounce" war that had ever been made. Nor was it the effort of just a few states interested in preserving the *status quo*, either. It was signed by practically every civilized state in existence. At the time it was concluded people high and low believed that it had ended war forever. Only later did they realize that it left the door open to "hostilities" on a vast scale so long as nobody called them "war." In fact, the Kellogg Pact produced not peace but a new kind of war—the undeclared war. But in 1928 it seemed to millions that it had ushered in the millenium.

The Dawes Plan, the Locarno agreements, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Young Plan—these and many other developments (not by any means the least of which was the greatly improved atmosphere of international relations, especially Franco-German relations) lent a lot of weight to the belief in those happy days that the vengeful phase of the peace was over and that in its place had come a steady and determined advance toward the new ideas of justice and fair play in the relations between nations, toward the peaceful settlement of disputes, the eventual renunciation of war under all circumstances, and the realization of the final goal of genuine collective security.

STRAWS IN THE WIND

But there were contrary indications, too, even in that hopeful era. They were not played up as much as the others. Often they were quite hidden from public view. When they were noticed, most people tended to minimize them. Yet they were there. And shrewd prophets could—and sometimes did—point to them as evidence of a gathering storm.

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There was, for instance, the fact that disarmament continued to be as far from realization as ever. Efforts were made to crack the problem, but they met with no success. Now as before, the reason was that some nations—like France, for instance—just would not disarm until they had been given iron-clad guarantees of security against attack, while other nations—like Great Britain and the United States—would not give such guarantees.

One of the reasons many nations had given for declining to sign the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (p. 43) had been that it didn't define the aggressor, but left it to the Council of the League to decide who the aggressor was. They were afraid, they said, that if they disarmed, and were then attacked, the Council might stall, in which case they would find themselves abandoned to the none-too-tender mercies of the attacker. What was needed, they said, was a definition of aggression that would obligate the other nations to come to their aid immediately, instead of waiting till the Council gave the word.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

In order to meet this objection, in October 1924 the League Assembly adopted the "Geneva Protocol." This treaty provided that all so-called "legal" disputes would be submitted to the World Court, while all non-legal, or political, disputes would be arbitrated. It defined war as a "criminal act," and stated that any nation which resorted to war would be automatically branded an aggressor and would immediately suffer all the sanction penalties of the League Covenant.

Here, then, was an air-tight, hair-trigger guarantee, sufficiently iron-clad to satisfy even France. It meant that any nation which agreed to limit its armaments in accordance with whatever plan the League might adopt could count on the instantaneous help of all the League members in case it were ever attacked. If Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain, who cooperated with Premier Herriot of France in introducing this treaty, had remained in office, it might have been adopted. Then the story of disarmament might have been different.

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A GERMAN NATIONALIST ATTACK ON BRUENING



Michel (Germany): "What have you brought me?"
Bruening: "What we always bring you when we go on a trip: a silver 'Nothing' and a gold 'Wait a little longer.'"
——From *Kladderadatsch,* Berlin, 1931.

But MacDonald's Labor Cabinet was replaced by a Conservative government under Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin while the fate of the Geneva Protocol was hanging in the balance. And Baldwin and his Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, turned thumbs down on the proposal. Apparently they did not want to have Britain undertake any such sweeping obligations as the Protocol would have imposed on her. Apparently they didn't like the idea of agreeing to arbitrate disputes in which Britain might be involved. Anyway, they said "No," and their "No" killed the Protocol.

With it died the whole cause of disarmament, though at the time few recognized the symptoms of death, and diplomats continued to work over the corpse for years, much as a life guard will work over the body of a drowned person long after everyone else has given up hope. In 1926, for instance, the

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League appointed a preparatory commission for a general disarmament conference, and the commission busied itself in preparing the draft of a convention that was destined never to be signed. When, four years later, the League adopted the draft and decided to call the conference, many of the knottiest technical problems were still unsolved. But that was of little importance compared to the fact that the biggest question of all, the question of collective guarantees, had never been answered. Until it was, any attempt to achieve disarmament was putting the cart before the horse.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

In fact, the last successful effort at disarmament that was made was again in the naval field. You remember that the Washington Conference had limited battleships and aircraft carriers, but had failed to agree on any limits for lighter craft (p. 44). The Powers tried again in London in 1930, and this time they had some success. France and Italy refused to accept parity with one another, but Great Britain, the United States and Japan not only agreed on limiting the total tonnage of their cruisers, destroyers and submarines but also extended the limits on their battleships and aircraft carriers another five years—that is, until December 1936. But that was the end of disarmament.

Nor was the failure of disarmament the only sign that even in the days of Locarno and the Kellogg Pact the powers had not really abandoned the old ways of power politics. The French, for instance, continued to build their ring of alliances around Germany. They made a treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1924, one with Rumania in 1926, one with Yugoslavia in 1927. In 1925—the very year in which the Locarno agreements were concluded—they began to build that immense belt of fortifications known as the Maginot Line. Evidently even in the heyday of the "new order" the French believed in keeping their powder dry.

The truth is, of course, that behind the mountain of treaties, protocols, and conventions that was piled up in this period, behind the amber floodlights of the "Locarno spirit" and the soft

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music of the Kellogg Pact and the Young Plan, power politics was still alive and kicking. Its antics were hidden from the audience, to be sure, but an occasional dull thud or the sound of a struggle now and then revealed its presence to all who were keen enough to recognize the signs. Or, to put it another way, it was the set of ideas that went by the name of "new order" that dominated the scene in the later twenties. But the other and older ideas were there, too, working beneath the surface. Later they would come out from hiding, and the two sets of ideas would be revealed, side by side. In fact, the existence of these two sets of ideas would cause endless confusion in the years to come, and would have disastrous consequences both for the victors and for the vanquished.

VI. Sowing the Wind

If you've ever seen a tropical hurricane, you'll have some idea of what happened to all the elaborate structure of peace in the years after 1929.

When it first begins to blow, you don't realize what's ahead. The autumn leaves rustle down the street, the sky grows suddenly dark, the trees bend and sway. Then it begins to rain. All at once you realize that your house is creaking, that the rain is coming in through the window-frames, that the trees in the back yard are bending almost to the ground. As you look out the window, you see the first of them go down. Perhaps, with a sickening crack, it breaks off a few feet from the ground. Or perhaps it simply goes on bending until it is lying flat, with half its roots thrusting crazily in the air. Other trees look like boys struggling to pull their sweaters up over their heads, bending and swaying and struggling to get loose.

By this time the wind is really angry: it slaps the side of your house with all the fury of madness. You can see the walls move now, see new cracks running across the ceiling, hear the rain water blowing through the window-frames. You think you'd

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better get out before it's too late. But when you open the door the gale is blowing so hard that all you can do is crawl to the nearest open space and lie flat.

When it is all over, the extent of the destruction is almost unbelievable. For miles around, not a house or a barn or a tree is left standing. The storm has cut a swathe across the countryside like the swathe a reaping machine cuts in a field of ripe wheat. It will take many years of hard work to build up again what the wind and the water have destroyed.

THE DEPRESSION

Something very like a hurricane hit the world in the years between 1929 and 1933. Economists are still arguing about the causes of it. But there is general agreement that it was one of those economic depressions which have plagued the Western, industrial nations at more or less regular intervals for over a hundred years now. And there is also general agreement that it was made much worse by the war and the economic dislocations caused by the war and the reparations and war debts payments which followed the war.

