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WAR ATLAS

A HANDBOOK OF MAPS AND FACTS

Maps by

EMIL HERLIN

Text by

VARIAN FRY

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INTRODUCTION

No one can follow today's news intelligently without maps. But the colored plates in the standard atlases give both too much and too little. They are so filled with detail that the average newspaper reader seldom stops to consult them. At the same time, by their nature they cannot include any details, however important, which may soon change: mine fields, for example, or fortifications.

Realizing this, American newspaper publishers have been providing more and more maps in the columns of their papers. And no newspaper has done a better job of map-making than *The New York Times*. Day after day, and especially since the beginning of the war in Europe, that paper has published maps many of which are masterpieces of the art of simplification. Viewed in retrospect, the *Times*' maps give a highly selective but at the same time a surprisingly well-rounded picture of the factors which have played, and seem likely to continue to play, dominant roles in the present war.

For that reason it has seemed to the Foreign Policy Association that it would be useful to bring together in a convenient and lasting form a collection of war maps such as the *Times* itself has published. This *War Atlas* is the result. It contains a number of maps in the form in which they originally appeared in the *Times*, and a much larger number which have been more or less extensively revised, partly to bring them up to date and partly to make a continuous and comprehensive series. In addition, Mr. Herlin, of the *Times*' staff, has drawn a number of new maps to round out the picture, and Mr. Fry, of the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, has written a running commentary to accompany the maps and has been responsible for the organization of the book as a whole.

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In short, this *War Atlas* is a book of news maps for busy newspaper readers. Our thanks and theirs are due the publishers of *The New York Times* for the generous cooperation which alone has made its appearance possible.

Frank R. McCoy, President
Foreign Policy Association

New York, N. Y.
March 25, 1940

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1. Europe—1914

Change—peaceful or otherwise (generally otherwise) is nothing new for Europe. In fact the map of Europe has been changed again and again since Caesar first staked out the limits of Roman Gaul, about two thousand years ago. But few periods have seen more drastic changes than the last twenty-five years. It has been estimated that in 1914 Continental Europe possessed about 13,000 miles of boundaries, whereas in 1937 there were approximately 7,500 miles of boundaries which did not appear on the map of Europe in 1914. Most of these new boundaries were drawn in Central and Eastern Europe.

In 1914 Central Europe was dominated by two great states, Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Germany there lived—besides the Germans—some inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine who spoke French, a large number of Poles, some Danes and Lithuanians, and smatterings of other peoples. But in general Germany was the country of the Germans.

Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, was a perfect mosaic of races and languages. Dominated by the Austrians (who speak German) and the Hungarians (who speak Magyar), it contained Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenes, Poles, Italians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Rumanians, Russians and others. Even before the World War, many of these peoples had become restive under Austrian or Hungarian rule and were seeking their independence.

Southeastern Europe—the "Balkans"—was a backward agricultural area coveted by both Germany and Russia. It was divided between seven separate states, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Rumania, Serbia and Turkey.

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2. Post-War Europe

The World War changed the map of Continental Europe almost beyond recognition. Chief among the states to lose territory were Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Germany lost territory all around her borders. Alsace-Lorraine (which Germany had annexed in 1871) was returned to France, and the coal-mining district called the Saar was placed temporarily under the League of Nations. The districts around Eupen and Malmédy were given to Belgium. The province of Schleswig was divided between Germany and Denmark. Part of Upper Silesia and the large area which came to be known as the "Corridor" were turned over to the newly established state of Poland. The German port of Danzig was made into a "free city" under League auspices. Memel was detached from East Prussia and eventually incorporated in another new state, Lithuania.

Austria-Hungary disappeared altogether. She lost the South Tyrol and the Küstenland to Italy, her Adriatic territories to the new state of Yugoslavia, Transylvania and parts of other eastern provinces to Rumania, and Galicia to Poland. What was left was divided into three parts, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

In the Balkans Bulgaria lost small bits of land to Yugoslavia and an important area (which gave her her only access to the Aegean Sea) to Greece. Greece also obtained a small piece of land from Turkey.

But the largest losses were those of Russia—now become the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Finland, Estonia and Latvia were constructed entirely out of land that had formerly belonged to the Russian Empire, while Lithuania and Poland owed most of their territory to it. Rumania took from Russia the large province of Bessarabia.

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3. Europe Today

Many of the changes made in the map of Europe after the World War have been altered again in recent years. The most dramatic development of this period has been the rapid expansion of Germany, now the largest power on the Continent with the single exception of the U. S. S. R.

This new German Empire includes the Saar, returned as the result of a plebiscite held in 1935, Austria, annexed in March 1938, most of Czechoslovakia, acquired in September 1938 and March 1939, and about half of Poland, conquered by force of arms in September 1939. In addition to these new possessions, Germany has also secured the return of Danzig and Memel. Not all of these newly acquired territories have been formally annexed to Germany. Bohemia and Moravia—the western provinces of Czechoslovakia—are "protectorates" of the Reich, and Slovakia—Czechoslovakia's large eastern province—is a semi-autonomous state also under German protection. Central Poland, similarly, has a separate government, though a German one. But for all practical purposes they are all parts of the new German Empire.

The changes wrought by Germany are not, of course, the only changes the map of Europe has witnessed within the past five years. Hungary joined in partitioning Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939. In April 1939 Italy attacked and conquered Albania, and in September and October of the same year the U. S. S. R. not only occupied the eastern half of Poland but, by threatening military action, "persuaded" Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to give the Soviet Union naval and air bases and the right to garrison troops within their borders. It then made similar demands on Finland and, when Finland refused to grant them, waged war on her until it had won more territory than it had originally asked.

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4. Seven Years of Hitler

Here the changes Hitler has wrought in the map of Europe in the first seven years of his rule are shown in the order in which they occurred.

The areas Hitler has annexed or conquered or placed under German protection are:

1. Austria. March 12, 1938. Population 6,750,000; area, 32,400 square miles.
2. The Sudetenland. October 1, 1938. Population, 3,500,000; area, 10,800 square miles.
3. Most of Czecho-Slovakia. March 14, 1939. Population, 9,500,000; area, 35,300 square miles.
4. Memelland. March 22, 1939. Population, 152,000; area, 1,100 square miles.
5. Western and Central Poland. September, 1939. Population, 21,000,000; area, 71,000 square miles.

