

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SPOTLIGHT ON THE BALKANS

LATIN AMERICA
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SPOTLIGHT ON THE BALKANS

by
P. B. STOYAN
(Stoyan Pribichevich)

Maps by RICHARD FALCONER
Charts by BUNJI TAGAWA

THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

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

MUSICAL CHAIRS IN THE BALKANS

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I. Europe's Powder Keg

Twenty years after the First World War people had almost forgotten about the Balkans, though it was there that that war was touched off. Occasionally you may have seen a news item about a Greek king being expelled or called back, about a Bulgarian peasant government being overthrown by the army, about a Yugoslav king being killed in France by a Macedonian terrorist, about the Italian occupation of small, rugged Albania. But to the world at large the Balkans had become a vague, distant land of dimly remembered revolutions and wars.

Then, when this war started, strange Balkan place names began to crop up in the news dispatches again: of the Rumanian provinces of Dobrudja, Transylvania and Bessarabia, claimed by Bulgaria, Hungary and Soviet Russia respectively; of Yugoslav Dalmatia, where Italy says she has an interest; of Yugoslav Slovenia, where the German minority behaves like the Sudeten Germans of former Czechoslovakia. We heard of German designs on Rumanian oil and of a powerful Allied army gathered in Syria, south of Turkey.

WHAT ABOUT THE BALKANS?

Rightly or wrongly, we have grown accustomed to the idea that European wars start in the Balkans. And ever since September 1939 people have wondered, what about the Balkans? Each time Hitler paused to deliver a new blow, many people guessed that it would be in the Balkans. Each time the guess was wrong. In the Second World War the Balkans seem destined to be the last group of small European nations to catch fire. Maybe this is because the Balkans are the only region of Europe where the vital interests of all three dictators —Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin—collide with one another.

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The Balkans are probably the least known part of Europe. To the average American they seem confusing and hard to understand. There are many countries and nationalities there, yet when you come right down to it, the story of the Balkans is fairly simple.

THE MOSAIC

Exactly where the Balkans are is not always clear even to the ordinary Western European. "Balkans" means mountains, and the word designates a large peninsula in the southeast of Europe, where you'll find the following small countries: Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, European Turkey and the Italian Protectorate of Albania. To these we should add Hungary, just touching the northern boundary of the peninsula. For though she is not, strictly speaking, a Balkan country, Hungary shares the fate of the Balkans, as they share hers.

"Melting Pot" has been a title claimed by many regions in this world, from fifteenth-century Italy to the United States and South Africa today. But there has hardly ever been a Melting Pot equal to Hungary and the Balkans. To the man in the street the whole thing is a mess, impossible of understanding. Within an area not much larger than Texas there live sixty million people, divided into six religions, seven states and more than fifteen races and nationalities. It is a mosaic whose sole unity is one space, filled in with variegated tiles.

THE LANDSCAPE

A dramatic region, where countless wars have been fought or have originated, the Balkans can boast of a landscape as varied as are its nations, languages and costumes. Level steppes, barren granite crags, fertile valleys, dark canyons, deep mountain forests, scalloped rocky shores follow each other in the view of the airplane traveler. Ruins of Roman baths and

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imperial palaces, of Greek temples and theatres, of frescoed medieval monasteries, of crumbling feudal castles dot the Balkans next door to Gothic cathedrals, Moslem mosques, Napoleon's highways, modern office buildings—and hundreds of thousands of miserable peasant hovels.

No wonder. For two thousand years the Balkan peninsula has been the meeting place and the no-man's-land between Europe and Asia; the bridge and the wall between empires, religions and civilizations. Numberless hordes, armies and nations have marched or migrated over its soil. Some of them left their people there; and many of them left the imprint of their character—culture or barbarism.

WHY ARE THE BALKANS SO IMPORTANT?

War is a normal state of life in the Balkans, and peace but an interlude. Since time immemorial, all those who have attempted to build an empire in Eastern Europe have tried to dominate this peninsula—the Romans, Turks, Hapsburgs, Tsars, Germans. Of enormous strategic importance, and with some potential riches, these lands, inhabited by many small nations, have been and will continue to be a magnet for foreign imperialists and their conflicting interests. For the last hundred and fifty years Austria, Russia, Turkey and England have struggled over the Balkans. Since this war started it is in this region most of all that the Axis Powers and Soviet Russia have eyed each other like strange dogs.

So it is that the Balkans have earned the nickname of Europe's "powder keg." It is a nickname well chosen indeed: the small nations furnish the keg and the Great Powers the powder.

WHAT THIS BOOK IS ABOUT

This book tells you who the Balkan peoples are and how they came to the Balkans; it tells what has happened to them in

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the course of centuries and how they live today; it sketches their character and their politics and explains the role of the Balkans in the present war; it describes the Nazi plans in the East; and it shows how the Balkans could be organized in the future should Nazi domination be overthrown some day.

Thus, no matter what happens in Europe, this book will provide the reader with a simple background for the understanding of news and events in the Balkans—an understanding which may be as important to us as it is to the Europeans whose very lives depend upon it.

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II. The Balkans in the Middle Ages

Few of us would imagine that in the Balkans, with their incessant struggles, their shifting frontiers and their rising and falling empires, are some of the oldest of European nations. All of the Balkan peoples existed more than a thousand years ago; and the ancestors of some of them lived there three thousand years before that. The handful of Albanians can claim an even more ancient origin than the Greeks; together with the Basques of northern Spain, they are believed to be the oldest living people in Europe.

Uncounted thousands of Teutons and Mongolians passed through the Balkans with fire and sword after the collapse of the Roman Empire; once Attila himself appeared before Constantinople. Not one of these raiders has left a single trace of his blood in the modern Balkans. But the Slav clans, which moved southward from what is now Poland and western Russia, stood their ground.

THE YUGOSLAVS, OR SOUTH SLAVS

A small Slav tribe, the Slovenes, pushed as far as the northern Adriatic, and stayed put in what is now the western tip of Yugoslavia. About the same time—toward the end of the fifth century—immense Slav hordes of bearded men with red hair and blue eyes appeared in what is now Rumania. There these savages spread themselves over the swamps and forests of the lower Danube, living in timber huts and mud houses and endlessly quarreling and fighting with one another. They acted together only when they crossed the Danube in their war canoes to raid the rest of the Balkans, then part of the Byzantine Empire (the eastern half of the Roman Empire). Finally a Byzantine emperor permitted these Slavs to move in and settle in his realm. The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have occupied the territory of present Yugoslavia

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ever since, withstanding the Byzantines, the Turks and the Hapsburgs for more than a thousand years.

THE BULGARIANS

One of the strangest stories in European history is the creation of the Bulgarian nation. Some time toward the end of the seventh century, when various Slav tribes were already established in what is now Bulgaria, a mounted army of slant-eyed, bowlegged men appeared from somewhere near the Ural Mountains. They marched in and subjugated the local Slavs. But, being few in numbers, they intermarried with their serfs and were absorbed into the Slav blood stream. Today the name Bulgar is the only trace of Mongolian origin left in this nation, which by race and language has become entirely Slav.

THE HUNGARIANS

The Magyars were the next to come. A nation from the Urals, related to the Finns, and with a strong Mongolian strain in their blood, they arrived on the eastern slopes of the Carpathians around 900 A. D. From there they gazed upon the silent Danubian steppes of what is now Hungary—a deserted plain without a living man. The Magyars made up their minds to cross the mountains and occupy the Danube valley. Fierce warriors and expert horsemen, they pillaged half of Europe, earning the name Hungarian from the Germans, who called them *hungrig* (hungry) for human prey. The Magyars were neither the first nor the last Asiatics to invade Europe, but they were the only ones to stay and maintain themselves where they settled until the present day.

Then a curious physical change occurred in some of these peoples who settled in the Balkans and the Danube valley. The Hungarians have long since lost Mongolian features; and the southern Slavs, after they had moved into the moun-

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

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tains, took on dark hair and swarthy skin. A similar thing happened later with the Turks: when they first settled in Asia Minor they were yellow, but when the Europeans first saw them they were already a white race. Of course, there was a great mixture of bloods—but these changes have never been satisfactorily explained except as a result of changed environment and occupation.