Prices fell. The demand for goods declined. Factories closed. Men were thrown out of work. Prices fell further. The demand for goods declined more sharply. More factories closed. More men were thrown out of work. And so on, and so on.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

Faced with these new and gigantic problems, governments everywhere took steps which were designed to improve conditions at home, but which often only made them worse. Everywhere there was a tendency to adopt measures of "economic nationalism"—high tariffs and import quotas to keep out foreign goods and "protect" the home market; export subsidies to increase exports to other countries; currency devaluations to lower the prices of exports in foreign markets and thus gain additional advantage over competitors.

But two or more can play at these games as well as one. So what happened was that such measures were taken by one

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country after another, and the cumulative effect was to choke the channels of foreign trade. By 1932 the value of world trade was scarcely more than a third of what it had been in 1929. And it was still going down.

Typical of the confused thinking of the time was our own Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, adopted in 1930. By raising our tariffs on hundreds of articles to the highest rates that have ever been imposed in our history, this act made it virtually impossible for the war debts to be paid except in gold. But the debtors didn't have enough gold to pay them with! Yet we were both amazed and angry when the nations which owed the war debts decided it was better to default than go completely broke.

To be sure, a few efforts were made to stem the tide of economic nationalism and start it flowing in the opposite direction. One such was Briand's scheme for a European union. Convinced that the nations of Europe were strangling one another to death, Briand in 1930 boldly suggested a kind of United States of Europe. His chief purpose was to find some way for closer economic cooperation. But the Germans thought they saw in the Briand plan a new form of the encirclement they so greatly feared, and other nations had equally convincing reasons for rejecting it.

Another, more modest, effort to reverse the direction of events was the plan put forth by Germany in 1931 for a customs union with Austria. So far as anyone could tell, the plan meant only that the two countries would abolish all tariff duties on one another's goods. But the French saw in it a disguised form of the "Anschluss"—or political union—between Austria and Germany which they had forbidden at the time of the Peace Conference. So they vetoed it. Once again narrow national interests triumphed over the common good.

CRISIS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

By June 1931 the economic situation in Europe was little short of desperate. In that month the great Austrian Creditanstalt Bank closed its doors. This in turn caused a panic in Germany. In fact, Germany was now almost as badly off as she had been

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at the worst point in the inflation period. She had between five and six million unemployed. In her attempts to meet her reparation payments she had increased taxes to the maximum, had reduced government expenditures drastically, and had cut the salaries of her government officials high and low. The German people were suffering acutely, discontent was growing rapidly, and more and more voters were flocking to the standards of the National Socialists.

In order to avert a complete collapse and possibly a bloody revolution, not only in Germany but elsewhere, in June 1931 President Hoover proposed a one-year moratorium on reparations and war debts payments. France, whose financial position was still relatively strong, and whose determination to collect the reparations at all costs was also strong, hesitated. But the other countries ganged up on her, and she finally yielded. Out of deference to France it was agreed that the moratorium would not in any way change the terms of the Young Plan, and that at the end of the year Germany would resume payments as though nothing had happened.

THE STANDSTILL AGREEMENT

It was not, however, enough to save the situation in Germany. By August it had become necessary to suspend payments on German private debts as well. The so-called "standstill agreement" by which this was done renounced for six months all payments of interest and principal on loans extended to German banks and business houses. But as Germany's principal creditors were the English banks, the standstill agreement meant that the English banks now had large sums frozen in Germany. This in turn produced a new panic, for depositors all over the world, fearing that the English banks might fail, withdrew their funds. And as they did not want to run the risk of accepting bank notes whose value would drop in case the banks failed, they took gold instead. In September 1931, unable to stand the drain any longer, Great Britain "went off the gold standard." In other words, she refused any longer to redeem her paper currency in gold.

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Many other nations soon followed suit. But the crisis brought down England's Labor government and replaced it with a "National" government which very soon became a frankly Conservative one. This fact was to have an important bearing on the future of the "new order."

Meanwhile, in Germany things had gone from bad to worse. By February 1932 Germany's unemployed numbered well over six million. There were frequent armed clashes between the Nazis, the extremists of the Right, and the Communists, the extremists of the Left. Against mounting odds, Chancellor Bruening was trying to continue the Stresemann policy of carrying out the terms of the Versailles Treaty and meeting the reparation payments.

But Stresemann had had successes to show for the sacrifices his policy had made necessary: the Dawes Plan, Locarno, Germany's entry into the League, the Young Plan, the evacuation of the Rhineland. Bruening too needed successes, needed them desperately if he and the very principles of democratic government he stood for were to survive.

Specifically, he needed a clean-cut end to reparations—which the moratorium had only postponed—and equality in armaments, either by the disarmament of the other powers or the rearmament of Germany. For the Nazis and the other jingo nationalists were calling for these things and taunting Bruening for his failure to achieve them. They were calling Bruening's Cabinet the "hunger government," claiming that it could do nothing but impose further burdens on the German people, urging the people to turn it out. And the Nazi flood was rising fast. The Weimar Republic was in dire peril. Would the powers rescue it before it was too late, or would they abandon it to its fate?

EUROPE MISSES ITS LAST CHANCE

The answer was not long in coming. The long-postponed Disarmament Conference had finally met in Geneva in February 1932. As before, France and her allies had insisted that security must come before disarmament, while the other powers had

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refused to grant France the only kind of security she considered adequate: guarantees of military aid in case of attack. So the conference was deadlocked from the start. But it had one chance: it could still save Germany from the Nazis. Bruening arrived in Geneva in April, explained the situation to the British, American and Italian delegates, won their consent to granting Germany equality of armaments in principle. But the French representative, André Tardieu, pretended to be too ill to see Mr. Bruening, and so poor Bruening had to go back to Berlin empty-handed. He realized as he went that his failure would mean the end of his government.

It was the same way with reparations. Almost everyone but the French had realized that reparation payments had probably been ended forever the day Mr. Hoover announced his moratorium. But it would have greatly strengthened Bruening in his fight to preserve the German Republic if the powers had openly acknowledged that fact and had written reparations off their books. For that would have meant another victory for the Stresemann-Bruening policy. The French, however, were unwilling to forego reparations payments. Largely owing to their opposition, a conference originally scheduled to meet and consider the subject in January 1932 was postponed until June 1932. And in June Bruening was already out of office. In June it was already too late! The Nazis were on the way in.

FIASCO IN LONDON

It was in order to follow an equally short-sighted national policy that we torpedoed the World Economic Conference which met in London the following year. The principal task before the conference was to stabilize foreign exchange and put a stop to the repeated currency devaluations that were strangling foreign trade. But in the middle of the conference President Roosevelt sent a message which effectually stopped any effort to reach an agreement. The result was that the conference accomplished practically nothing.

Small wonder that, with the nations finding it so difficult to cooperate on the economic plane, where cooperation, you

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might have thought, would have been relatively easy, this dark period should have been marked also by a rapid retreat from the principles of collective security.

JAPAN CHALLENGES THE NEW ORDER

The first big test of collective security came in the winter of 1931-32, when Japan attacked Manchuria, in flagrant violation of the Covenant of the League, the Nine Power Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. By rights, her action ought to have brought League sanctions into action against her, for she was clearly the "aggressor." But no sanctions were ever invoked. Instead, Japan got a slap on the wrist.

What happened was this. China appealed to the League, and the League sounded us out, asking first if we would take part in a commission of inquiry to find out what had actually happened. We said no, sorry, we couldn't. But we did send a delegate to Geneva to sit in on the League meetings on the subject. When we were asked if we would cooperate in imposing sanctions on Japan, we again said we couldn't. That was the end of sanctions so far as Japan went. Probably the other Great Powers were just as well pleased, anyway. The British, for instance, had never been keen about the idea in the first place, and now some of them were probably hoping that if Japan were given a free hand in Manchuria she would soon find herself at war with Soviet Russia, whom these conservative Britishers continued to fear and hate.