In addition to annexing and conquering the territory of neighboring states and establishing protectorates, Hitler has been responsible for some remarkable shifts of population. Besides driving something like 400,000 Germans into exile, he has moved, or is about to move:

A. 185,400 Germans from the South Tyrol into Germany.
B. 120,000 Germans from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the former Polish Corridor.
C. 160,000 Germans from Russian into German Poland.
D. 110,000 German farm families from Western Germany into conquered Poland. These are to be followed by an undetermined number of artisans, officials, etc.

Thus, in all, Hitler has added, or is adding, some 41,314,000 persons to the population of the Third Reich and, by annexation, conquest or the establishment of protectorates, some 150,600 square miles to its territory. The total population of Great Germany is now about 110,000,000.

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5. The Line-Up

On Sunday, September 3, 1939, two days after Germany invaded Poland, Great Britain and France announced that they considered themselves to be at war with the German Reich. They were promptly joined by the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Thus for the second time in a single generation the three Great Powers of Western Europe found themselves locked in a death struggle. But the line-up of 1939 was very different from the line-up of 1914-18. Then Germany had Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey as allies, while Britain and France had Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and Belgium at the outset of hostilities and eventually Italy, Albania, Rumania, Greece, Portugal, the United States, Japan, China, Siam and eight of the republics of Latin America—not to mention the new-formed states of Europe, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Germany entered the present war with only one military ally, Italy, and even Italy refrained from engaging in hostilities in Germany's defense. On the other hand, Germany removed the danger of having to fight on two fronts by signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. This was soon followed by a treaty of friendship.

As for Britain and France, their only belligerent ally at the outset was Poland. And Poland soon disappeared from the map. But Turkey, in the World War an ally of Germany, now has a treaty of mutual assistance with the British and French. This treaty provides that she will come to their aid in case they become involved in hostilities in the Mediterranean area, but it exempts her from any obligation to make war against the Soviet Union unless she considers her own interests threatened.

Rumania and Greece have received and accepted guarantees from the Allies.

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



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6. The First Partition of Poland

September 1939 was not the first time that Poland had disappeared from the ever-changing map of Europe. For several centuries before the eighteenth, Poland had been a large and sometimes powerful kingdom. But in the seventeenth century her power began to decline, and by the middle of the eighteenth she was weak and almost defenseless.

It was then that, in three bites, the expanding empires of Russia, Prussia and Austria gobbled her up.

In the First Partition, which occurred in 1772, and was accomplished partly by bribery and partly by a show of force —methods not so very different from those in use today— Poland lost about a third of her territory and population. The part that went to Russia was poor and unimportant, but Austria obtained the fertile province of Galicia, and Prussia got the "Corridor"—then called West Prussia. Danzig remained for the time being in the possession of Poland, from which, however, it was cut off by the territory ceded to Prussia.

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7. The Second Partition of Poland

In the Second Partition, which took place in 1793, Poland lost about half of her remaining territory and population to Russia and Prussia. Russia took the entire eastern segment, including the Polish Ukraine, while Prussia occupied Danzig and the westernmost province, called Great Poland. Austria did not participate in the Second Partition.

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8. The Third Partition of Poland

In the Third Partition (1795), Poland's three greedy neighbors helped themselves to all that was left of the once proud Kingdom of the Poles. The Polish patriot, Kosciusko, tried desperately to defend his country, but the combined forces of the three Great Powers were too much for him. Russia took Courland and what was left of Lithuania and Podlesia, Austria took Little Poland, and Prussia rounded off her empire by taking all the rest.

Thus Poland disappeared from the map, not to reappear again for more than a century. In the words of an English poet of the time,

> "Hope, for a season, bade the world farewell,
> And Freedom shrieked—as Kosciusko fell."

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9. Poland Restored

Though Poland disappeared as an independent state in 1795, the memory of Poland lived on in the minds and hearts of the Polish people. In the collapse of Germany, Austria and Russia at the end of the World War, the Polish people found their opportunity. By taking territory from all three nations, they were able to reconstruct Poland as an independent state.

From Germany Poland got the provinces of Pomorze, Posnan and part of Upper Silesia—in all 17,889 square miles. From Austria-Hungary she obtained Galicia and Cracow—30,914 square miles. And from Russia she secured most of the rest—101,196 square miles.

The return to Poland of the German and Austrian areas was ordered, or sanctioned, by the Peace Conference. Of the area Poland acquired from Russia, however, the Peace Conference sanctioned the transfer of only a part. The rest the new Polish Republic took by force. The Allies' experts suggested a border—the so-called "Curzon line"—considerably to the west of the one which was finally established. But in 1920 the Soviet Union attempted to win back the area it had lost. Soviet troops reached the edge of Warsaw before they were stopped. Then, with the help of the French, the Poles not only drove them back but actually conquered a large piece of territory previously held by the Russians—the part east of the Curzon line.

In 1920, also, a Polish freebooter captured the Vilna area from Lithuania. This acquisition, amounting to 10,422 square miles, was accepted by the Powers in 1923. It was never accepted by Lithuania, however.

Poland's last territorial acquisition occurred at the time of the Munich Conference, in September 1938, when she acquired from Czechoslovakia the small Teschen district—405 square miles.

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

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10. The Minorities of Poland

One of the major problems of the new Polish Republic which was created at the close of the World War was the problem of the minorities within its borders. In Central Europe race and language groups are so mixed that it would have been impossible to draw boundaries for Poland which would include only Poles. The experts at the Peace Conference did the best they could, but even they were forced to include a good many Germans, and some other minority groups, within the new Polish state.

Then the Poles themselves made the situation worse by pushing their eastern border far beyond the line tentatively drawn for them by the Allies' experts. For in doing so they brought millions of White Russians and Ukrainians under their rule. Finally, by taking the Vilna area, they acquired the additional problem of governing Lithuanians.

None of these minority groups, with the possible exception of the White Russians (who were for the most part illiterate peasants), was at all satisfied to be ruled by Poles. The Germans particularly resented it, for they considered the Poles to be an inferior people.

Instead of taking the minorities into partnership (as the Austrians did the Hungarians in 1867), the Poles discriminated against them in many ways. The result was that, when he was looking for an excuse to invade Poland, Adolf Hitler found more than enough discontent to serve as grist for his propaganda mill.

Since the conclusion of the German-Polish hostilities, Germany has been moving Germans into what was once the western part of Poland, so that today the concentration of Germans there is probably greater than that shown on the map. Not shown, either, are the Jews, of whom there were about three million before the German invasion.