THE RUMANIANS

How the Rumanians—whose language is based on Latin—came to be where they are is a matter of heated debate. The Rumanians themselves maintain that they are direct descendants of those Romans who, during the second and third centuries A.D., held the territory of present Rumania. The trouble is that there is no evidence of the Rumanians having been there for a thousand years after the Romans left. This gives the Hungarians a chance to say that the Roman origin of the Rumanians is a myth, that those who appeared in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were simply refugees of rather mixed origin from the Central Balkans. To this the Rumanians retort that they had been there all the time—hidden in the high, forest-grown mountain tops of the Carpathians and Transylvania, unseen and untouched by the migrating masses which passed through the valleys at their feet; and that, after a while, they descended from their Olympian heights and spread over the plains.

If you happen to have friends among both Hungarians and Rumanians, the best thing to do is to compromise and assume that the modern Rumanians spring equally from the original "Romanians" and the later Balkan refugees. The controversy would really not be important except for the quarrel over Transylvania—a large province in Rumania with a mixed population of Rumanians, Hungarians and Germans (map, p. 39). Transylvania was part of Hungary before the

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First World War and Hungary wants it back again. If, as the Hungarians claim, their ancestors settled there before there were any Rumanians, then, they argue, Hungary has a historic right to the whole province.

THE GREEKS

All Balkan nations are very mixed. Even the Greeks are not the same as their ancient ancestors. For although the modern Greeks use the same script and speak a language based on ancient Greek, they have received Latin, Slav and Turkish blood in the course of centuries.

Anyway, the fact remains that all the main nations which you'll find in the Balkans and the Danube valley today—the Albanians, Greeks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bulgars, Rumanians and Hungarians—were already there by the year 900.

EAST AND WEST

A fateful line of division—between the eastern and western Roman Empires—had already rent the Balkans when the first Slavs settled there. Unfortunately further partitions followed, causing ever deeper differences among the Balkan and Central European peoples.

When the Christian Church split into the Eastern and Western Churches, in the eleventh century, the line of division followed the same track, leaving the Slovenes, Croats and Hungarians in the realm of the Pope of Rome, while the Patriarch of Constantinople spread his wings over the Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs and Rumanians. When, later, the Turks swept into Europe, the boundary again followed the ancient furrow. For most of the time during four centuries the Slovenes, Croats and Hungarians lived under the Hapsburg emperors and the other Balkan nations under the Sultans. East and West, Asia and Europe, have long wrestled in this area.

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THE FIRST BALKAN STATES

Most of the nations in the Balkans and the Danube valley have known a longer or shorter period of expansion in the medieval past.

For a long time the Greeks ruled the Byzantine Empire, extending over the Balkans and Asia Minor the only stable and orderly state to be found in Europe until the end of the eleventh century. It was a cosmopolitan empire, where Roman and Greek traditions mingled with Oriental influences, where art was rigidly stylized, the splendor of the upper classes was glittering and the people's skill in trading was equal to that of the later Venetians. At the pinnacle, in Constantinople, sat a sacred Emperor, to whom even the Church was subordinated. This was a form of government that all the later Balkan kings tried to imitate and that the Tsar of Russia subsequently succeeded in copying. But, under the blows of the rising Slav nations and the Turks, the Byzantine Empire slowly shrank and disintegrated.

BULGARIA

The Bulgars were the first Slavs to build a powerful medieval realm in the Balkans. In the tenth century their empire stretched from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. But it soon fell again under the sway of Constantinople. Later it was revived, lasting until the Turks finished it off, in the fourteenth century.

CROATIA

The next to bloom and fade were the Croats, in the far west of the peninsula. The Croats were exceptionally good sailors. In the eleventh century, after a long struggle with the Germans, their kingdom embraced the entire Dalmatian coast and half of present Yugoslavia. Then they yielded to the Hungarians, and for 800 years—until the end of the First World

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War, in fact—Croatia was a semi-independent province under the crown of Hungary.

SERBIA

The Serbs were the last Slavs to form an independent Balkan state in the Middle Ages. This they did in the twelfth century. Once formed, their state grew stubbornly, finally enveloping half of the Balkans. Just when, in the fourteenth century, a Serbian emperor was about to attack Constantinople, the Turks crossed over from Asia Minor and turned a new page in Balkan history.

As you can see, the medieval Balkan states were not solid creations. They grew and died in constant strife, and there was nothing firm to give them stability. It is the Balkan peoples, not their governments, who have had stamina throughout history.

HUNGARY

The Hungarians, really, were the only ones to have a lasting state of their own in the Middle Ages—a state which endured six hundred years—from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries. There were times when Hungary was the dominant power in all Central Europe. But disastrous feudal conditions and abuses caused Hungary to deteriorate gradually from within. By 1526 it was easy for Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent to inflict on her a crushing defeat. After that only a narrow strip of Hungarian territory along the Austrian border remained. There the desperate Magyar nobles had no choice but to accept "protection" under the rising Hapsburg star. From then until 1918 the Hapsburgs wore the Hungarian crown.

If you want to have a better understanding of the political mind of the modern Hungarian, you must meet Saint Stephen. Stephen lived a thousand years ago, conquered many lands,

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changed Asiatics into Europeans and converted the Magyars to the Catholic faith. Pope Sylvester II sent him an especially made crown for his work. This crown has been known ever since as the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen. It is enshrined in Budapest and kept safe by special Royal Guards—a golden circlet studded with jewels and enameled portraits of the Apostles and with a tilted cross at the top. Because of this mystic crown, Hungary has been called a kingdom for ten centuries—even when there was no king and no independent Hungary!

All this is a wonderful tradition, but here is the trouble with it: every Hungarian nationalist believes that all the lands which have ever been ruled by the Holy Crown must some day be returned to Hungary. So when Germany marched into Prague in the spring of 1939, the Budapest government seized the opportunity to take back Slav Ruthenia from crumbling Czechoslovakia. Hungarians officially claim all of Transylvania from Rumania, although the Magyars, you'll remember, are only a minority there. Unofficially they think they should also get back Slovakia and certain Yugoslav provinces where there are other Hungarian minorities; some even wish for Croatia, where there are no Hungarians. For all these lands have been at one time or another "the lands of the Holy Crown," and therefore (according to the Hungarians) they should be restored to Hungary.

INVERTED BALKAN NATIONALISM

To be fair, we have to admit that such attempts to use past conquests as the bases for future legal claims are not exclusively Hungarian. Modern nationalists among the Serbs and Bulgars are also loath to hurt the memories of their medieval kings by relinquishing claims to Macedonia, which they conquered in turn from each other and part of which now belongs to Greece. When Hitler occupied the Czech

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provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, he said that, after all, the Holy Roman Empire (whose emperors were German princes) once ruled Prague. If you push such arguments far enough, you'll see that France could demand Canada and England the United States; while Mussolini might claim France, Spain and England as parts of the ancient Roman Empire!

If you grasp this unreasoning obsession with the past, you will have a clearer picture of nationalistic intolerance in present-day Southeastern Europe. Bemused with bygone eminence, many people there find it difficult to adjust themselves to the workaday world of today.

HOW THE BALKAN MAN LIVED IN THE MIDDLE AGES

During these medieval times in the Balkans, how did the man in the street live?

Well, there were hardly any streets. Then there were no citizens as we know them today. You belonged either to the very small privileged class of landowners (the nobility and the higher clergy) or to the Great Unwashed—the land-tilling serfs, without any personal or political rights at all.

The vast mass of the serfs lived in hamlets of wattle huts, while most of the nobles spent their lives overeating and overdrinking like their fellow Europeans, and occasionally sallying forth from their fortified castles to hunt or to plunder. The court circles imitated the Byzantine or the Western fashions, and the kings claimed divine authority.