In any case, a little later, when our Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, tried to get the British government to join us in condemning Japan's invasion as a violation of the Nine Power Pact, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, displayed an intense lack of interest in the whole idea. After trying several times, Mr. Stimson gave it up as a bad job. "I finally became convinced," he later wrote, "...that for reasons satisfactory to it...and which I certainly had no desire to inquire into or criticize, the British government felt reluctant to join" in such a declaration.

As for the League, it appointed a commission (in which we

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took part after all), the commission found Japan guilty, the League adopted the report, and Japan resigned from the League. The only penalty Japan suffered was that we and a good many other countries refused to "recognize" her conquest. Otherwise she went scot free. And she not only kept what she had taken but soon took more. Evidently there was no collective security in the Far East.

"HEIL HITLER!"

The story of the Disarmament Conference is equally negative. Having missed its chance of helping Bruening, the conference continued its futile debate for another two years, off and on. But its prospects of succeeding were soon reduced to the vanishing point. For on January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler at last succeeded to the Chancellorship of Germany.

Almost immediately there was unleashed on the unsuspecting German people a terror the like of which Western Europe had not seen for decades. Dozens of the Nazis' political enemies were murdered, hundreds were beaten up, thousands were thrown into concentration camps. One by one the opposition parties disbanded "voluntarily" or were forcibly suppressed. By the end of the year the Nazis were the only political party left in Germany. With their opponents had disappeared most of the civil liberties and democratic rights the German people had won from their rulers in a whole century of reform.

This was bad enough, but, from the point of view of the Allies, Nazi foreign policy was worse. Bruening and Stresemann had carried out the policy of fulfilling the terms of the Versailles Treaty and using the good will thus created to get the Treaty modified gradually by agreement. Hitler denounced the Treaty as a "Diktat." But it would be necessary to use force, or the threat of force, to shake it off, he believed. Germany had already rearmed secretly to some extent before he came to power. Almost from the day he assumed the Chancellorship she began to rearm on a vast scale. In six years she had spent the vast sum of $36,000,000,000 on equipping an army, a navy and an air force that were to prove the terror of Europe.

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Yet in the first months of their rule the Nazis seem to have been unsure of themselves. It is just barely possible that, if Great Britain and the other nations immediately concerned had realized the dangers of the situation and had consented to give the French those military guarantees on which they had always insisted, some kind of agreement on disarmament could have been reached. In that case Germany would have had no excuse to rearm and might not have done so.

But Britain was as unwilling as ever to extend her obligations, and so the old debate continued. In October 1933 Hitler rocked the Disarmament Conference to its foundations by announcing that Germany would withdraw from both the conference and the League. After that the conference took on the qualities of a wake. In June of the following year it came to an ignominious end. In December of the same year Japan gave notice of her intention to denounce the Washington Naval Treaty, which accordingly expired on December 31, 1936.

So disarmament was declared legally dead. Once again separate national interests had prevented effective international action.

HITLER'S "DYNAMIC" FOREIGN POLICY

Once Hitler had taken his decision to rearm, he lost no time in attempting to carry out his new "dynamic" foreign policy—the policy of destroying the whole peace settlement of 1919 by force or the threat of force. In July 1934 the Austrian Nazis, acting apparently under orders from Germany, attempted to take over the government of Austria. They succeeded only in murdering Austria's diminutive Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss. But to all who were still inclined to give the Nazis the benefit of the doubt they clearly revealed the kind of methods the "new" Germany could be expected to employ in its foreign policy. This time, to be sure, those methods had not worked. Later they would be more carefully and craftily employed. Later they would work.

Finally, on March 16, 1935, Hitler took his first step in open

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defiance of the Versailles Treaty. On that day he announced that Germany would increase the size of her army from the 100,000 stipulated by the Treaty to 500,000, and that she would also introduce compulsory military training, which the Treaty forbade. The reason, he said, was the Allies' failure to disarm. Germany could no longer submit to an inferior status. If equality was not to be granted her, she would take it.

Here, then, was an open challenge, the first serious threat the peace settlement had encountered in Europe itself. In Nazi Germany the Great Powers of Europe—Great Britain, France, Italy and Soviet Russia—were faced with a new and incalculable menace. From the moment Hitler revealed his intention of repudiating the treaty settlement, they knew—or ought to have known—that their close cooperation along an agreed path would be necessary—even vital—if the peace settlement they had achieved at such great cost were not to be overthrown.

Specifically, there were just two policies they could pursue. Those policies are our familiar friends. One was the policy of the balance of power. The other was the policy of collective security. Either one would have made sense. It would have been perfectly sensible, for instance, to rearm like mad, strengthen existing alliances and form new ones, just to stop Hitler. It would also have been sensible—perhaps more sensible—to abandon the old balance of power program and announce that thereafter guaranteed collective security—with Germany participating if she would—was the order of the day. What would prove fatal would be to continue to pursue both policies at once.

EUROPE'S BABEL OF VOICES

Yet that is just what the Great Powers of Europe did. They continued to pursue opposing and conflicting policies just as they had before. For a very long time the British government clung to the idea that by making concessions to Germany they could strengthen the "moderates" in Germany and correspondingly weaken the "hot heads." For a while—until the death in October 1934 of their brilliant Foreign Minister, Louis

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Barthou—the French resolutely pressed on with their alliances. After Barthou's death, however, their policy began to waver. Italy showed no interest whatever in collective security, but was willing at first to join a balance of power coalition against Germany. Later she abandoned the coalition and joined the other side. Soviet Russia joined the League and pressed repeatedly for genuine collective security. But all her pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears. In the end, she gave it up as a bad job and set about picking up what she could of the fragments of Eastern Europe.

PREVENTIVE WAR?

The confusion made any effective action impossible. At the very outset of the Hitler regime there was the possibility of launching a "preventive" war. Such a war would, of course, have been justified by every consideration of power politics. But the noble ideas of collective security, peaceful relations between nations, and the self-determination of nations ruled it out. After all, it would have been undisguised aggression against a state which had not yet attacked a neighboring state. The French and British people would never have stood for it. So it was discarded.

ENCIRCLEMENT OR APPEASEMENT?

Alliances, of course, were a different matter. It was the French policy to build up an ever widening system of allies against Germany. In 1935 even the U. S. S. R. joined the French system, signing a treaty of mutual assistance with France in May of that year. But the British were lukewarm to this policy at the time. Evidently they felt (quite rightly) that it was like a red rag to the German bull, and that their own policy of concessions and "appeasement" was less dangerous.

Actually, of course, it was far more dangerous—unless linked with genuine collective security, which it was not. For every concession only whetted Hitler's appetite and led to demands for more and more, until the point was reached where to grant

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any more would have been tantamount to giving Hitler the mastery of Europe, while to refuse to grant more meant war.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY?

The policy that would have commanded the most enthusiastic support in both Britain and France, and the policy that might still have saved the day—the policy of collective security—was the very one which the governments of those two countries were the most reluctant to follow. The British government was still unwilling to undertake commitments to defend far-away countries. Probably it also hoped that if war came, the war would be between Germany and Russia, and that Germany might defeat Russia and put an end to communism there. Certainly Hitler made very effective use of his claim to being Europe's only bulwark against the "Red menace." As for the French government, it had more faith in alliances than in the untried notions of collective security. Probably it too was not free of the hope that Germany and Russia might some day fight it out, leaving Western Europe to sit back and watch. At any rate, the French could do little or nothing without the backing of the British.