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

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11. Germany's Blitzkrieg in Poland

Germany's *Blitzkrieg*, or lightning war, in Poland was all over in less than three weeks, and from the military point of view it was a brilliant achievement. It was accomplished by the familiar German tactic of pincers movements. One pincer cut the Polish Corridor, while another took a series of quick, deep bites at the industrial areas around Cracow. The army which had been operating in the north was then joined by other forces from East Prussia. Together they chopped and snipped toward Warsaw. Meanwhile, the army of the south divided into two wings, one moving north to meet the forces from the Corridor and East Prussia at Warsaw, the other hurrying southeast to cut off the railroad to Rumania. The final pincer closed around Warsaw itself. Before it had closed completely, the Russians marched in from the east.

The German land forces were preceded and accompanied by squadrons of bombing planes. The bombers blasted the Polish defenses, scattered the Polish forces, disrupted their lines of communication, destroyed their airplanes, pockmarked their landing fields.

It was the very kind of war the world had been fearing since Germany began to rearm. It succeeded partly because Germany was so well prepared but partly also because the Poles were badly organized and poorly equipped. They had almost no heavy fortifications and far too few fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns—for that matter, too little modern equipment of any sort—to meet such an overwhelming attack.

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12. The Fourth Partition of Poland

After the German army had overrun two-thirds of Poland, and the Russian army had marched in from the east, Germany and the U. S. S. R. divided the conquered country into three parts. The western part, including all that had been German territory before the World War, Germany annexed outright. The eastern part, most of which had belonged to Russia before the World War, the U. S. S. R. annexed. In between the two areas Germany set up a "Polish" state under her control, calling it the "Gouvernement Général of Poland." In charge of this "Polish" state she placed a German Nazi, Dr. Hans Frank.

Other, minor border adjustments were also made. Thus Russia returned to Lithuania a part of the territory around Vilna which the Poles had seized from the Lithuanians in 1920, while Germany deeded to Slovakia (already under her protection) the two small districts of Orava and Zips.

In addition to annexing the western part of Poland, Germany also reincorporated the Free City of Danzig into the Reich.

The Fourth Partition of Poland increased Germany's population by 21,000,000, Russia's by 14,000,000 and Lithuania's by 500,000. Germany annexed about 32,000 square miles outright and brought about another 39,000 square miles under her control. Russia acquired roughly 75,000 square miles and Lithuania perhaps 5,000.

The population of the Free City of Danzig at the time of its annexation by Germany was 415,000, its area 754 square miles.

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13. Poland's Resources

More important even than territory and population are the economic assets Germany and Russia acquired in the Fourth Partition of Poland. Chief among the German gains are Poland's coal fields, located in Upper Silesia. In 1938 these fields produced about 45,000,000 tons of coal—roughly one-fourth as much as was produced in the whole of Greater Germany in that year. With the Polish production to add to her own, Germany now has a sizable surplus of coal which she can exchange for other raw materials of which she has a shortage.

But that is not all that Germany gained. She also acquired rich stores of zinc and nearly all of Poland's war industries. She obtained about one-third of the Polish oil fields. And she gained control of agricultural areas producing surpluses of rye, barley, oats, flax, hemp and hogs. The famed Polish hams are now being enjoyed by German families.

The part of Poland assigned to the U. S. S. R. is much less valuable than the German part. Nevertheless it contains two-thirds of the Polish oil fields. Though much less productive than the Rumanian fields, nearby, the Polish oil fields yielded over half a million metric tons of oil in 1938. In the same year Russia produced 28,860,000 metric tons.

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14. The Western Front

As in 1914, Allied and German troops again face one another along the Western Front. But there the similarity ends.

Today France possesses Alsace and Lorraine, and she has fortified these and other border regions with a deep band of fortifications, called the Maginot Line. The Maginot Line consists of forts large and small, concealed artillery emplacements and machine-gun nests, tank traps, vast underground storage rooms and living and sleeping quarters for the troops. It has been said that no army could penetrate it without losing at least a million men. Every possible route is subject to interlocking artillery and machine-gun fire from several angles, and the "line" is so deep that it is an open question whether, even if he succeeded in breaking through, the enemy could avoid a flank attack and destruction.

Germany too has her "fortifications in depth," as strategists call them. The German fortifications are known as the Westwall, or the "Siegfried Line." They are similar to the Maginot Line but are said to put greater emphasis on the factor of depth.

On both sides of the border there are also great fortresses around certain cities. These cities are shown on the map by stars.

If Germany finds that the Allied blockade is seriously menacing her supplies, some strategists believe that she may seek a quick decision in the west. In that case she may try to invade France by one or more of seven possible routes, shown on the map by arrows. On the other hand, if the Allies should decide to invade Germany, they might be expected to follow the valley of the Moselle River, drive on Saarbrücken, or go northeast along the left bank of the Rhine.

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

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15. Belgium and the Netherlands

If Germany decides to launch an attack on France, and chooses one or more of the first three routes, she will first have to fight her way through Belgium. The Belgians have built light fortifications along their eastern border and heavier ones along the Albert Canal and the Meuse River. They also have provisions for flooding the territory north of the Albert Canal.

Another neutral neighbor of Germany's which fears invasion is the Netherlands. The German High Command might decide to march through southeast Holland on the way to Belgium or occupy the Netherlands in order to obtain air and submarine bases for mass bombing raids on strategic points in the British Isles and attacks on Allied and neutral shipping.

Like Belgium, the Netherlands has a line of light fortifications along her eastern border and heavier ones farther west. But these are not her only defenses. To protect her principal cities she is relying on a natural defense, water. A considerable part of the country actually lies below sea level. In normal times the sea is kept out by dikes. But if she were faced with invasion, the Netherlands could open the dikes and let the sea in. A highly mechanized army like the German might then find it quite difficult to get through to the coast.

Some strategists say that Germany is unlikely to attempt to seize Dutch positions anyway. As long as the Netherlands remains neutral, she forms a natural defense for the German industrial area of the Ruhr. Once Dutch neutrality had been violated, the British and French would be free to send troops into the Netherlands. Thence they might be able to outflank the Westwall or break through it and engage the German army on its own soil. Realizing this, the experts argue, the German High Command is unlikely to take a step which might open their country to invasion by the Allies.

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

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16. The Allied Blockade

After a cautious initial advance against outposts of the Siegfried Line, an advance which was discontinued when it was seen that Poland was lost, Britain and France contented themselves during the first winter of the war with imposing a blockade on German imports and exports.

Germany is a great industrial nation which is poor in many raw materials. Her only surpluses are coal, potash and magnesite. She produces little or no copper, tin, bauxite (aluminum ore), mercury, textile fibres, or the metals used in making steel (chromium, tungsten, etc.). Her supplies of iron ore, sulphur and pyrites (used in making explosives), antimony and timber are far below even her peacetime requirements. She has very little oil, and no cotton or rubber at all. (She now makes artificial rubber and produces some oil from coal.) And while she has almost enough grain for bread, she has to depend on neighbors for fodder grains, livestock and fats.