It is almost impossible to get accurate information about the medieval peasantry in the Balkans proper. We can assume that since the peasants number 80 per cent of the population of the Balkans today, the ratio must have been even higher then. From the scanty legal texts of the times we gather that the Balkan peasant, as a rule, had to give two days' work to his master each week; and that for the same crimes for which the noble paid fines the peasant had his ears, nose,

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tongue or hands cut off. Of course this state of affairs was not peculiar to the Balkans; it prevailed throughout Europe in the Middle Ages.

WHO LIVED IN THE CITIES?

Culture was on a low level in the medieval Balkans—and in Hungary as well, native historians notwithstanding. The only valuable things the kings and princes left behind them there are the many monasteries and churches, some really beautiful. But they imported their architects and painters. On Mount Athos, near Salonika, you'll still find ancient monasteries where there are mosaics, frescoes and ikons made by artists from many distant lands.

Herdsmen and soil-tillers, the Balkan peoples—except the Greeks—were particularly unsuited to urban life. That is why they never developed great native civilizations. Only in a few coastal towns did Balkan culture flourish in the rugged Middle Ages. The most ancient such Slav city republic was Dubrovnik (Ragusa), on the Adriatic, where the citizens traded with far-off Spain and took up mathematics as a hobby at a time when the inland nobles were still eating with their fingers. Today Dubrovnik, with its medieval wall, its palaces and arcades, is only a favored tourist spot.

HOW THE FIRST GERMANS CAME

The subconscious memory of their nomadic past also made it difficult for the Hungarians to live in towns. But as early as the thirteenth century the Hungarian kings invited German settlers from the Rhine to build cities and develop agriculture in Transylvania. The descendants of these early "guests," and those who followed them, still live in modern Rumania, where they form a substantial part of the German minority of 800,000—and a very pro-Nazi part, too.

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THE TURKS—NAMED OSMANLIS AFTER THEIR LEADER

One by one the small Balkan states of the Middle Ages fell under the sway of empires of the East or West. The most amazing Asiatic conquest in Europe was the Turkish. In the eleventh century a Turkish tribe moved from Central Asia through Persia and wrested Asia Minor from faltering Byzantium. Had these nomads chosen to go straight west, in the tracks of the Huns and Magyars, the whole history of Europe would have been different.

Until a brilliant leader, Osman, or Othman, brought them all under his command and organized the entire nation into a believing and fighting unit, the Turks lived in Asia Minor, scattered in many clans and groups. Since Osman's day the Turks have adopted the name of Osmanlis, and until the end of the First World War the realm of which he laid the foundation was called the Ottoman Empire.



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The hooves of the swift-moving Osmanli cavalry first resounded on the European shores of the Dardanelles in 1354. From there, beating Bulgarian and Serbian armies one after another, the Osmanlis spread over the Balkans. In 1453 they took by assault "impregnable" Constantinople, the capital and last stronghold of the Byzantine Empire. The splendid Church of St. Sofia was transformed into a mosque, and Constantinople became Istanbul. Not until 1919—nearly five hundred years later—did a foreign army again pass through its streets.

Soon Bosnia, then an independent Slav country, now part of Yugoslavia, capitulated. Finally Suleiman the Magnificent routed the Hungarians and, in 1529, appeared before the spires of Vienna. But he gave up the siege and retired to consolidate his recent conquests.

WHAT THE TURKS DID

The Sultan's highly effective troops had powerful allies in the oppressed Christian peasants. In desperation the Balkan serfs generally made common cause with the Turks and even rose against their own feudal barons.

For a long time the lot of the peasants was actually better under the Turks than it had been under their former Christian overlords. They paid fewer taxes, and they weren't harried by their Moslem landlords. But they didn't get any political rights; these were reserved for the Moslems. It may sound strange, but except for their treatment of the native landlords, the Turks were more tolerant of other peoples' religions than the Western Europeans were. Throughout their domain they granted religious liberty to all groups, even the Jews, as long as those groups submitted willingly to Moslem rule.

The one tax that the subject peoples felt heavily was the so-called "blood tax." Every four years the Sultan's commissioners roamed over the Balkans to draft the soundest

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Christian boys from six to ten years old. They took them to Istanbul, brought them up as Mohammedans, trained them in special schools and put them into the formidable corps of Moslem storm troopers, the Janissaries—then perhaps the best infantry in Europe.

The Turks changed the whole social structure of the Balkans by liquidating the native aristocracy. (Only in Hungary, and to some extent in Rumania, did the aristocracy remain untouched as a class.) Those nobles who had not adopted Mohammed's faith were required to surrender their lands to Turks. Without any nobility or middle class of their own, the Balkan nations lived for almost four centuries as totally peasant nations. When they regained independence, in the nineteenth century, all their new classes sprang from this sturdy peasant stock.

WHY THE TURKS FAILED

The main trouble with the Osmanlis was that they were a fighting, not a working, nation. When their conquests stopped and their war machine became purposeless, the only way they could think of to make a living was to start taxing the last penny out of their subjects. So their whole empire sank into economic decline and cultural desolation, while the administration festered with corruption. During this long agony of dissolution, revolts began to flicker in the Balkans and guerrilla bands appeared in the mountains and forests—the forerunners of the modern *komitadjis* (famous irregulars of the Serbian and Bulgarian armies, specializing in hand-grenade throwing and hand-to-hand fighting).

What kept the Osmanlis from achieving anything in industry or science was the mental dictatorship of their faith. Mohammedanism was a "totalitarian" religion, regulating not only man's relationship to God but politics, economics and private conduct as well. The Koran, the Mohammedan's

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Bible—to which even sanitary installations had to conform—had petrified the Turkish mind.

THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY

The destiny of the Turks is strange: they were Asiatics in Europe for six centuries and only began to be Europeanized after 1913, when they were definitely pushed back to Asia.

Unlike other dictators of our time, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the dictator of modern Turkey until his death in 1938, had the courage to trample upon his nation's past. He abolished the Sultanate, ordered the men to throw away their fezzes and turbans, pulled the veils from the faces of the women, drove them out of the harems into the offices and sports fields—and thus liberated the Turks from the long tyranny of the Koran.

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III. The Balkans before the First World War

More than nine hundred years ago, on the Swiss river Aar, facing green rolling Alsace, there was a castle built called Hapsburg. By the thirteenth century, through continued accumulation of lands, its owners had reached Austria.

THE HAPSBURGS

The outstanding trait of the Hapsburgs was their ability to acquire and rule lands and peoples as they would have private enterprises. Their favorite method was to contract political marriages. They settled in Vienna and won the German imperial crown in the fifteenth century, to hold it until 1806. At just about the time when the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the Balkans, the Near East and Africa (the sixteenth century), the successful Hapsburg family could also claim enormous territories in Western Europe and Central and South America. By 1918 it had piled up a collection of titles covering half a printed page and ranging from Count to Apostolic Emperor.

What was the meaning and importance of the Hapsburgs to Southeastern Europe?

The real job of this dynasty was to unite and organize the small Christian nations of Southeastern Europe into a bulwark and spearhead against the Turks. And in this the Hapsburgs succeeded. They threw back the Turks at Vienna (1683), gradually occupied all of Hungary and then throughout the eighteenth century undertook a series of offensive thrusts against the Sultans. Unfortunately the Hapsburg emperors forced the German language and the Catholic faith on their subjects, thus spreading resentment and provoking endless conflicts, particularly with the Hungarians. And their

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ultimate aim was to "liberate" the Balkan peoples from the Turks by taking them under their own so-called "protection."

MORE GERMANS COMING

The Germans were the best European colonists of the time —industrious and expert in crafts and agriculture alike. The Austrian Empress Maria Theresa (1740-80) settled a good many of them in her Danubian provinces, and those Germans were the forefathers of most of the German minorities in Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia today.

ENTER RUSSIA

Soon another power appeared on the Balkan scene. In his last will and testament Peter the Great, the Tsar of Russia from 1689 to 1725, called the acquisition of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles the "historic mission" of Holy Russia. For nearly two hundred years after his death this imperialistic program was disguised as the duty of protecting the Balkan Slavs and Orthodox Christians. Under this banner Russia waged incessant wars on Turkey.