There were other reasons for inaction, too. Deluded perhaps by his own eloquence, and blind to the grim realities behind the pretty façade that had been erected in the late twenties, Ramsay MacDonald had allowed British arms to decline to the point where Britain was actually unable to support a strong policy with force or the threat of force. Nor had Mr. MacDonald's successors been any more realistic. Even in 1935 they hesitated to begin to rearm, though at that time it might still have been possible for them to keep ahead of Germany if they had. As for the French, they never made the mistake of disarming, but they did have many internal troubles to contend with: strikes, Cabinet crises, the decline of the franc and so on. These troubles made it just as difficult for them to take a strong line as it was for the British.

Thus when Hitler announced rearmament, in March 1935, Britain, France and Italy protested, but took no action. The

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League, too, condemned Germany, but likewise took no action. A little while later British, French and Italian statesmen met at Stresa, in Italy, and formed a united diplomatic front against further German action. At about the same time the French concluded their mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia.

PERFIDIOUS ALBION?

Having joined France and Italy in condemning Germany's repudiation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, the British then turned about and connived with the Germans in repudiating the naval clauses. In June 1935 they made an agreement with Germany in which they said it would be all right with them if the Germans built a navy up to 35 per cent of the tonnage of their own. They also agreed to let Germany build submarines, forbidden her in the Treaty of Versailles.

In explanation the British said that the Germans would build a navy anyway—had already begun, in fact—and that it was better to have that navy limited than to have no limit on it at all. But why Britain didn't act through the League, or at least consult the French before going ahead, is a question which has never been answered.

DEATH AGONY OF THE NEW ORDER

This failure to pursue a common policy towards Germany was disastrous. But equally disastrous was what happened when Italy attacked Ethiopia, later the same year.

The attack was no surprise. Even before the World War Britain and France had recognized Ethiopia as an Italian "sphere of influence." In 1896 Italy had made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the country. But her troops were overwhelmingly defeated at the battle of Adowa. In 1906 Britain and France went so far as to give Italy a free hand in Abyssinia. In 1915, as we have seen, they signed a treaty with Italy promising her, among other things, "compensation" (which would presumably have been, in part, at the expense of Ethiopia) in case they took over Germany's African colonies.

It was not, however, until 1935 that Italy was ready to press

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her claim. Her actual preparations, however, began as early as 1933. By December 1934 she had found an excuse for invasion in a frontier incident. All through the winter of 1934-35 and the spring and summer of 1935 she poured troops and supplies into her East African colonies, from which they could launch an attack upon Ethiopia whenever Rome should decide the time was ripe.

ITALY ATTACKS ETHIOPIA

The decision came in October. In that month the Italian forces invaded Ethiopia. Ethiopia appealed to the League, and the League lost no time in declaring Italy the aggressor and deciding to impose sanctions. But after that it lost much time. It was a month before any sanctions went into effect. And even when they did, there were no sanctions on iron, coal or oil. Yet these were undoubtedly the very raw materials which Italy needed most if she was to carry on her war against Ethiopia to a successful conclusion.

When the League delegate from Canada proposed oil sanctions, one excuse after another was found for postponing action. Meanwhile Italy pushed ahead with her conquest. When, on May 5, 1936, Mussolini's army triumphantly entered the Ethiopian capital, no sanctions on iron, coal or oil had yet been invoked. They never were. Thus in the only effort the League ever made to bring an aggressor to terms, it was the aggressor, not the League, which won.

BETRAYAL IN GENEVA

The reason was that familiar conflict between power politics and collective security we have been following all along. The French wanted Italy to help them against the growing menace of Nazi Germany. In January 1935, Pierre Laval, who was then Premier of France, had gone to Rome, where he had had a long conversation with Mussolini. Despite subsequent denials, we now have good reason to believe that Laval secretly agreed to let Mussolini take Ethiopia in return for the Duce's promise to help France against Germany. In other words, he

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made a "deal" which was as cynical a violation of the solemn obligations of the League Covenant as could be imagined.

The British made no such deal. But they did appoint a secret commission to determine whether Italian occupation of Ethiopia would constitute a serious threat to the safety of the Empire, and the commission decided that it would not. The British Foreign Office therefore seems to have made up its mind to let Mussolini go ahead.

For British statesmen were apparently still unwilling to believe that Great Britain should uphold the principle of collective security. Apparently they still thought that the wiser policy was to permit nations like Japan and Italy to let off steam in Asia and Africa, and not to interfere unless British interests were directly involved. Furthermore, Mussolini kept saying that oil sanctions would mean war, and the British armed services, but especially the British navy, were in no condition to face war in 1935 and 1936. Finally, there was the fact that in April 1935—just after Hitler announced German rearmament—Britain had joined France and Italy in forming the "Stresa Front" against Germany. Thus Britain was not merely interested in avoiding war with Italy. Like France she was actively interested in keeping Italy friendly.

WHY SANCTIONS AT ALL?

Why, then, were any sanctions applied at all?

For two reasons. One reason was that the smaller nations in the League pressed for them, and pressed so hard that Britain and France had to give way. The other reason was that the British and French people demanded them. So French and British statesmen paid eloquent lip service to the principles of the Covenant while secretly doing much to see that those principles were not effectively carried out.

In the midst of the discussion of sanctions on oil they cooked up the so-called "Hoare-Laval Plan," which would have given Mussolini about half of Ethiopia if he would only call off his war. News of the plan leaked out, however, and it raised such a rumpus in Britain and France that the British

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and French governments had to repudiate it. In Britain the public outrage was so great that Foreign Secretary Hoare, who sponsored the plan, had to be sacrificed. After that Britain, represented by its new Foreign Secretary, dapper Anthony Eden, plugged for oil sanctions. But France continued to hold out against them. Just as the struggle was getting to be really tense, Hitler sprang the first of his series of dramatic surprises. In the excitement all thought of imposing oil sanctions on Italy was dropped. Thus Britain and France raised the hopes of the whole world that at last the League was going to stop aggression, only to dash those hopes cruelly when, owing to their duplicity, the League failed to stop the aggressor. Thus, too, considerations of power politics prevented the "new order" from working, while at the same time the "new order" ideas prevented the powers from playing power politics effectively.

BETRAYAL BOOMERANGS

The result was about as bad as it could be. Instead of sticking by France, Italy joined Germany in a loosely defined union known as the "Rome-Berlin Axis." As for all the other League members (a good ninety per cent of whom had faithfully cooperated in the sanctions experiment), not clearly understanding at the time exactly what had been going on behind the scenes, they decided that the failure had been due to some imperfection or other in the wording of the Covenant. In this belief Britain and France, anxious to cover up the facts, encouraged them. So for a while there was much talk about "revising" the Covenant. But the stark truth was that Britain and France had knifed the League and lost Italy to boot. They had killed collective security in the vain hope of winning a doubtful ally against Nazi Germany. And they had lost the ally because they had been forced to make an effort—even if half-hearted—to apply the principles of collective security.

AFTER THE HURRICANE, WHAT?

Thus in the six years after 1929 the policies of the Great Powers had resulted in sweeping away most of the achievements of the

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post-war years. The nations which won the World War had not succeeded in the policy of keeping Germany weak; and they had not succeeded in building up the alternative of genuine collective security, either. Reparations were a dead letter. The Allied armies of occupation were out of the Rhineland. The liberal German Republic had been replaced by a ruthless militaristic dictatorship which was bending every effort toward rearming on a gigantic scale. At the same time, collective security was no more. Disarmament had given way to a new arms race. The Nine Power Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been reduced to meaningless gestures. Not for a long time—if ever—would it again be possible for France and Britain to rally the other nations around them in applying sanctions against an aggressor.