The Allied blockade cuts Germany off from supplies of cotton and natural rubber altogether but leaves her with access to large—though not always adequate—supplies of nearly everything else. She can get some oil from Poland, more from Rumania and Russia. For iron ore she must depend on Sweden and for fats on the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic states. Even if she could get all of the available oil, iron ore and fats in those countries, however, she would probably still be short of her requirements.

On the other hand, as the map shows, Northern, Central and Southeastern Europe and the U. S. S. R. provide a rich storehouse on which Germany might still draw to some extent for many of the other products she cannot produce at home. She also claims to have stored up considerable stocks of certain raw materials before the war began.

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17. Germany's Principal Supply Lines

The problem Germany faces of getting sufficient supplies is complicated by transportation difficulties. Because of the lack of adequate railroads, not even the riches of the Balkans are as accessible as they may seem. And the vital iron ore of Sweden, and the vital oil of Russia, are a long way away.

Sweden's principal iron mines are located far to the north. In peacetime about two-thirds of Germany's share of the output of these mines is shipped from the Norwegian port of Narvik, and only one-third from the Swedish port of Lulea. This is because Lulea is usually ice-bound six months of every year. Today the German supply ships homeward bound from Narvik are keeping close to the Norwegian shore, where, by international law, the British navy cannot intercept them. But if Britain were willing to violate Norway's neutrality it would be a simple matter for her to cut Germany off from the principal Swedish mines six months of practically every year. Even without violating anyone's neutrality, she can sink some of the German supply ships in the open sea as they go from Norwegian territorial waters to Danish.

Germany's supply lines from Russia are somewhat less vulnerable than those from Sweden, but they present other problems hardly less trying. These problems include inadequate railway lines, a difference in the gauge of Russian and European railways, insufficient rolling stock of all kinds and the fact that, in winter, the rivers and canals are frozen solid, so that traffic must come to a standstill. Furthermore, if Turkey gives them permission to pass through the Dardanelles, the Allies may try to cut off the oil routes via the Black Sea as they have the trade lanes to Germany in the North Sea.

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18. The Allies' Supply Lines

Britain and France are no less dependent than Germany on imports. France can produce enough food at home to keep her people alive, and she has more iron ore than she needs. But her coal production is not much more than half her requirements, and she has almost literally no other minerals at all. Britain has surpluses of coal and nitrates (used in making fertilizers and explosives) but must import three-quarters of her foodstuffs and larger or smaller proportions of almost everything else.

Hence it is a matter of life and death to the Allies to keep their supply lines open. And it is on an attempt to cut them off that Germany has concentrated most of her war efforts. If she should succeed, the war would soon be over.

Germany's weapons in this bitter sea war are the submarine, the mine, the surface raider and the airplane. By torpedoing Allied and neutral ships, sowing mines from submarines and airplanes, capturing and sinking ships with surface raiders, and bombing them from the air, the German navy had destroyed enough shipping by the spring of 1940 to worry the Allies but not enough to cause them serious shortages.

The Allies' principal defense has been the convoy system. Instead of letting each merchant vessel go its own way, as in peacetime, they now assemble them in large groups which then proceed to or from their shores under the vigilant protection of numerous naval vessels and airplanes. The Germans claim to have sunk a few ships proceeding in convoys, but even the Germans admit that the number has been very small. On the other hand, the convoy system is slow and cumbersome.

The time and place of forming convoys are closely guarded secrets, but convoys bound for Britain and France are believed to form at the points shown.

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

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19. War in the North Sea

During the first phase of the war, at least, it was on, over and under the North Sea that the naval and air warfare raged at its fiercest. German planes bombed British naval bases and British planes bombed German naval and air bases. German planes attacked British naval vessels and Allied and neutral merchant ships. German submarines torpedoed Allied and neutral merchantmen and sank British men-of-war. German mines destroyed neutral and belligerent ships alike.

British planes and British and French naval vessels carry on a ceaseless hunt for German submarines, warships and merchantmen. The forces of Britain and France patrol both ends of the North Sea to prevent Germany from using that highway to bring supplies to her industries and food to her people. Neutral ships using this area are required to call at the control ports shown on map on page 41 and submit to search for contraband cargo.

To protect their North Sea coast from German submarines and surface warships, the British are laying down a vast belt of anchored mines. The exact location of this mine field is of course a secret. Germany has laid similar but smaller mine fields off her coast. She has also sown offensive mines in the mouth of the Thames.

If the belligerents decide to resort to the kind of wholesale bombing raids which were expected at the outbreak of the war, they will probably direct their raids at the naval and air bases and areas of heaviest industrial concentrations shown on the map.

The map also shows the time it would probably take enemy bombers to reach some of these points from their home bases.

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

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20. Activity of the German Sea Raiders

In the World War a number of German sea raiders slipped through the British blockade and did much damage to Allied shipping before they were hunted down by the British navy. At the outbreak of the present war at least two of Germany's three 10,000-ton "pocket" battleships, the *Deutschland* and the *Admiral Graf Spee*, set out on similar careers. The *Deutschland* apparently operated on the North Atlantic, the *Graf Spee* on the South. Within a few weeks the *Deutschland* had sunk the British freighter *Stonegate* off Florida waters, had fought a dramatic battle with the British auxiliary cruiser *Rawalpindi* (a converted passenger vessel) and had captured the *City of Flint*, of the United States Lines, placed a prize crew in charge of her and sent her to Murmansk.

In the South Atlantic the *Graf Spee* had sunk at least nine merchant ships before she was sighted by three British cruisers off the coast of Uruguay, on December 13, 1939. There followed a day-long battle, at the end of which the *Graf Spee*, severely damaged, sought refuge in Montevideo harbor. After receiving emergency repairs, however, she was obliged to put to sea again. Rather than have the *Graf Spee* risk another battle, this time against hopeless odds, Berlin ordered the captain to scuttle her.

Besides her two remaining pocket battleships, the *Deutschland* and the *Admiral Scheer*, Germany has two 26,000-ton battleships, two 10,000-ton cruisers (with three more under construction) and six lighter cruisers, any one of which might some day elude the British blockade and begin a career of sea raiding like that of the ill-fated *Graf Spee*. But if World War experience is any test, sooner or later every German sea raider will be hunted down by the naval forces of the Allies.

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

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21. Russia's Western Boundaries—1914

Like the other, larger war in Western Europe, the Russo-Finnish War had a long historic background.