THE EASTERN QUESTION

At first the two missionaries—Austria and Russia—acted as partners, but in the nineteenth century they turned into bitter rivals, with England stepping in, now in favor of Turkey, now of Austria, but always opposed to Russia's attempts to seize Istanbul. By then the Sultan's empire was so decayed that it was commonly called the Sick Man of Europe. And the question of whether to let the sick man die or not, and how to dispose of his corpse and of the small Balkan nations, when he did, became so complicated in this tangle of power politics that the term "Eastern Question" came to be used for any insoluble puzzle.

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Such were the conditions under which the Balkan peoples fought for freedom both from Turkey and from the European powers.

NATIONAL REVOLUTIONS

Although the Turks, by 1800, had already lost Hungary, Transylvania and the Crimea to the two advancing Christian powers, they still held practically the entire Balkan peninsula.

It was in a Turkish border province, Serbia, that the first Balkan national revolution blazed up (1804). Profiting by two Russian wars on Turkey, the Serbs soon won their autonomy. This was the signal for the insurrections and wars which swept over the Balkans for many years and which in 1913 drove the Turks back to the western defenses of Constantinople. Only Istanbul, with a narrow belt of land around it, remains of Turkey's European empire today.

The Greeks followed the Serbian example in 1821, and their rebellion became so popular in Europe that, when it was in danger of failing, the governments of England, France and Russia forced the Sultan to recognize a small independent Greece (1829).

So far so good. But by helping the Serbs and the Greeks Russia secured for herself free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles—and so England began to worry. If Russia were allowed to take Istanbul and destroy Turkey, she would cut off Britain's land route to India. So the British statesmen figured out that Turkey should, after all, be preserved as a barrier to safeguard the imperial highway, and that the Balkan nations should not be completely liberated from Turkey because they would then become pawns of Russia. Together with France, England even fought the famous Crimean War against Russia to save Turkey (1854-6).

British determination to keep Russia out of the Mediter-

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ranean only grew stronger when the French engineer De Lesseps, after a full decade of hard work, opened the Suez Canal (1869). In the seventies new Slav uprisings against the Turks spread through Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria—and the Russian army again crossed the Danube and appeared before Istanbul. Frightened, the Sultan renounced practically all his possessions in the Balkans and recognized a large, independent Bulgaria.

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

Then England rallied the European powers to a congress in Berlin (1878) to stop Russian expansion. While stripping Russia of almost all her gains, the powers distributed among themselves a number of Turkish territories. England took the island of Cyprus, which faces the Suez Canal; France was authorized to establish a protectorate over Tunis; and Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia and Rumania were accorded full sovereignty, but only a small Bulgaria, vassal to Turkey, was permitted.

Thus a large strip of land in the Central Balkans, from Istanbul to the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic, remained in Turkish hands, embracing the Albanians and a good many Serbs, Greeks and Bulgars. In other words, the Berlin Congress left the Balkan peoples partly independent and partly divided between Turkey and Austria-Hungary.

THE SEEDS OF THE WORLD WAR

The seeds of the World War were sown at the Berlin Congress of 1878. Almost immediately after the diplomats had left Berlin, those alignments were made which finally clashed in 1914.

One year after the Berlin Congress Germany and Austria-Hungary signed a treaty of alliance and started on a campaign of penetrating the Balkans and the Near East. The Hapsburg

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Monarchy was to use its political and military might, the German Kaiser only economic methods.

THE DRANG NACH OSTEN

Without profitable colonies, and in need of raw materials and foodstuffs in exchange for her industrial goods, Germany evolved a grandiose scheme for the economic domination of the Balkans, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia (Iraq). German banks opened branches in eastern cities, German commercial agents appeared everywhere, German military missions came to drill the Turkish army, German enterprise focused on building railroads. In 1903 the Sultan finally granted the concession for the celebrated Berlin-to-Bagdad line.

Having dealt with Napoleon and Russia, the British now perceived an even more threatening enemy in Germany. London and Paris suddenly realized that Germany was up to no mere economic penetration but was attempting political control of the many millions of human beings living between Belgrade and the Persian Gulf. In fact, she was building herself an economic empire along the oldest route from Europe to Asia—and a German railroad through the Balkans and Asia Minor would be a much better artery for transporting goods and troops to India than the Suez Canal. This was the *Drang nach Osten*—the "Push to the East"—of Imperial Germany.

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

France and Russia had concluded a counteralliance against Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1891. In 1907, though she did not assume military obligations, England joined the alliance to form the so-called Triple Entente. Thus once again the King of England and the Tsar of Russia found themselves friends. The explanation of the British was brief and to the point. "We have not changed," they said. "The circumstances have."

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European peace after the Berlin Congress was an armed peace, that is, an armistice leading to a final accounting.

AUSTRIA BECOMES AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Unfortunately for them, the modern Hapsburgs were not tolerant and liberal rulers. While the Turks were being pushed out of Europe, the Hapsburgs' job was to hold and weld together the many different nationalities in Central Europe—and they thought the way to do it was to impose on all those nationalities a Germanic police-state. It was an efficient system, but it aggravated grievances and resentments on all sides. In 1848, for instance, a Hungarian rebellion almost broke up the Hapsburg monarchy.

Two decades later, after Austria's defeat by Prussia, Emperor Francis Joseph concluded with the Hungarians the so-called Compromise. Under it the Empire was transformed into a dual monarchy, Austria and Hungary, each composed of many nationalities. Both had the same monarch and decided in common on war, foreign policy and tariffs.

The real reason for this reorganization, however, was the Hapsburgs' growing fear of the many Slavs in their realm. Before the First World War, Austria-Hungary's 260,000 square miles were divided into two states of nineteen provinces, and her fifty-one million people consisted of ten nations with twenty divergent nationalities. In 1910 there were twelve million Germans and ten million Hungarians; these ruled over twenty-nine millions of other peoples, of whom the Slavs alone numbered twenty-five millions. By 1914 the Slavs, because of their high birth rate, had become more than one-half of the total population.

Apparently it was unwise to devour so many indigestible Slavs—among them the Yugoslavs (South Slavs), the most turbulent of all.

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THE SOUTH SLAVS TOUCH OFF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Austria-Hungary's real trouble with the Yugoslavs began when she occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. Things only got worse during the Balkan War of 1912-13. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece attacked Turkey, defeated her and divided up all the remaining Turkish territories in the Balkans except Istanbul and the immediate vicinity. It was agreed that Serbia was to have an outlet on the Adriatic, but Austria-Hungary wouldn't let her get it. Then the Serbs asked the Bulgars for a bigger slice of Macedonia. Thus a free-for-all started in which the Serbs took what they wanted. Greece grabbed part of Thrace, the Turks Adrianople, and the Rumanians southern Dobrudja. These wounds still rankle in Bulgarian hearts.

Numerous terroristic acts and endless trials for high treason filled the last decade before the World War in those Hapsburg provinces which are now western Yugoslavia. Finally, on the bright morning of June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, an eighteen-year-old Serbian high school student, Gabriel Princip, fired two shots which ended the lives of the heir to the Hapsburg throne, Francis Ferdinand, and his wife. The government at Vienna accused Serbia of being responsible for the crime and declared war against her. But Russia regarded further expansion of Austria-Hungary into the Balkans as a threat to her own vested interests there—and so the whole mechanism of European big-power alliances was set in motion.

WHY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY PERISHED

The First World War did not destroy Austria-Hungary; it only brought about the end of her own fatal sickness. The Hapsburg rulers could not see that the only workable basis for holding together all their many small peoples was an extensive democratic federation. Today many people think that if the Hapsburg monarchy had given autonomy to each nat-

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ional group under a democratic government, it would not only have lived but would have attracted other small Balkan nations to it. It might even have included all of Southeastern Europe and have grown—say—into the United States of the Danube!

It is said that Archduke Francis Ferdinand had intended to grant increased federalism to Austria-Hungary—but he was assassinated before he had a chance to do so. When Emperor Francis Joseph died, in the midst of the World War, Charles, the father of homeless Otto, mounted the throne. A few months before the Armistice Charles issued a manifesto for a federal reorganization of the Hapsburg Empire. But by then it was definitely too late, for by that time most of the Empire's nationalities were demanding complete independence.