Truly, the straddling policy had proved disastrous. In their attempt to pursue both courses at once—the course of power politics and the course of collective security—the powers had fallen between two stools. They had not only not achieved very much in either direction: they had actually lost much of what little they had achieved in both directions. They had sown the wind. It would not be long before they would be reaping the whirlwind.

VII. Reaping the Whirlwind

In fact, they began reaping the whirlwind even before the Ethiopian business was over. In March 1936 the Peace of Paris began cracking up right in the heart of Europe.

HITLER REOCCUPIES THE RHINELAND

Encouraged, no doubt, by the League's failure to stop Italy, and realizing that Italy was too deeply involved in Ethiopia to take any steps against Germany, Hitler pounced. On Saturday,

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March 7, 1936, while Britain, France and Italy were still in a wrangle over the question of oil sanctions, and many people believed that the quarrel was leading them to war, Hitler denounced the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno agreements and ordered the German army into the Rhineland.

The news of Hitler's action struck Europe and the world like a bolt from the blue. Here was what the French had feared most. Here, from their point of view, was what Versailles and Locarno had been designed to prevent. Here was Germany moving troops right up to their border. If Hitler should be allowed to get away with it, he would doubtless proceed to fortify the Rhine country, and soon the French would no longer be able to hold over him the threat of invasion from the west in case he started some "adventure" or other in the east. If Hitler were allowed to get away with what he had done, there would be nothing left for France and Great Britain to do but rearm as fast as possible and prepare for the day when the war would start again.

HE GETS AWAY WITH IT

By all the rules of power politics, what Britain and France ought to have done was issue Germany an ultimatum demanding that she withdraw from the Rhineland or face war. Germany was still too weak to resist the combined forces of British and French arms, and if Britain and France had threatened her with invasion she would have had to back down.

The French, as a matter of fact, apparently wanted to do just that, but they couldn't take the chance unless Britain backed them up, and the British were not willing to back them up. Once again the new ideas of self-determination and respect for the sovereign rights of other nations prevented France and Britain from playing the power politics game effectively. In Britain, at least, there was at the time a good deal of feeling that Germany was justified in what she had done, if not legally, then at least morally. For hadn't she merely reasserted a right which every other sovereign nation already enjoyed, the right to defend her own territory?

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

"Came Up Over Night."
——From the *Daily Express*, London, 1936.

Unable to persuade Britain to join her in issuing an ultimatum to Germany, France and her allies demanded League sanctions instead. Here, however, the moral position of the French was very weak, for they had just been preventing the League from using effective sanctions against Italy. Now they wanted effective sanctions against Germany. The French, accordingly, were caught in their own net.

In the end nothing happened at all. The League condemned Germany's action, but took no steps to undo what had been done. The Locarno powers also condemned the German move, but they too did nothing to reverse it. Thus Adolf Hitler got away with the first of a series of surprise moves with which, in three years, he was destined not only to scrap almost the last vestiges of the Versailles Treaty but also to raise Germany to a pinnacle of power beyond anything of which she had been able to boast in 1914.

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THE SONG IS ENDED

With the effectiveness of the League as an instrument for keeping the peace reduced to nothing, or next to nothing, and with Germany fortifying the Rhineland and rearming at an ever increasing pace, it was now incumbent upon France and Britain not only to arm themselves but to acquire as many allies as they could if they were to prevent Germany from going any further. For Europe had now returned to a contest for power, and woe to the side which lost a trick or slept while the other side worked. In this new, uneasy Europe there would be no room for sentiment or ideals: everything—territory, populations, industries, sources of raw materials—would be so many chips in the gigantic poker game the Great Powers were playing. The "new order" was definitely over.

BUT THE MELODY LINGERS ON

Rearm the British and French proceeded to do. In fact, Hitler's action in reoccupying the Rhineland started the greatest arms race the world had ever seen. By 1938, the nations of the world were spending about 17 billion dollars—or nearly seven times as much as they had spent in 1913—on arms of all sorts. And the curve was getting steeper every day.

What the British and French failed to do, however, was play an effective power politics game. For they were still hampered—as Germany was not—by those noble ideas of self-determination and the like which had had so much to do with the peace settlement and the history of Europe in the post-war years. They were also genuinely horrified at the prospect of another great war, and genuinely desirous of staving off that ultimate disaster if they possibly could. Furthermore, both countries, but especially France, were going through difficult times. France was having trouble with the franc, with unemployment, and with strikes. Britain was struggling to catch up in an armaments race in which she had fallen far behind.

As for Russia, she was in the throes of a crisis in which she is said to have shot scores of her army officers and to have imprisoned or shot a great many civilians besides. Finally, there

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was the fear of communism, which continued to make effective cooperation between Britain and France on the one hand and Russia on the other exceedingly difficult.

For these and other reasons weakness and indecision continued to be the characteristic features of British and French policies for three more years.

SPANISH INTERLUDE

In July 1936, when civil war broke out in Spain, and Germany and Italy openly intervened on the side of the rebels, it was widely believed that their purpose was to establish themselves on the Pyrenees, in which case France would have been almost completely surrounded by potential enemies. By the rules of power politics, France and Britain probably ought to have insisted that Italy and Germany withdraw their support from the Spanish rebels. But partly because they feared that a strong stand might involve them in a war for which they were not yet ready, and partly, perhaps, because they believed what Italy and Germany kept saying—namely, that they were saving Spain, and so all Western Europe, from communism—France and Britain agreed instead on a policy of non-intervention. Despite the fact that, by international law, they had every right to sell arms and ammunition to the friendly Spanish government, they voluntarily renounced their right to do so.

Italy and Germany also joined the Non-Intervention Committee, but actually they "non-intervened" in Spain with a vengeance. Italy, for instance, sent something like 70,000 regular troops to fight in the rebel army, and Germany sent bombing planes and aviators and lent much help with supplies and technicians. Though she too joined the Non-Intervention Committee, the Soviet Union sent help to the Spanish government. But thanks to German and Italian aid, and thanks also to the fact that the Spanish government was cut off from the arms which, under international law, it had every reason to expect to be able to buy, the rebels eventually won.

If things had turned out as Hitler and Mussolini evidently intended, the Spanish rebel victory might have had very seri-

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ous consequences for the French and British. Actually, Britain and France were saved—if they were saved—not so much by their own smartness as by pure luck.

GOODBYE TO GENEVA

As for collective security, if there was anybody who believed that it had survived the Ethiopian fiasco, he was relieved of his illusions when Japan renewed her war on China, in July 1937. Once again China appealed to the League. The League condemned the Japanese action. An international conference meeting at Brussels in November also condemned Japan under the terms of the Nine Power Treaty. But neither group took any action.

Finally, pressed by China, the League decided that its members were free to apply economic sanctions against Japan if they wanted to. This, of course, was a frank confession of bankruptcy, for obviously no nation was going to penalize itself by cutting off its trade with Japan unless others agreed to do likewise. Actually, no nation imposed any sanctions against Japan at all, and the whole idea of League sanctions and collective security soon disappeared into the limbo of lost causes.

The rest of the story is familiar to us all. Italy and a number of other states withdrew from the League. Belgium resumed her neutrality—the opposite of collective security. Many other countries announced that they no longer considered themselves bound by the obligations they had assumed when they joined the League. Italy and Germany cooperated diplomatically in the Rome-Berlin Axis. Later this cooperation was extended to Japan. Britain tried repeatedly to pry Italy loose from Germany; she also tried to "appease" Hitler by making one concession after another to his demands. As for France, she could pursue no other policy than to follow the British lead. But "appeasement" did not serve to stave off the threatened war after all. It only served to whet Hitler's appetite, convince him that the democracies were "decadent," and encourage him to demand more and more.