In 1914 Finland, like Estonia, Livonia, Courland, Lithuania and most of Poland, was a part of the Russian Empire. Finland had belonged to Sweden from the middle of the thirteenth century until 1809, when the Russians took it from the Swedes. Although granted a considerable degree of self-rule, the Finns were not very happy under Russian domination. Their discontent was greatly increased by the nationalism which seized them, as it did most other peoples in Europe, in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth.

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22. Russia's Western Boundaries—1918

Russia entered the World War on the side of the Allies. Her military operations were disastrous, however, and by 1917 her armies were demoralized and she was exhausted.

Then came the Bolshevik Revolution. In the civil war which followed, the Finns, aided by the Germans, drove the Red troops out of their land and won their independence.

The Bolsheviks had attained power partly by force and partly by promising the Russian people peace, land and bread. In 1918 they made a separate peace with Germany and the Central Powers in which they renounced all their claims not only to Finland but also to Estonia, Livonia, Courland, Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine. The peace treaty was signed at the Polish city of Brest-Litovsk.

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23. Russia's Western Boundaries—1920

After the World War was over, the territory Russia had given up was divided among the new states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Most of the Ukraine, however, returned to the Soviet Union.

While the creation of these new states was undoubtedly in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, and so was a victory for the principle of the self-determination of peoples, it is only fair to recognize that it made the Soviet Union much more vulnerable to attack from the west than Russia had been before the World War. As long as Russia occupied the coast along the Baltic Sea and the gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, she had little reason to fear an attack there. For the attempt to land troops on a coast which is held by a hostile force is one of the most difficult and dangerous of all military operations.

But once the east Baltic coast was in the possession of small and weak nations a hostile power would have little trouble in establishing bases there from which it could launch a land attack on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, between Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other there are no natural defenses.

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24. Russia's Western Boundaries—1939

Just before he launched his attack on Poland, Hitler made a treaty with Russia in which the Soviet Union promised not to attack Germany and Germany promised not to attack the Soviet Union. This was followed a few weeks later by a treaty of friendship in which the two nations agreed to cooperate actively together.

Not long after the war in the west had begun, the Soviet Union called the Foreign Ministers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Moscow and demanded the immediate cession of air and, in the case of the first two countries, naval bases, and the right to garrison troops in all three. As the demands were backed up by the presence of large forces on their eastern borders, the Baltic states quickly agreed.

The Russians then called the Foreign Minister of Finland to Moscow, where they apparently presented him with much the same sort of demands they had made of the Baltic states.

But the Finns refused to be intimidated. On November 30, 1939 the U.S.S.R. launched a general attack against Finland.

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25. The Russo-Finnish War

At the outset of the Russo-Finnish hostilities, the Russian invasion followed four principal routes. In the extreme north (1) the Red Army attempted to cut the Finns off from their tiny strip of Arctic Ocean coast, while another wing of the same forces drove toward the railhead at Kemijaervi. At the center of Finland, where the distance between the Russian border and the Gulf of Bothnia is shortest (2), the Russians sought to cut the country in two and to intercept the easternmost of the three rail lines which supplied the Finnish forces farther north. East and north of Lake Ladoga (3) the Red Army drove straight toward the lake district of central Finland. Finally, on the narrow isthmus between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland, northwest of Leningrad (4), the Russian forces made a frontal attack on the strong Finnish defenses of the Mannerheim Line, a "fortification in depth" similar to the Maginot Line and the German Westwall. The land campaign was accompanied by bombings from the air and by naval attacks on Finnish coastal defenses.

At first the Russians had considerable success. But their preparations were apparently inadequate and their supply lines weak. At any rate, their advances were soon stopped by the Finns, and in some places they were actually driven back. After pausing to call up other and better trained troops and to consolidate their equipment and supplies, they launched a ferocious assault on the Mannerheim Line early in February. In a little over four weeks of fighting, during which they must have lost many thousands of men, they succeeded in penetrating the Finnish defenses and surrounding Viborg, Finland's second largest city. At this point the Finns sued for peace.

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26. The Threat to Scandinavia

In the peace treaty which they signed in Moscow on March 12, 1940, the Finns ceded the Soviet Union part of the Sredni and Rybachi peninsulas (1), a considerable area on their eastern border (3), the shores of Lake Ladoga (5) and the whole of the Karelian isthmus (6), including Viborg. They also agreed to give Russia the right to have an air line and freight and passenger route across the Petsamo district (2), to build a railroad connecting Kemijaervi with the new border (4), and to lease the peninsula of Hangö (7) to the Soviet Union for thirty years, as the site for a naval base.

Though the Russo-Finnish treaty brought peace to Finland, it did not entirely allay the fears of the Scandinavian nations. Some strategists believe that, from their new-won vantage points, the Russians may go on and attempt to take the northern half of the Scandinavian peninsula, in order to obtain an ice-free port on the Atlantic Ocean.

But a Russian port on the Atlantic would be a threat to the safety of the British Isles. Hence it seems likely that if the Russians should attack Sweden, or Norway, or both, the British would immediately cross the North Sea and do what they could to stop the Red Army.

In that case the supply lines by which Germany now gets indispensable iron ore from the mines of northern Sweden would be in imminent danger of being cut off. So the Germans would probably have to invade Norway, perhaps via Denmark and Sweden, and meet the British forces on Norwegian soil.

It is also possible that the British might attempt to cut off Germany's supply lines from the iron mines of Sweden even if the Russians did not continue their westward advance.

Thus the Scandinavian nations are living under the shadow of a triple threat: from the Soviet Union, from Britain and from Germany.

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27. Central Europe and the Balkans

If the Balkans are drawn into the European war, it will probably be because of oil. The Balkan oil is in Rumania. The Allies have brought great pressure on Rumania to persuade her not to ship to Germany-at-war any more oil than she was sending to Germany-at-peace. Germany has also brought counter-pressure. If the Allies should win in the diplomatic tug-of-war, and an oil shortage of crisis proportions should appear in Germany, Germany might feel obliged to march through Hungary (1) and attempt to take the Rumanian oil fields by force. Or Russia might seek to regain the province of Bessarabia (2), which she lost to Rumania in the World War. Italy might seize the opportunity to extend her conquest of Albania to include northern Greece (3). Or she might attack Yugoslavia. And the Allies might try to counter the German, Russian and Italian moves by any one of three routes: by landing at the Dardanelles and moving up the railway line to Sofia, Belgrade and Budapest (4); by landing on the Rumanian coast and seizing the oil fields before the Germans or the Russians could reach them (5); by starting north from Salonika and following the valley of the Vardar River and the railway to Belgrade (6).