Except for the United States of America, Austria-Hungary was the greatest racial experiment of modern times. It failed chiefly because it was not built on the bedrock of America's principles. But the task remains—and is more important than ever.

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IV. Claims and Complications

For the moment, let's not be strict about geography. To get a bird's-eye view let's take in, along with the Balkans, all the lands that used to belong to Austria-Hungary. Look at the map as it was in the years after the First World War and you will find in the 400,000 square miles between Prague, Istanbul and Athens nine small independent countries: Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and a tiny part of Turkey. Two of these states were new—Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; two were uncoupled and reduced—Austria and Hungary; one—Rumania—was enormously enlarged, mostly at the expense of Hungary.

By April 1939 three of these states had disappeared—Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania. In June 1940 Soviet Russia took Bessarabia, which she had lost to Rumania in 1918, and also North Bukovina, which she had never before possessed. How much further the map will change during the present war, no one knows.

BLOC AND COUNTERBLOC

After the First World War two opposing groups immediately began to take shape among the small post-war states: those which felt satisfied with their frontiers and those which didn't. In the first group were Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece—called the *status quo* countries, because they wanted no change of boundaries. In the second group were Hungary and Bulgaria, nicknamed the "revisionist" countries because they wanted—and still want—to revise the frontiers to their advantage.

For fifteen years the two revisionist states were supported by Italy, the only victorious power in Europe which was dissatisfied with the booty she had won in the First World War.

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The *status quo* states were supported by France. In 1921 three of them—Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia—made an alliance. This alliance was called the Little Entente. It was intended primarily to prevent Hungary from getting back the territories she had lost in the war, but it also gave the French a convenient eastern barrier against Germany. It collapsed when France and England, believing that Nazi Germany would leave them alone if allowed to march east, permitted her to occupy Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939.

THE REVISIONIST STATES

The peace treaties of 1919 took away two-thirds of Hungary's territory and more than half of her population. It is true that of her forfeited people nearly two-thirds were not Hungarians. Still, along with them more than two and a half million Hungarians were allotted to Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria, having lost southern Dobrudja to Rumania in 1913, also made a rash choice in the First World War by siding with Germany—and lost more land, this time to Greece and Yugoslavia.

Talking about big power politics, we should not forget that there are also small power politics in the Balkans. This is the way they work: the claim for territory which any one small country puts forward depends on which one of the others is in trouble. For instance, Hungary, which retrieved her 700,000 Hungarians (and acquired 600,000 Slav Ruthenians) from Czechoslovakia when Czechoslovakia was dismembered by Germany, pretends to be content with the Yugoslav frontier and demands Transylvania from Rumania. And Bulgaria, which would like to get Thrace back from Greece and cannot forgive the Serbs for taking Macedonia—the Balkan Alsace —acts as though she wanted only southern Dobrudja from Rumania.

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THE MAZE OF NATIONALITIES

Just try to enumerate the Balkan nationalities to the average American and he'll throw up his hands long before you've finished. You can't blame him, either. The names of seven nations—Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Greeks, Albanians, Bulgars, Turks, Rumanians and Hungarians—would seem to be enough. But you can't avoid mentioning also the numerous minorities sprinkled all over the Balkan map—Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians and others (remnants of various invaders and refugees)—to say nothing of Jews and gypsies. The largest of these national groups is the Rumanian, numbering fifteen millions. The smallest, the Slovenes, hardly exceeds one million.

Of all European countries Rumania has—or had before the loss of Bessarabia and North Bukovina—the greatest percentage of so-called national minorities—about five millions out of twenty. They are chiefly Hungarians, Jews, Germans and Ruthenians; then come Bulgars, Russians, Turks and Tartars. Around two out of Yugoslavia's fifteen millions are minorities, mainly Hungarians, Germans and Albanians. There are over one and a half million Ruthenians, Jews and Germans in Hungary's more than ten millions. Bulgaria's six millions include half a million Turks, while Greece's seven millions are the least diluted with national minorities.

Much has been said against the peace treaties of 1919, and it has become trite to blame the Versailles Treaty for all the misfortunes of Europe. But if we take another look at the map of the Balkans and Central Europe as it was in 1914 we'll see that Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia ruled over sixty million alien people. Even though the post-war treaties did increase the number of frontiers and tariff barriers in this area, they reduced the total of national minorities there to something like twenty millions. This was far from ideal, and the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier in par-

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

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ticular seems to have been unfair. Yet it was surely a tremendous improvement over what had gone before.

SELF-DETERMINATION OR MUTUAL TOLERANCE?

The gentlemen who made the peace of 1919 reshuffled European frontiers in the name of the self-determination of nations, which means that each nationality should belong to the state of its own choice. But the trouble is that this formula won't work in the Balkans and the Danube valley. Secretary of State Lansing was quick to recognize this fact: he called self-determination a "word filled with dynamite." The trouble is that the numerous nationalities in the Balkans and the Danube valley are so tangled up that it's next to impossible to draw "just" frontiers between them. Wherever you might put a boundary line, there would always be a national minority left on at least one side of it. So self-determination for one people turns into alien rule for another.

Let's agree that about half a million Rumanian Magyars could be ceded to Hungary without turning over more than a very few Rumanians. But most of the minority groups are big or small "enclaves," or islands, within the regions inhabited by other peoples; and either they are so scattered that they can't be gathered up or they form compact masses with no territorial connection with their parent bodies. Certainly many Rumanian and Yugoslav Magyars could be given back to Hungary—with their immediate Rumanian and Yugoslav neighbors becoming new national minorities in Hungary. But how are the nearly two million Germans who are dotted through Central Europe going to get "home to the Reich"?

All in all, self-determination is an unfortunate slogan for Southeastern Europe. Mutual tolerance would be a much better one. The welter of nationalities there will continue to be a source of strife until, in some distant future, they all combine in a general federation with constitutional guarantees for each group.

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THE JEWS

The Jews in the Balkans constitute a problem all their own. Since Biblical days it has never been easy to count the sons of Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew. It seems that in the whole world there are only about sixteen million Jews, and of these less than two millions live in the Danube valley, chiefly in Rumania (900,000) and Hungary (600,000). Even so, in both Hungary and Rumania the Jews—as yet—fare better, or rather less badly, than in the Third Reich: there are no concentration camps for them and they are not forbidden to marry non-Jews, although they have been deprived of certain civic rights.

HUNGARIAN JEWS

By far the largest part of the Jews in Hungary and Rumania are descendants of the great Israelite exodus from the pogroms and misery of Tsarist Russia in the 'sixties and 'seventies. In both countries, as elsewhere, the strength of Jewry rests on two main foundations: its formidable solidarity and its concentration in the most important localities and branches of business. This concentration is sometimes the result of the Jews' own astute judgment and sometimes of an invitation by incapable non-Jews.

Of all Hungary's business men, lawyers and physicians, until 1939 almost one-half were Jews. Budapest alone—one of the biggest Jewish centers in the world—has 200,000 Jews, more than 20 per cent of its population. How did this happen? Well, the sons of the Hungarian aristocrats and landowners despised the "low" occupations of industry and commerce, and when jobs were made for them in the civil service, the Jewish refugees were welcomed to build up Hungarian business. So we can say that two middle classes were born in Hungary, a Gentile and a Jewish one, one dominating the civil service and the army, the other trade and industry.

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In 1939 a law was passed limiting the number of Jews in Hungarian business and industry to 12 per cent of the total number of persons in those occupations and in the liberal professions to 6 per cent. They may hold no leading position in journalism, the theater or the cinema. No Jews are allowed in the civil service, and all Jewish land over half an acre can be expropriated.

To make a long story short, by the end of 1944 one-half of the Hungarian Jews—some 300,000 people—will have no means of living and will have to seek new homes abroad.