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In March 1938, Hitler seized Austria. Not a step was taken to prevent him from doing so; not a step to force him to give up the fruits of the conquest. From the point of view of power politics, of course, the union of Austria with the Reich constituted a danger to France and Britain, for it not only strengthened Germany but to a large extent it encircled Czechoslovakia—a French ally. That was why it had been forbidden in the peace treaties; and that was why even the customs union proposed in 1931 was vetoed. Here was something much more dangerous than a customs union. Why, then, wasn't it stopped?

Partly because Britain and France weren't willing to go to war over it and partly because, once again, considerations of power politics gave way to other and more generous ideas. The Austrians, after all, were Germans, and perhaps it was only right that they should join their fellow Germans in the Reich. Furthermore, any attempt to stop Hitler would have meant war, and war was to be avoided, even if the cause for which it would be fought was just. Probably, too, the British and French felt that their own rearmament, which began later than Germany's, had not yet reached a point where they could afford to challenge the Reich. Anyway, they did nothing but protest. Germany kept Austria.

MUDDLE AT MUNICH

It was much the same way with Czechoslovakia in September 1938. There, too, there were Germans—the so-called "Sudeten Germans"—living outside the borders of the Reich. Hitler staked his claim to the areas in which they dwelt on the basis of self-determination. On that basis there could not be much doubt as to what should be done: a majority of the Sudeten Germans wanted to go over to Germany.

But the Paris Peace Conference had had very good reasons for giving those Germans to Czechoslovakia. There was a strategic mountain range in the Sudeten area. As long as that mountain range was within the Czech border, Czechoslovakia could easily be defended against Germany. If, on the other hand, the range was handed over to Germany, it would be

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almost impossible for the Czechs to prevent the Germans from moving into their country whenever they wanted to. Furthermore, since the Peace Conference the Czechs had fortified the Sudetenland with a chain of giant fortresses, underground casemates, and the like, similar to the French Maginot Line. Thus in 1938 the Sudeten border was even more essential to Czech security than it had been in 1919.

The real question therefore was, which was more important, self-determination, or strategy? Of course, as everybody knows, the British plumped for self-determination (and appeasement), and it was under their pressure (the French tagging along as usual) that, at the Munich Conference late in September 1938, the Czechs were persuaded to give the Sudetenland over to Hitler.

Yet if in the minds of the British and French ministers the principle of self-determination won out against considerations of power politics at Munich, the settlement was no triumph for the new ideas, at that. In the first place, it was a dictated settlement: in the end the Czechs were not consulted. They were simply told to hand over or face the consequences alone. Thus the Munich settlement was in reality a victory of power politics for Germany, for it was Hitler's threat to resort to force which brought the issue to a head. In the second place, far from being the result of the combined deliberations of all the states of Europe, as, according to the Wilson principles, it ought to have been, the Munich settlement was made by Britain, France, Italy and Germany. Even Russia was excluded —with serious consequences to Britain and France later. So here again the old ideas and the new were jumbled up together, and the result, from the Allies' point of view, was still another diplomatic boner.

EXIT CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia was now at Hitler's none-too-tender mercy. Six months later, in March 1939, he took the rest of the now defenseless country. Almost immediately thereafter he stuck a pistol in Lithuania's back and demanded the handing over

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"SICK EUROPE"



In this German comment on Czechoslovakia, the doctors are saying, "Acute appendicitis! It ought to have been removed in 1918."
——From *Kladderadatsch*, Berlin, 1937.

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of Memel. The next month Mussolini annexed Albania. The very foundations of the peace settlement of 1919 had now been blasted away.

Confronted with these acts of naked aggression the British and the French at last woke up to the fact that they had been tricked. Realizing that Germany's real purpose was not the relatively limited one of uniting the Germans of Europe into a single nation, as Hitler had said at Munich, but the far more ambitious one of dominating Central and Eastern Europe, they immediately set about the task of preparing for an early show-down.

DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION

Britain guaranteed Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey against attack. France did what she could to revive her system of alliances, badly shattered by her betrayal of Czechoslovakia. Both nations redoubled their efforts to arm. Britain took the almost revolutionary step of introducing compulsory military service. The French made a horse trade with Turkey in which, without any thought now for self-determination, they handed over the district of Alexandretta, north of Syria, in return for a Turkish pledge to come to their assistance in case of war in the eastern Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, Germany and Italy had signed a military alliance. To meet this new threat, the British tried for months to persuade the Russians, whom they had so recently cold-shouldered, to join them in a "stop Hitler" bloc. But the Russians apparently wanted something in return. Evidently they wanted certain rights in the Baltic states which the British thought constituted a violation of the sovereignty of those states. Evidently the British were still hampered, as the French were not, by their respect for the rights of small peoples. Anyway, in the end the negotiations broke down, and Hitler apparently gave Stalin what Britain had been unwilling to give him.

On August 23, 1939 Germany exploded her diplomatic bombshell. She announced that she was about to conclude a

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"SILENCE"



——From the *Evening Standard,* London, 1938.

non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Russia ratified the pact on August 31. Early the next morning, German troops crossed the Polish border at several points. France and Britain soon honored their pledges to go to the aid of Poland if she were attacked, and the war which Europe had been dreading for months was on.

EUROPE'S NEW CONTEST FOR POWER

Thus, in the end, of the two sets of ideas which had dominated the Paris Peace Conference, it was power politics which won out. By the time the Germans began turning the steam on Poland all thought of listening to arguments about self-determination had been abandoned. Danzig had a very good case for going back to Germany. It was inhabited by Germans, and it had been a part of the German Reich until 1919. It was also true that there was a large German minority in Poland, and that, unlike Czechoslovakia, Poland had not treated any of her minorities very generously.

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If the questions of Danzig and the German-Polish frontier had been settled in the days of the German Republic, they might perhaps have been settled fairly without war, and to the satisfaction of everybody concerned. But by the autumn of 1939 it was too late. Now they could not be settled or even discussed. For by that time it was plain that Hitler was only using them as an excuse for extending his power still further—bloodlessly if possible, by war if necessary. Now at last the issue was clear. For Britain and France the issue was fight or acknowledge surrender, fight or accept the position of second-rate powers, fight or, perhaps, submit to Nazi German domination.

Consequently, whatever the results of the new war in Europe may be, it could hardly be said to have *started* as anything but a new contest for power. Germany was fighting to gain still more power, Britain and France to hold what they had.

By the kind of peace they made, and by their failure to extend a helping hand to the German Republic when the Republic was in peril, the Allies helped to raise the Frankenstein of Nazi Germany. Terrified and cowed by their own creation, they then began throwing it concessions in the hope of satisfying its greedy appetite. But its appetite only grew as it ate.

When they had made the last concessions they could without weighting the scales so heavily in Germany's favor that they would be at her mercy, Britain and France called a halt to concessions and took a firm stand against further German expansion. Germany challenged that stand. The result was war.

But not war for collective security. Collective security was scuttled in 1936. Not war for the rights of small nations. Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania had all been sacrificed before. War not for the principle of justice and honor in international relations. They were dumped overboard years back. War for self-preservation.