Every one of these operations would be fraught with tremendous difficulties. The Germans could probably crack Hungary like an egg; but then they would be faced with the Transylvanian Mountains. The Russians might be able to take Bessarabia, but they would find it harder to take the oil fields. Italy could take care of Greece. But what would the Allies do to Italy meanwhile?

As for the Allies' own forces, they could safely land at (4), (5) and (6) only with the consent, or at least the passive assent, of Turkey, Rumania, Greece and perhaps also Italy and Russia.

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28. World War Losses in the Balkans

The Allies' problem of keeping Germany from the oil fields of Rumania is complicated by the political divisions that exist in the Balkans. These divisions have their origin in the shifts of territory that took place just before and just after the World War. Yugoslavia and Rumania obtained large areas from Hungary. Rumania occupied Bessarabia. Bulgaria lost the southern half of the province of Dobruja to Rumania in the Second Balkan War (1913), and small areas to Yugoslavia and a much larger piece (her "corridor" to the Aegean) to Greece in the World War.

The memory of these losses, and the determination to win them back, have prevented the Balkan nations and Hungary from cooperating effectively for their common safety ever since. Hungary will not ally herself with Yugoslavia or Rumania as long as either of those nations holds territory which was formerly hers. Bulgaria will not cooperate actively with Yugoslavia, Rumania or Greece until she regains what she has lost to them. And cooperation between Rumania and the U.S.S.R. is highly unlikely until the question of Bessarabia has been settled.

In 1934 Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey formed the Balkan Entente, a loose alliance for common defense against Bulgaria. In 1938 Bulgaria signed a non-aggression pact with these neighbors, agreeing not to seek the return of her former territories by force. But she did not renounce her claim to them. Russia, too, has agreed not to use force to regain Bessarabia. But she has not abandoned her claim to the province. Hungary's relations with Rumania have never been dignified by so much as a non-aggression pact.

All of these claims and counter-claims make for a situation which invites trouble.

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30. Strategy in the Mediterranean

One of the big question marks in the European war is the attitude of Italy. Like Germany, Italy regards herself as a "have-not" power. In December 1938 the Italian press began to demand concessions to Italian residents in Tunisia, a share in the management of the Suez Canal Company and Italian control over Djibouti and the French railway from that port to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. In May 1939 Italy signed a military alliance with Germany.

Yet when Germany attacked Poland, and Britain and France declared war on the Reich, Italy did not enter the war on the side of her ally. Instead, she maintained a state of "non-belligerency."

If Italy should intervene on Germany's side, she could cause the Allies a good deal of trouble. Britain's shortest trade route to the East runs through the Mediterranean. Italy could menace it and perhaps cut it off altogether. The French "life lines" which bring men and materials from Algeria, Tunisia and French Morocco also pass through the Mediterranean. Italy could menace them, too.

Likewise in the Eastern Mediterranean Italy could seriously embarrass the Allies. If they are to cut off the Russian oil route to Germany, the Allies may have to send their warships into the Black Sea. But Italy has naval and air bases in the Dodecanese Islands. From these she could readily attack the Allies' war and supply ships. She might also sink Allied and neutral tankers carrying oil from the Iraq oil fields.

On the other hand, Italy could so easily be blockaded, and she is so vulnerable by land, sea and air, that there is very little doubt that, in a long war against Britain and France, she would eventually be defeated.

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

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31. The Near and Middle East

If they are to win their war against Germany, one of the principal concerns of the Allies may well be to cut her off from Russia's oil fields. This will not be easy. With Turkey's permission they could, theoretically, send their warships into the Black Sea and intercept the tankers which now carry the oil from the pipe lines at Tuapse and Batum to the Dnieper River, Odessa, the Danube and Bulgaria. But there would still be the railway route from Baku to Rostov and thence to Germany, as well as the pipe line from Petrovsk to Trudovaia. Any attempt to send an army into Southern Russia to cut these lines would be more than risky unless Rumania could be used as a base. And loaded bombing planes would have great difficulty in clearing the high peaks of the Caucasus Mountains—though they could fly over the Black Sea from Turkey and bomb Batum. Furthermore, Russia has other oil fields farther inland. These could be reached only if she were decisively defeated.

On the other hand, the Iraq and Persian oil fields, on which the Allies depend for the greatest part of their own oil and gasoline supplies, are almost as safe from attack as are the Russian fields. To be sure, the tankers which carry oil from Tripoli and Haifa could be intercepted by a hostile navy. But in that case England and France could get their oil through the Persian Gulf and around the Cape of Good Hope.

Despite the obvious difficulties of action, however, the Allies, the Russians, the Turks and the Rumanians have all been reported to have large bodies of troops massed in the Near East. So it is still possible that this part of the world will see some fighting before the new European war is over.

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32. Germany's Pre-War Colonies

One of the few territorial changes of the Treaty of Versailles which Hitler has not yet reversed is the colonial settlement. Before the World War Germany had large colonies in Africa, and much smaller ones in the Far East. At the Peace Conference these were all taken from her and divided among the Allies in the form of "mandates," or trusts, of the League of Nations. Britain, France and the Union of South Africa divided up the African colonies, while those in the Far East were shared among Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

Before the occupation of Prague, when the policy of "appeasing" Germany was still the official policy of Britain and France, there were people in both countries who believed that some at least of Germany's former colonies ought to be returned to her. No actual steps were taken, however. This was perhaps partly because, if she had her colonies back, Germany would be able to threaten the British sea lane to India via the Cape. It was also partly because possession of the former German colonies gave Britain, France and the Dominions access to raw materials they needed, and partly because the Nazi theory of the superiority of the "Aryan" race raised a real question whether the Germans of the present day should be permitted to rule other peoples. For these and other reasons, no steps were taken either to return any of Germany's former colonies to her or to permit her to share in their administration.

Germany, however, is still making the return of her colonies one of her objectives. But in order to achieve that objective now, she will first have to win the war in Europe.

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

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33. The Great Empires of the World

At present a considerable part of the world is shared by seven great colonial powers: the British Commonwealth, France, Italy, Belgium, Japan, Portugal and the Netherlands. To this list many would add an eighth: the United States. But Germany today is not a colonial power, though she is far larger in population, and far more advanced industrially, than most of the nations which are.