RUMANIAN JEWS

The story of the Rumanian Jews is similar. They flocked into the towns to take over the shops and the trades, for the vast majority of the Gentiles there were not townsfolk. For instance, forty years ago the total city population of Rumania was only 700,000, of whom one-half were Jews. Here, as in Hungary, the Jewish immigration was more than just an addition of people of another race and religion: it upset the national class balance. But the newcomers couldn't be held back, for they had greater business ability than the natives and were also willing to work harder. Naturally, the Rumanians, not knowing what else to do, resorted to anti-Jewish legislation, and occasionally to riots.

Full citizenship was not granted to the Rumanian Jew until 1918, and with the recent economic depression anti-Semitic sentiment has flared up again, especially among the middle classes. A severe anti-Jewish law was almost enacted in 1938, and only desperate need for friendship with the Western powers at that time made the Rumanian government drop the idea. When France fell, in June 1940, King Carol barred the Jews from the army, public offices and boards of corporations. And the moment Rumania gets under definite German control, the Jews will be the first burnt offering.

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THE JEWS IN THE REST OF THE BALKANS

A very few Jews live in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Most of them are picturesque, highly cultured people—remnants of fifteenth-century refugees from Catholic Spain. Of all European Semites they would seem to be the safest. Not only have there never been outbreaks or legislation against them, but, despite the conscientious efforts of the scanty local Nazis, there is not even a sign of bad feeling. In the streets of Istanbul, Salonika, Belgrade, Sarajevo, you may still see old Jewish women wearing ancient-looking, multi-colored shawls bound around their heads and hear them speaking the old Spanish long since forgotten in Spain.

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V. How They Live

Far more than half the people of the Balkans are peasants. The Balkan peasants are poverty-ridden and differ from the city dwellers in customs as well as in costumes. Industrial workers, except in Hungary, are extremely few, and those few are unorganized and half-peasant. Industry, commerce and banking are still in their swaddling clothes and have often been run by foreign companies or native governments; so that there is no real business class, but only a few capitalist families. The intellectual class is small and poor. And almost one-third of the city dwellers are civil employees and their families.

EUROPE'S "DEEP SOUTH"

Catch a train in Berlin going southeast toward Belgrade or Bucharest and you'll be amazed when you emerge overnight from a highly industrialized Europe into an agricultural Europe where the living conditions remind you of the deep South in the United States. This is a region where peasants are more numerous than anywhere else in Europe. In Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia alone they amount to as much as eighty per cent of the total population—thirty-two million peasants and only eight million non-peasants!

Over here we hear a lot about the conflict between capital and labor. Over there in the Balkans this rivalry doesn't amount to much; the main difference is between the city and the village, the town dwellers and the peasants. And these two groups, one small and one large, are not merely what you'd call classes; they are two ways of living and thinking, two economies, two moral codes, two political attitudes—almost two hostile worlds, with little in common but their language.

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Don't think that the Balkan peasant is anything like his Russian counterpart, or our American farmer either. He is much more of a rugged individualist than the first, and certainly more of a collectivist than the second. Not so long ago he used to live in large patriarchal households, called *zadrugas*, and embracing sometimes more than a hundred relatives, who owned and worked their land together. By now these big families have completely broken up. But take a walk through a Balkan village or field and you'll see the neighbors still helping each other with voluntary collective labor. In other words, the Balkan peasant favors collective work but believes in private property.

Many things in these countries of contrasts make the Balkan peasants strikingly similar everywhere: serfdom in the past, low level of living and education in the present, exclusion from public affairs under authoritarian regimes, the same traditions, customs and outlook on life. This basic likeness shows most in the peasant parties and their almost identical programs of "agrarian democracy."

PEASANT PARTIES

Green is the color of the Balkan peasant parties. These parties, systematically banned and persecuted by the Balkan governments, are particularly strong among the Croats in Yugoslavia, the Bulgars and the Rumanians. Their platform is opposed to communism and fascism alike, for it demands representative government with free speech and ballot; and it differs from Western democracy because it asks for equality of wealth. As one of the peasant leaders summed it up: "No man can be free without private property; but private property must be small if all men are to be free."

The peasant parties believe cooperatives would cure all the ills that beset the Balkan peasantry. Cooperatives, they say, would eliminate middlemen without resort to forcible sociali-

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zation; they would also not only organize community credits and wholesale buying and selling but would extend cooperation into production by collectivizing labor, while leaving ownership untouched. No wonder the Balkan communists call cooperatives a capitalist trick.

It's anybody's guess how this program would work out, for these parties have been in power only in Bulgaria and Rumania, and only for a few years after the First World War even there. Their cooperatives, such as have been tolerated by the governments, have done fine work in spreading literacy and in promoting public hygiene.

Under Nazi-Fascist domination, the peasant parties will have to withdraw entirely into the hearts of men.

WHO OWNS THE LAND?

One-half or more of the peasants in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Rumania live on holdings smaller than the official minimum for mere existence. How is that, since there are no large estates to speak of? It's because of overpopulation. Vast stretches of land in the Balkans are unfit for agriculture, and in the three countries just mentioned there are three or four times as many people living on the same arable acreage as in Denmark. In the past the remedy was emigration to America; now there is nothing left but improvement of agricultural methods and industrialization—or, in dollars and cents, a tremendous investment of capital.

In the few good years after the first World War, the peasants themselves tried to improve their production and borrowed money at exorbitant rates to buy seed and implements. Then what happened? Agricultural prices crashed and the peasants couldn't pay either debts or taxes. So they found themselves burdened with a staggering debt which even their governments don't know how to pay off. In Rumania, for instance, the debt swelled by 1932 to nearly

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

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$400,000,000, or $26 to every single Rumanian peasant—the largest agricultural debt in the world. To figure out what this would mean to an American farmer, remember that Uncle Sam's money has double purchasing power in the Balkans; in other words, in America the Rumanian peasant's debt would be equivalent to $52 for every person in a farm family.

Now let's take a country in a different plight, Hungary. She suffers from big-estate trouble. In 1934 there were 1,200 large properties in Hungary covering nearly one-third of all the land, while peasants with insufficient land, or none at all, numbered three millions out of a total of four and a half.

HOW THE BALKAN PEASANT LIVES AND WORKS

It seems hard to believe, but the standard of living of the Balkan peasant is infinitely lower even than that of the Western European farmer. He is underfed, poorly clothed and still worse housed. Mechanized agriculture is practically non-existent, and a good many peasants still use wooden plows (there are 300,000 of them in use in Yugoslavia alone). In Rumania 37 per cent of the rural families do not even own draft animals. Almost one-half of the Balkan people are illiterate, and this sad disability ranges from 5 per cent among the Slovenes and 10 among the Hungarians to 60 among the Serbs.

The common way in which the city takes advantage of the Balkan peasant is to tax him for the right to sell in the city. You may ask why he doesn't try to sell somewhere else. Well, either there is no transportation or he can't afford to pay for it. Add to this the fact that agricultural prices in the Balkans have fallen 50 per cent during the last ten years, while the prices of industrial commodities, protected by tariffs and price-fixing, have risen—and you will have an inkling of the predicament called "scissors."

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And yet, with all the poverty and disease, the population increase in the Balkans has been stupendous. In Yugoslavia the population has increased 25 per cent in the last twenty years; and in Bulgaria the birth rate is 136 children a year to every 1,000 women between fifteen and fifty. The most fertile non-Slav country in Europe—Italy—can produce only one hundred per thousand.

Emigration to America during the forty years before the last World War was heaviest from Hungary and those poor parts of the Balkans which belonged to the Hapsburg Empire. Between 1876 and 1910 more than three and a half million peasants left those lands, and of them three million came to the United States.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

In point of numbers the industrial workers make a pretty poor showing in Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece —two and a half million out of forty-eight. Only in Hungary do they form one-fourth of the population. The only strongly organized labor group in the Balkans is the Greek maritime workers' union: they learned about unions in England. But on the whole unionization is utterly feeble, comprising only 5 to 10 per cent of all Balkan workers. Such Lilliputian organizations, of course, have no say in national politics.