These other things—collective security, self-determination, just and honorable dealings among nations—may be added to the war aims of the Allies later. Already there have been

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some hints that they will be. Already there have been some protests that these are what Britain and her Allies really are fighting for. Thus this war, like others before it, may end as something very different from what it was when it began. The various belligerents may *all* change their minds about their ultimate aims long before the war is over. But that will not alter the fact that the war *began* as another in that long series of struggles for power with which the history of Europe is studded.

If they had grasped the chance, and had made a really serious attempt to carry out the principles of collective security, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, the nations of Europe *might* have been able—it's not certain, but they *might* have been able to close the balance-of-power chapter of their history forever. They weren't willing to make the attempt. At the same time, the nations which won the World War weren't willing to do the things they would have had to do to retain the dominant position they found themselves in when the World War ended in their victory. That position could only be held by overwhelming force, and an instant readiness to use it. But they weren't willing or able to maintain that force, or use it if they had it. Consequently they landed in the soup, with no collective security and almost no allies.

A more complete failure the history of European diplomacy has never recorded.

VIII. Picking Up The Pieces

For want of a nail the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe the horse was lost. For want of a horse the rider was lost. For want of a rider the message was lost. For want of a message the battle was lost. For want of a battle . . . .

You know the old story, and its moral: how a kingdom was lost, "and all for the want of a nail."

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It was much the same way with the Peace of Paris. If the peace had been wholly "realistic," it might have been made to last much longer than it did. If, on the other hand, it had been a negotiated peace, based on Wilson's principles, it might conceivably have lasted for centuries. It was both. That was the beginning of the trouble.

Then if the United States had joined the League, as Wilson had intended, we might have used our influence to modify the vengeful aspects of the peace settlement and strengthen the other aspects. We turned our backs on the League.

Again, if we had ratified Wilson's treaty of alliance with France, the British would have ratified theirs, and the French would probably not have pursued their encirclement policy, or have gone into the Ruhr. If they hadn't tried to encircle Germany, and hadn't gone into the Ruhr, Hitler might never have had a chance.

Similarly with security and disarmament. If Germany, Britain, Russia and the United States had been willing to sign the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, or the Geneva Protocol, France might have felt sufficiently secure to disarm. And if France had agreed to disarm, Germany might never have gone Nazi. She certainly would have had no excuse for rearming. But Germany, Britain, Russia and the United States were not willing to give France those guarantees, and France—quite understandably—was not willing to disarm without them. So Germany rearmed instead. Once Germany had begun, there was nothing for the other nations to do but follow suit.

It was the same story with reparations. If reparations had never been demanded in the first place, Germany might not have felt quite so bitter about the "Versailles Diktat." If they had been cancelled when Bruening was struggling to keep the dying German Republic alive, Hitler might never have become Chancellor and Fuehrer of the Reich. But they were demanded and, owing to French insistence, they were not wiped off the slate until it was too late.

Likewise with collective security. If sanctions had been

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applied at the time Japan attacked Manchuria, Italy might never have attacked Ethiopia. And if Italy had not attacked Ethiopia, and gotten away with it, Germany would probably not have dared to march into the Rhineland. If Germany had not reoccupied the Rhineland, she certainly could not have risked seizing Austria, or Czechoslovakia, or Poland. But sanctions were not invoked against Japan. When, under the pressure of public demand, they were invoked against Italy, care was taken to see that they didn't really hurt her. So Hitler walked into the Rhineland, fortified Germany's western border, and then seized Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Even in 1936, after the failure of the sanctions experiment, it might still have been possible to stop Hitler without a major war. If Britain and France had defended the Locarno agreements and had threatened to fight if Hitler did not withdraw his troops from the Rhineland, Hitler would probably have backed down. If he hadn't backed down, the war would soon have been over.

Hitler might even have been stopped at the time he entered Austria, with far less risk than Britain and France faced when the war actually began. For Germany was weaker then, and France still had allies in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Finally, if Britain and France had taken an unbending stand on the Sudeten question, war might have come—probably would have. But then the British and French would have had the help of all the French allies, while Germany would not have had Russia even as a source of supplies.

THE REASONS WHY

We've already seen some of the reasons why, again and again, the Great Powers missed the boat. We've seen how the pursuit of separate national interests made it well nigh impossible for the Great Powers to follow a common international policy. We've seen how the British wanted to forget Europe and devote their attention to their own problems. How the French wanted to achieve security. How the Italians wanted to

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get what they believed they had been cheated of at the Peace Conference. How the Russians wanted for a long time to carry out their self-imposed mission of freeing the "toilers" of other countries from the shackles of capitalism. How the Japanese wanted to conquer an empire in Asia. How Germany wanted to tear up the Treaty of Versailles. How our own country wanted to avoid assuming any responsibility at all outside the Western Hemisphere.

We've also seen other, more general, factors at work to thwart all efforts to achieve an international society based on law and order. We've seen, for instance, how, by the very nature of democracy, the statesmen of democratic countries have sometimes been prevented from following consistent policies, veering instead from side to side as the demands of their countrymen have changed. We've seen how economic nationalism helped to make political internationalism impossible. How fear of communism often prevented capitalist nations from cooperating with the Soviet Union even when the Soviet Union was willing to cooperate with them. And how, underneath the new international political order, the old economic competition continued, making it difficult if not impossible for the capitalist nations to cooperate with one another on the political plane.

What it all boils down to is this. Far from ever having been on the main highway toward peace and justice, the Great Powers never really started out on that road at all. For no one of them ever really gave up its right to do as it pleased, regardless of the consequences to others. Yet without some surrender of that right—that "sovereignty"—no genuine world order was possible.

As for the achievements of General Bliss's high period, they were like a thin crust of lava over the crater of a dormant volcano. That crust cooled and hardened. The rains came. Grass grew. Here and there a bush or a tree sprang up. But underneath the surface the molten rock continued to boil. Now and then a fissure would open in the crust, and a jet of steam would reveal the true nature of the subsurface material. At last the

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"PEACE ON EARTH"



"What our streets would look like if individuals behaved like nations."
——From *Hvepsen,* Oslo, Norway, 1921.

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pressure beneath grew so great that the crust was blown off, the grass and trees burned to cinders, and, as General Bliss had predicted, there was "the devil to pay all over the world."

The molten rock, of course, was the forces of power politics. The thin crust on top was the "new order."

PEEPING INTO THE FUTURE

What about the future? Will it always go on this way, with healthy young Germans, French *poilus*, English Tommies, killing one another every twenty years or so? Will Europe continue to wallow in blood at intervals, until, perhaps, there are only old men and children left? Is there no alternative in sight?

Only a very foolhardy person would make any predictions today. But the record of the past leaves little room for hope. The present is dark indeed. The future is even darker.

This much, however, seems clear. When this war is over, as some day it will be, Europe will again be faced with a choice. That choice will be much the same choice that confronted the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. It will be a choice between the old, old ways of domination, revolt and war and a new effort to establish a negotiated peace based on principles of justice and fair play.

If either side in the present war wins a smashing victory, it may be able to impose so stern a peace on the defeated enemy that he will not be strong enough to challenge that peace for fifty years. But never in history has such a peace lasted forever.

UNITED STATES OF EUROPE?

The alternative is some new attempt to make a peace settlement that will really stick. That attempt might take the form of a return to the principles of the League. Or it might go further and set up a kind of United States of Europe, a federal union in which the various states would surrender some of their sovereignty for the sake of the general welfare of all. In either case, it will undoubtedly be necessary to solve the problem of economic competition as well as the problem of political cooperation or union.

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There was a time, of course, when our own original thirteen states faced something not unlike the problem Europe is facing today. From 1781 till 1789 the thirteen states lived under "Articles of Confederation" so loose that the states were, to all intents and purposes, independent sovereign nations like the nations of Europe. And they quarreled and scrapped much the way the European states—or some of them—do still. Then they got together and formed the Federal Union under which we now live.