It is an old argument whether the possession of colonies really "benefits" the mother country or not. Some argue that it obviously does, while others claim that non-colonial powers reap equal advantages without having to assume either the responsibilities or the costs of maintaining a colonial empire. Yet it is obvious that, in wartime, provided they can control the seas, the powers with large colonial empires have reservoirs of materials and men which the non-colonial powers do not have. And even in peacetime mother countries tend to favor their own citizens in their colonies, and to discriminate against the nationals of other states.

Yet the return of her colonies would not solve Germany's problems either in peace or in war. From 1894 to 1913 Germany's trade with her colonies amounted to less than 0.4 per cent of her total trade. And her geographical position is such that, in a war with Britain, she cannot get access to them anyway.

But there is more involved than economic and strategic considerations: there are also the factors of pride and prestige. Since, as long as she is deprived of colonies, Germany will probably strive to obtain some, and since she is too large and powerful a nation to have her strivings ignored, sooner or later the question of redistributing the world's colonial areas—or lumping them together under some sort of cooperative administration—will probably have to be solved.

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34. The Far East in 1910 and 1933

Like the war in Western Europe, the war between Japan and China also has a long history. Japan embarked on a career of imperial expansion in 1874, when she took from China that necklace of islands which extends between her own southernmost territory and Formosa. In 1895, after a short war, she acquired Formosa itself and engineered the independence of Korea. In 1905 she defeated the forces of the Czar in the Russo-Japanese War. As the fruits of her victory she acquired not only the southern half of the great island called Sakhalin but the Kwantung Peninsula, at the southern tip of Manchuria. In 1910 she annexed Korea. The first map shows the extent of her territory in that year.

Japan joined the World War on the side of the Allies. At the end of the war she was given a mandate over Germany's former possessions in the Pacific north of the equator. For a while she made no further territorial demands. But in 1931 and 1932 her armies overran the whole of Manchuria, and in 1933 they moved into the province of Jehol as well. A little later Japan also established a puppet regime north of Peiping. The second map shows the extent of the territory under her control at the end of 1933.

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

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35. The Far East in 1937 and 1940

Japan spent the years between 1933 and 1937 trying to separate the five North China provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi, Hopeh and Shantung from China by intrigue and military threats. But attempts to establish in these areas a puppet government subservient to her will were unsuccessful. So in 1937 she again resorted to arms. By the end of that year her armies had overrun much of North China and had occupied the Shanghai-Nanking area.

Japan's new war against China was not destined to end as quickly or as victoriously as the hostilities of 1931-32, however. At great cost she has managed to take over the railroads and the principal cities in the vast territory between Manchuria and the lower valley of the Yangtze River. She has also occupied the South China ports of Amoy, Swatow and Canton. In an apparent effort to cut off the Chinese supply lines from French Indo-China and Burma she has driven inland and has captured the city of Nanning. She has also taken over the great island of Hainan, off the southernmost point of the Chinese mainland.

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

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36. The Resources of the Far East

Japan's military activities have driven the Chinese from all their large seaports and have compelled them to rely on the interior of their vast country as the economic base for continued resistance. Here they have many advantages which are not always immediately apparent to western eyes. The region is almost completely self-sufficient in foodstuffs. With the exception of cotton (the production of which is steadily increasing), it also produces agricultural raw materials such as wool, bristles and silk, needed for Chinese industry, and enough coal and iron to keep that industry going. China also has arsenals in this area sufficient to meet her requirements of small arms and ammunition. On the other hand, she lacks heavy industries, and she produces little artillery and few airplanes. In order to be able to buy these abroad, she is obliged to export quantities of such goods as tung oil (used in making paint), tea, silk, tin and antimony. She is fortunate, however, in having a large export surplus of all these products.

Japan is in a rather different position economically. She produces practically all her own food (rice, fish, etc.) and nearly all the coal she needs. But, unlike China, she has developed a number of heavy industries, and so she requires large quantities of industrial raw materials in order to keep her economic system functioning. Most of these she has to import. She has no cotton, nickel or mercury, very little lead, petroleum or zinc, and much less iron, aluminum and copper than she uses. In order to be able to buy all of these raw materials she is obliged to export large quantities of raw materials like wood pulp, timber and silk, and manufactured goods like cotton and rayon textiles, pottery and tea. Manchukuo has increased her supply of coal and iron, but has not substantially reduced her dependence on foreign supplies.

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

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37. China's Supply Lines

Because she is dependent on the outside world for her artillery and her airplanes, and because she must export the goods of which she has surpluses in order to be able to buy the products she must import, China's ability to continue her resistance to Japan depends in large measure on her ability to keep her supply lines open. Japan's occupation of the seaports has cut China off from the world's sea lanes, and the recent occupation of Nanning has not only severed one of her lines of communication with French Indo-China but has enabled Japanese bombing planes to threaten the railroad from Indo-China. But China still has an automobile highway into Burma and she is building a railroad along the same route. Furthermore, even if the railroad to Indo-China and the highway to Burma should be cut, she would still be able to bring airplanes and munitions from the Soviet Union. Thus it will be next to impossible for Japan to blockade her completely.

Moreover, this is not the only difficulty Japan now faces. The district around Chungking, which constitutes the heart of China's war base, is so well protected by mountains that an enemy army would have the greatest difficulty in entering it. In the north the Yellow River (which has no bridges) offers an almost equally effective obstacle to further Japanese advances. Even in the areas which she is supposed to have occupied, Japan is constantly harried by Chinese guerrilla bands. In fact, so tenuous is her authority in much of this region that it has been said to extend no farther than a sentry's rifle bullet will carry on either side of the railway lines.

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38. U. S. Foreign Trade

With wars going on in Europe and Asia, it is only natural for Americans to wonder whether we cannot reduce our chances of becoming involved by making ourselves self-sufficient as certain European nations have tried to do.

The map shows how difficult this would be. In 1939 the total value of our foreign trade—exports and imports—was about $5,496,000,000. Doing without it—even if that were possible—would immediately plunge us into a serious economic depression. It would probably spell the difference between profits and losses to such industries as automobiles, airplanes and oil. It would ruin our cotton, tobacco, fruit and hog farmers. And it would affect many other branches of our industry and agriculture almost equally disastrously.

But even if we were willing to stand the costs, we still could not erect a Chinese wall around the United States and hope to maintain the kind of life we now lead. For there are many products—like nickel, antimony, tungsten, tin, rubber, coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, hemp, jute—which we do not produce ourselves and could hardly get along without. So, whatever the dangers, we must still trade.

That means, of course, that our economy is bound to feel the effects of the European war. In fact, the war has already begun to distort our foreign trade. Our tobacco growers, apple farmers and grain producers have all suffered from sharp declines in the exports on which, to a large extent, their continued prosperity depended. For our peacetime shipments of these and other products have given way to huge exports of basic war materials to the Allies. Such shipments, it is estimated, may total a billion dollars in 1940.