No government relief or unemployment insurance blesses the Balkan workman, and his wages range from $3 to $9 a week. Coming from the village, he retains his peasant way of life and is ready to eat nothing but beans and onions, sleep on the floor with a dozen other fellows in some tumbledown shed and work ten hours a day for a ridiculously small reward. He never gets used to industry and the city and dreams only of returning to the land in his old age.

Immigrants to America from those parts behave very much the same way. What money they can save they send

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to their families back home. They even cherish the illusion that some day they will go back themselves. Their homesickness is not really for their old countries but for their old peasant homes: it is the peasant, not the alien, in them whom it is difficult to Americanize.

MIDDLE CLASS AND BUREAUCRACY

The people who crowd the booming Balkan towns are still only a thin crust on each nation's surface. They come from all sorts of stock—medieval craftsmen, imported German shopkeepers and officials, Greeks—but mostly from land-deserting peasants and their sons. Balkanites of this class are often enterprising and rugged and fascinated by power and money, a fact which makes them tough business men and politicians.

Just the same it is surprising to know how many of them live from the public purse. Over here a farmer or a worker who wants to improve his son's station in life tries to send him into business; over there, where there is little business, he puts him into government service.

In short, the Balkan middle class is largely taken care of by the taxpayer. In Yugoslavia, for instance, there were 200,000 civil servants (exclusive of provincial employees) in 1938—which is as if in this country in the same year we had had 2 millions instead of only 850,000. Hungary created a colossal bureaucracy as a form of relief for the sons of her impoverished gentry. And of the Rumanian townsman it has been said that he is born on a government fellowship, lives an official and dies on a pension.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

The Balkan countries are capitalist countries. But, strangely enough, there is little room there for native capitalists: much of business and industry that is not controlled by foreign companies is run by the governments.

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As a rule, the Balkan governments have fingers in the pies of banking, mining and lumbering. They own and operate the railroads, telephone, telegraph, radio. They monopolize the tobacco industry and the production of basic necessities: matches, sugar, salt, yeast, kerosene. Since you've simply got to buy these things at any price decreed, this comes down to additional taxation. And when you remember that business is really not big in the Balkans, don't forget that the Balkan governments themselves are huge business enterprises.

In contrast, Hungary has developed since the last World War a fairly good industry, particularly in sugar, textiles, leather, chemicals, machines. But most of it, again, is protected by high tariffs and by price-fixing agreements under government control.

FOREIGN CAPITAL

Kemal Ataturk, the late dictator of Turkey, managed to run his country without much foreign capital; Hungary too has few foreign-owned business enterprises. But in the rest of Southeastern Europe practically one-half of the capital invested in industry is foreign. This, of course, has only spurred on the Great Powers in their competition for political control of the peninsula. You could hardly expect anything else, since the people there have neither their own money nor much industrial talent and experience.

Who owns what? To draw a simple picture: the French control Yugoslavia's copper and lumber industries, Bulgaria's banking and Rumania's banking, iron works and cement factories. The British control the Yugoslav lead and zinc mines, the Rumanian oil industry and the Greek nickel mines and public utilities. The Belgians control Bulgaria's mining and public utilities. And the Germans have penetrated into the Yugoslav bauxite (aluminum ore), antimony and steel industries and banking, as well as into Rumania's metallurgy.

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German capital, the most aggressive in the Balkans nowadays, is constantly acquiring new enterprises, but has no hold on the most important item—Rumanian oil: foreign companies extract 90 per cent of it, and the British and the French alone control 52 per cent of the invested capital.

The fortunes of war, however, are rapidly changing this picture. Germany is expected to liquidate the Belgian and French interests in the Balkans—and she may soon be able to do so with the British too. For example, on July 24, 1940 the Rumanian government confiscated the largest British oil company in Rumania, the Astra Romana, a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell.

THE STORY OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Every single government in Southeastern Europe has encouraged industrialization since the First World War, both to attain self-sufficiency and to provide an outlet for overpopulation in the rural areas. Neither of these aims has been achieved, however. Instead, such a forcing policy has created a small, wretched proletariat and has supplied the people with goods of high cost and low quality, tariff-protected against the better and cheaper imported products.

Here is one example of how agriculture fared: in 1937 Yugoslav peasants had to pay six dollars duty on the lightest foreign-made iron plow (a tariff equal to that on a piano) to protect a domestic plant which produced just fifty plows a year!

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VI. Politics in the Balkans

The man from the Balkans has often been pictured abroad as an unwashed, wild-looking individual, with a dagger in one hand and a bomb in the other, or maybe with a knife between his teeth. Of course, we know that caricatures of foreigners are popular in every country. There are a good many respectable provincial people in the Balkans, for instance, who, thanks to Hollywood, still imagine the typical American as a dapper gangster shooting at the police with a submachine gun; or as an editor with his feet on the desk and a derby hat over one eye.

THE TYPICAL BALKANITE

In truth, there is no such thing as a typical Balkanite because there are so many of them, each different and each peculiar to a certain region or walk of life. Between the Adriatic and the Black Seas you can meet every kind of human character under the sun; sober, industrious people, as methodical as the Germans; impulsive men inclined to violence; romantics capable of stubborn passive resistance; ruthless, cynical politicians and money-makers; overproud mountaineers who would rather die than break their word, but would also kill you if you offended them; gay, exuberant people, and the somber ones who never dance or sing; the energetic, hard-working stock from which the immigrants come; and groups so indolent that nothing can rouse them from their sleepy indifference. And all over the peninsula crooks and profiteers rub elbows with men of fine, gallant character.

This much we can say in general: the Balkanite is extremely touchy and extremely clannish. He is not at all fond of regimentation, like the German, which is one of the reasons

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why Nazi parties could never flourish in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Nothing strikes the natives there as quite so funny as movies of saluting, goose-stepping automatons.

ENTER THE ASSASSIN

The Balkan revolutionary and terrorist is the type best known abroad. How did he develop, and why? For one thing, long experience with the Turks and the Hapsburgs has taught past generations that violence is more effective in politics than discussion. For another, the primitive instinct for revenge is powerful in the Balkans, even in the hearts of the educated.

So we can understand how forcible alien rule only fanned Balkan nationalism to white heat, and how political assassination came to be valued as a patriotic duty. Even native autocrats have often paid with their lives to learn that people in the Balkans can hate fanatically and that their revenge is limited neither by time nor by fear. There was a man in Yugoslavia, now dead, who was so proud of an assassination he had committed under the Hapsburg regime that he had "Political Assassin" engraved on his visiting cards!

It's ten to one that a new foreign conquest of the Balkans would bring another wave of conspiracies and political murders in retaliation. Adolf Hitler, most of all, would be foolish to parade through any Balkan town, no matter how well guarded he might be.

BALKAN KINGS AND GENERALS

All strictly Balkan countries are kingdoms—Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and former Albania. The Balkan kings are unique among royalty: the Yugoslav and the former Albanian kings are descended from mountain peasants, and the others from adventuresome German princes. Still self-made men, they are strong-handed absolutists but seldom head totalitarian parties (although they desperately try to create

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them): the army and the bureaucracy are their props. Some are quite wealthy: the King of Rumania has a salary of over $700,000 a year, while the King of Yugoslavia is even better off than that—he receives $3,000 a day!

The army has become dominant in Balkan politics for a simple reason: during many decades armed men were needed to throw off foreign yokes or defend national independence; and then, unchecked by any other organized social group, they remained a ruling caste in peacetime. Rumania is reputed to have a higher ratio of officers to men than any of the larger European armies. And in Yugoslavia there are about 170 generals to a population of fifteen million. (The comparable figure for the United States would be 1,470 generals to command our army of 280,000 men!)

WHAT PRICE BALKAN CONSTITUTIONS?

Now that you realize that Turkish and Hapsburg autocratic ideas have been inherited by the Balkan ruling circles, that there is no real democratic tradition, no numerous and prosperous business and middle class in the Balkans, you can see why the post-war vogue for democracy died away there, and why the destitute peasant masses could not prevent the reappearance of the customary court and military dictatorships.