In a way it was a more revolutionary step than the Revolution itself. It meant that each state voluntarily surrendered a part of its sovereignty—its right to do as it pleased—to a superior government. That is something states very seldom do. But it worked, and it stuck.

Of course, it took a civil war to test its strength. And the Federal government today is very much stronger than the Federal government of Washington's time. It has increased in power as it went on. But from the very beginning it put an end to the threat of inter-state wars. It put an end to inter-state tariffs. It made possible much of the amazing development of commerce and industry that occurred in America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Instead of a group of little nations strangling one another with measures of economic nationalism and bleeding one another white with periodic wars, it created a single great nation. That nation is not without its faults: it still has much to work and strive for. But that it is incomparably better, politically and economically, than the European arrangement, few people will deny.

Theoretically Europe could follow our example. But its long history of wars and counter-wars, its strident nationalisms, the traditional sovereignty and independence of its many separate states—all these make it infinitely more difficult for Europe to unite than it was for us. In fact, the analogy between Europe's problem and the problem we faced in the 1780's is far from complete, and there are lots of people who will tell you that Europe can't possibly achieve the kind of union we did. Yet it is a real question whether anything less than union

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will ever solve Europe's big problem. And the idea of a federal union is already being discussed in England and among the governments in exile, much as the idea of the League was discussed during the First World War.

RETURN TO THE LEAGUE?

The other possibility, of course, is for Europe to return to the principles of the League. There is nothing wrong with those principles as far as they go. The question is whether they go far enough. For instance, is it ever going to be possible to control aggressors simply by means of economic sanctions? Won't it be necessary for the League members to assume the responsibility of actually going to war against the aggressor in case sanctions fail to stop him? And how many nations will be willing to assume that responsibility? For that matter, how many nations will be willing to agree to defend the existing divisions of the world by *any* means unless those divisions are changed from time to time to meet changing situations? And how is it going to be possible to change them except by force or the threat of force? How, too, is the League going to solve the problem of economic competition?

These are only a few of the questions that will come up if the League idea is ever revived. Some people think they are harder questions than those raised by the idea of a United States of Europe. Others think they are not so hard.

OR MORE OF THE SAME?

One thing, at least, seems clear. That is that either in collective security or in union lies Europe's only hope of lasting peace. The only other choice is more power politics. If the side which wins the war imposes its own kind of peace on the defeated enemy, the enemy will grit his teeth and prepare for the day when he can throw off the shackles of that peace and impose *his* terms instead. In other words, it will be the story of Germany and the "Versailles Diktat" all over again. And the continued story of balance-of-power wars will probably go on and on as long as there is anyone left to fight them.

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SUGGESTED READING

There are many good books covering most or all of the period between the Paris Peace Conference and the outbreak of the new European war. One of the best, perhaps, is G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's *Short History of International Affairs* (New York, Oxford, 1938). For a briefer and somewhat more lively account, you might read William A. Orton's *Twenty Years' Armistice* (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1938). Or, if you want a textbook, try F. Lee Benns' *Europe Since 1914* (4th ed., New York, Crofts, 1939) or Walter Consuelo Langsam's *The World Since 1914* (4th ed., New York, Macmillan, 1940). A well-balanced account is Paul Birdsall's *Versailles Twenty Years After* (New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941).

There are many good books also on the special problems of the post-World War period. James T. Shotwell's *On the Rim of the Abyss* (New York, Macmillan, 1936), for instance, examines the failure of the League from the point of view of one who believes that a return to League principles holds the only hope of permanent peace. In *The Great Powers in World Politics* (New York, American Book, 1937), Frank H. Symonds and Brooks Emeny consider the impact of economic nationalism on international relations. For a clear account of British foreign policy, particularly in relation to the dictators, read R. W. Seton-Watson's *Britain and the Dictators* (New York, Macmillan, 1938).

Of more popular books the number is legion. Especially entertaining are John Gunther's *Inside Europe* (rev. ed., New York, Harper, 1940), Vincent Sheean's *Not Peace But a Sword* (New York, Doubleday Doran, 1939) and Dorothy Thompson's *Let the Record Speak* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1939). In *Betrayal in Central Europe* (New York, Harper, 1939), G. E. R. Gedye gives an eye-witness account of both the Austrian and the Sudeten German crises, while in *We Shall Live Again* (New York, Doubleday Doran, 1939) another eye-witness, Maurice Hindus, describes the Czechoslovak Republic and its collapse at the time of the Munich settlement. For comic relief, look through *A Cartoon History of Our Times,* by David Low (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1939).

Books on plans for the future have now begun to appear. Though it was published before the outbreak of war, Arthur Salter's *Security: Can We Retrieve It?* (New York, Macmillan, 1939) is still well worth reading. The same is true of Clarence K. Streit's *Union Now* (New York, Harper, 1939), which advocates a federal union of all the democracies of the world, and his more recent *Union Now With Britain* (New York, Harper, 1941). A more philosophical book is Lionel Curtis's *World Order* (New York, Oxford, 1939). And very provocative is Harold Laski's *Where Do We Go from Here?* (New York, Viking, 1941).

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Varian Fry is the author of *War in China* (Headline Book No. 13) and *Bricks Without Mortar* (Headline Book No. 16) and co-author with Delia Goetz of *The Good Neighbors* (Headline Book No. 17). He was formerly editor of the series.

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SHADOW OVER ASIA—The Rise of Militant Japan. By T. A. Bisson. "A first-rate introduction to Japan for schools, adult education groups or the general reader." —The Far Eastern Survey

AMERICA REARMS—The Citizen's Guide to National Defense. By William T. Stone. "Should serve to help many a puzzled reader sort out his own thoughts and arrive at a reasoned conclusion." —New Haven (Conn.) Journal-Courier

LOOK AT LATIN AMERICA. By Joan Raushenbush. With 25 maps and charts. "Written with shrewdness and simplicity, and made to order for the man in the street." —San Francisco (Cal.) Chronicle

CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAS. By J. I. B. McCulloch. "An up-to-the-minute study of what many people are talking about, pan-Americanism, fifth column, aggressor nations and our own defense." —Minneapolis (Minn.) Tribune

SPOTLIGHT ON THE BALKANS. By P. B. Stoyan. "Simplifies . . . one of the most highly complicated and least understood aspects of Europe." —Hartford (Conn.) Times

THE BRITISH EMPIRE UNDER FIRE. By James Frederick Green. "An altogether excellent job of selection, emphasis and presentation." —American Foreign Service Journal

WAR ATLAS. By Emil Herlin and Varian Fry. "The most up-to-date and useful handbook of its kind; certainly the biggest bargain." —The New York Times

NEW HOMES FOR OLD—Public Housing in Europe and America. By William V. Reed and Elizabeth Ogg. With 95 illustrations. "A compact, sharp-outlined handbook on one of our most urgent concerns." —The New Republic

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IN QUEST OF EMPIRE—The Problem of Colonies. By Walter Consuleo Langsam. "Brief but exceedingly informative." —Boston (Mass.) Transcript

BATTLES WITHOUT BULLETS—The Story of Economic Warfare. By Thomas Brockway. "One of the great tasks of our time is to make complicated economic facts accessible. Thomas Brockway has achieved this most effectively." —H. V. Kaltenborn

BRICKS WITHOUT MORTAR—The Story of International Cooperation. By Varian Fry. "An excellent survey of the efforts to achieve a peaceful world order." —Washington (D.C.) Post

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