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

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39. The Resources of Latin America

The United States is a great industrial nation, and the countries of Latin America are still for the most part producers of foodstuffs and raw materials. Why can't we take their products in exchange for our industrial goods, and so shift our foreign trade away from the world's danger areas?

When you look at the list of Latin America's products, you see that this would not be as easy as it seems. For instance, Latin America produces large quantities of wheat, corn, meat, copper and petroleum. But so do we. Consequently we refuse to import them in any quantities. Furthermore, we produce cotton, tobacco, fruit and nuts, which Latin America either does not buy from us at all, or not in quantities large enough to absorb all of our exports of those products.

Finally, there are the products like rubber, tea, spices, hemp and jute, which neither the United States nor Latin America produces at all, or produces in much smaller quantities than our needs or theirs.

The conclusion seems to be that, given time and determination, we could slowly reshape the economy of the Western Hemisphere in such a way as to bring it much nearer self-sufficiency than it now is. But the process would involve such vast changes in so many branches of agriculture and industry, both in the United States and in Latin America, that it seems unlikely to be undertaken except very gradually indeed.

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40. The U. S. Neutrality Act

In recent years Congress has passed a number of neutrality laws designed to reduce the risk of our becoming involved in foreign wars. These laws have been based on the belief that the United States was drawn into the World War partly because we sold arms to the Allies, partly because we lent them money, and partly because German submarines sank our own ships and other ships carrying American citizens and American goods to Allied ports.

On September 3, 1939, when Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, the neutrality laws forbade Americans to sell arms to belligerents but allowed American ships to carry other cargoes to belligerents and neutrals alike. President Roosevelt immediately called a special session of Congress to revise the law. The special session repealed the arms embargo and passed a new neutrality act. This act makes it possible to sell airplanes and other instruments of war to any nation able to pay cash for them and carry them away. It authorizes the President to proclaim "combat areas," into which American vessels may not venture in any circumstances. It forbids American vessels to carry American passengers or goods to belligerent nations except when those nations are far from the danger zone. And it makes it unlawful for Americans to ship goods to belligerents on any vessel until the title to those goods has been transferred to a foreign organization or individual.

The map shows how the Neutrality Act has been applied to American shipping in the present European war. The combat area was proclaimed by President Roosevelt on November 4, 1939 and is subject to change in the future.

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41. The War and U. S. Defense

Occupying, as we do, a continent between two great oceans, we can, at least in theory, choose between three possible national defense policies: (1) continental defense (we can defend only the territory of the United States, Alaska, the Panama Canal, the Caribbean and Hawaii); (2) hemisphere defense (we can undertake to defend the Monroe Doctrine and so extend our protection to the whole of North and South America); (3) Pacific Ocean defense (we can undertake to defend the Philippines and other outlying possessions in the Pacific and to support American interests and policies in Asia).

Of course, the nature and size of the army and navy we shall need will depend on which policy we adopt. We now have a small regular army and a navy about 20 per cent above the upper limit established at the Washington Conference (1921-22). This force was considered large enough to keep any single hostile navy from our shores, protect the lines of communications from Newfoundland to the Caribbean and control the area between Alaska, Hawaii and the Panama Canal.

Recently, however, there have been demands for a substantial increase in our fleet. These demands are based on the assumption that we ought to adopt the hemisphere defense policy and prepare to uphold the Monroe Doctrine against any possible combination of hostile powers that might come our way. But actually this policy would require a much greater increase than anything yet proposed. For the area we should then have to protect is enormous.

The policy of defending our possessions in the eastern Pacific would require still greater increases in our naval strength.

The "neutrality zone" shown on the map was established by representatives of the United States and the Latin American nations, meeting at Panama shortly after the European war began. It is intended to keep the war at sea from our shores.

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

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42. Naval Strategy in the Pacific

The policy of Pacific Ocean defense is the most difficult of the three possible defense policies for the United States because of the tremendous distances involved.

Most maps are drawn on the so-called Mercator projection, which greatly distorts these distances. The map on the opposite page gives a much more accurate picture. It shows that the shortest distance between the United States and the Philippines is the "great circle" route from Seattle to Manila. This route is about 1,500 miles shorter than the route via Hawaii. But it is still 6,865 miles long—a tremendous distance over which to carry on naval operations against a hostile power. Even Dutch Harbor, our undeveloped naval base in the Aleutian Islands, is 2,300 miles from Japan, and Pearl Harbor, the great fortified naval base in the Hawaiian Islands, is 3,500 miles away.

What these distances mean is that, with a navy at present about three-fifths of ours, Japan dominates the western Pacific, and we are not in a position to challenge her there. Before we could do so we should have to join forces with the British or build a navy perhaps three times as large as Japan's.

On the other hand, Japan could not hope to challenge our supremacy in the eastern Pacific either. Before she could make a successful attack on our territory—penetrating the line of defense which runs from the Aleutian Islands to Hawaii and thence to the Panama Canal—she would have to build a navy about three times the size of ours.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many of the maps in this book have already appeared, some in the form in which they are found here, and others in forms slightly or greatly different, in the pages of *The New York Times*. The maps on pages 11, 21, 23, 25, 49, 51, 53, 55 and 91 have been reproduced without change. Those on pages 13, 15, 17, 27, 29, 33, 37, 45, 57, 59, 65, 67, 73, 77 and 89 have been slightly changed. And those on pages 19, 31, 35, 41, 43, 47, 69, 71, 79, 81, 83 and 85 have been more extensively revised. Our thanks are due the proprietors of *The New York Times* not only for their kind permission to reproduce the maps but also for the generous way in which they have placed the extensive facilities of their art department at our disposal.

The text on page 62 and the map on page 63 are both based on *Handbook of the War*, by John C. DeWilde, David H. Popper and Eunice Clark (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1939).

The map on page 75 has already appeared, in a slightly different form, in *In Quest of Empire: The Problem of Colonies*, by Walter C. Langsam (Headline Book No. 19, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1939).

The information about the length of Europe's boundaries in 1914 and 1937 is from *International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems*, by S. Whittemore Boggs (New York, Columbia University Press, 1935).

Many other books have been used in the preparation of both maps and text. A complete list would cover several pages. But we cannot allow the atlas to go to press without thanking all the members of the Research Department of the Foreign Policy Association, and especially T. A. Bisson, John C. DeWilde and William T. Stone, for their invaluable assistance.

E. H.
V. F.

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

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