In no European region have constitutions been violated as often as they have in the Balkans. Balkan constitutions have so far been given and taken back like Hitler's promises. Serbia, for one, had twelve constitutions within the hundred years of her independent life; and during less than fifty years before the First World War her army accomplished four revolutions and liquidated two kings. New Yugoslavia already has her second national charter, decreed by King Alexander in 1931, three years before he was assassinated. King Carol tore up the Rumanian constitution in 1938. Greece is also

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a country with rulers coming and going: four revolutions and six dictatorships have blessed her people since 1918.

Sometimes the Balkan kings and generals agree to an appearance of parliamentarism: the king lets the parliament share the legislative power with him but reserves the right to appoint and dismiss the judges and cabinets. In such cases electoral laws prohibit anti-government propaganda or candidates and even forbid secret balloting. Indeed, voting methods in the Balkans are proverbial: a government rarely loses an election there.

In Rumania, before June 1940, only employed and literate males over thirty could vote (nearly 50 per cent of the population of Rumania is illiterate), and only government candidates were allowed; now no one votes. In Bulgaria no parties are permitted, and the Cabinet is responsible only to the king. In Greece matters are simplicity itself: there just aren't any elections.

Yet there was a gleam of democracy apparent in the Balkans nevertheless. In 1939 Regent Prince Paul of Yugoslavia issued decrees promising the Croats federal autonomy, freedom of the press and political parties and free secret balloting. Some of these promises have been kept; some haven't. In any case, while all the other Balkan countries were tightening their dictatorships during the war, Yugoslavia seemed to be moving toward a timid democracy.

THE KINGLESS KINGDOM OF HUNGARY

Hungary has a parliamentary system but is governed by a Regent, a few landowners and a great many bureaucrats. The Regent has by no means the power that the Balkan kings have: he can veto the Parliament's bills, but the Parliament can vote again and overrule him. Nevertheless the device for preventing the peasant from having representation in the Hungarian Parliament has long been to require open

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balloting in the villages (that is, in four-fifths of the electoral districts). Only in the elections of 1939 was the village vote secret.

There are only about 1,200 great land barons in Hungary, owning very nearly one-third of all the land in the country. People of great charm and lavish hospitality, they live like maharajahs, enjoying the two princely privileges of all time: leisure and power. Although as a class they have been dying a slow death ever since the industrial revolution, these glamorous aristocrats still cling to life. They now have too many enemies, any one of whom may overthrow them some day—the Nazis, the Communists, the peasants.

One step below the land barons are the hundreds of thousands of members of the Hungarian gentry—something like English country squires. They do not live in castles on large estates but in ordinary country houses amidst fragrant acacias and surrounded by waving wheat and rich black fields. In debt and unfit for business, they are still the most influential class in Hungary because of their hold on the civil service and the army. The ruling parliamentary group is composed principally of these gentry people.

Kings without kingdoms have been known from John Lackland to Queen Wilhelmina, but Hungary is the only kingdom without a king, a dynasty or even a pretender. No man, no living body, but the ancient Crown of Saint Stephen, which you will remember from some pages back, has the supreme power. When the Hapsburgs were gone after the First World War, the Hungarian national assembly elected Admiral Horthy Regent. He is to be succeeded by other regents until a man is found with a forehead worthy to be touched by the holy crown—and so an American newspaper man has called Horthy a "throne warmer."

If there were no Hitler the Hungarians might try the Hapsburgs again. But some venerable Hungarian statesmen

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maintain that as long as the crown is safe in the country there is no hurry for a king; that, in fact, no king is necessary at all. Thus Hungary presents the unique spectacle of a kingless kingdom. These things are odd to the world at large, but then the Magyar political mind is strangely different from that of any other people.

HOW STRONG ARE THE BALKAN NAZIS?

Germany has spent tremendous sums of money to foster native Nazi parties in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania and Hungary. But only in the last two countries has this campaign achieved a certain success, and there its success has been due very largely to the prevalence of anti-Semitism. Not only the unemployed white-collar people but a good many landless peasants were carried away by limitless Nazi promises.

In the rest of the Balkans the Nazis got a very poor return from all their efforts and money, even among the middle class. As to the bulk of the peasants, they either stubbornly follow their peasant parties or look at Nazism as another hated "city product." On the whole, the common Balkanite is easy to exploit but very difficult to regiment. Nazism—and for that matter Marxism—is to him a weird, mechanical way of thinking. Besides, both run counter to the average peasant's feeling for property. "The Communist will take your cow," he says. "The Nazi will leave you the cow and take the milk."

Yet there are more formidable enemies of the Nazi-Fascists than are the peasants: the absolutist kings. These kings are firmly in favor of dictatorship, but in their own hands; and none of them wants to be in the position of the King of Italy. In short, to seize power in the Balkans the Nazis would have to overthrow—or to subdue—four kings and four dynasties. Two authoritarian forces are thus in conflict, and one must die if the other is to live.

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Don't forget, however, that the Nazi strength is not in numbers but in organization and striking power. In Yugoslavia, for instance, a former Premier and a former Minister of the Interior, both Serbs, were arrested in the spring of 1940 for plotting with the Reich. They are Hitler's candidates for a pro-Nazi regime. Then there is a small group of Croatian Fascist terrorists, called *Ustashi* (the Rebels), who organized the assassination of the late King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934 and whose leaders and armed camps are still in Italy; any time Mussolini occupies the Croatian parts of Yugoslavia he can set up a Croatian Fascist government without delay. Yugoslav authorities have repeatedly found huge quantities of arms and motorcycles among the few tens of thousands of Germans living along the German border. And all Balkan countries are full of innocent-looking German tourists who—like the German sailors in Norway—can change into soldiers the moment Germany decides to march in. All these groups, no matter how small in number, constitute a dangerous Fifth Column—traitors, spies, saboteurs and guides for German parachutists in case of war.*

NAZI DANGER IN RUMANIA

The famous Rumanian Iron Guard, later called "All for Country," was founded by a young fanatic, Zelea Codreanu, in 1931, with the swastika as its symbol and a platform practically identical with that of the German Nazis. It grew rapidly, feeding mainly upon anti-Semitism and the desperation of the landless peasants. Students, homeless peasants, Orthodox priests, even civil servants and army officers filled its ranks. Aided by German funds, hundreds of Iron Guard newspapers sprang up, and terrorist groups were provided

*In the Spanish Civil War General Franco originally had four army divisions at his disposal. "Fifth Column" was the term used for his sympathizers within Loyalist Madrid.

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with large quantities of machine guns and hand grenades. In January 1938, the Rumanian Nazis won 16 per cent of the total vote—and then King Carol proclaimed his dictatorship. Instead of taking this warning seriously, the Iron Guardists continued their terrorism. But the Balkan kings don't stand for much nonsense: hundreds of Iron Guardists were imprisoned, and Codreanu and other leaders were exterminated with superior Balkan efficiency.

Fighting his Nazi opponents with both violence and ruse, King Carol made a truce with the imprisoned Iron Guardists in the spring of 1940: he offered to release them if they would pledge loyalty to him and to his totalitarian party, the Renaissance Front—and many accepted the offer. When France fell, King Carol, quick as the most sensitive weathervane, decreed that there should be a new totalitarian party, the Party of the Nation, and invited the Iron Guardists to join it. With Trojan horse sense, the Guardists responded *en masse*—and the first name on the long list of applicants was Ion Codreanu, the father of the assassinated Codreanu. The king even permitted memorial services for those he had ordered executed, and swung his country into line with the Axis powers. But all Nazis are past masters in protective coloration, and no one knows better than King Carol that the Iron Guardists will turn vengeful at the first sound of the approaching German mechanized divisions.

THE NAZIS IN HUNGARY

The Hungarian Nazis were a little late in getting started, but they were wise in abstaining from terrorism and enjoyed more success than the Rumanian Nazis. In 1934 various Hungarian Nazi groups began to sprout like mushrooms. They used all sorts of names—Green Shirts, Crossed Arrows, Hungarists, etc.—and they had too many would-be leaders. But slowly they made one front and in May 1939 obtained

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the second largest vote in Hungary (22 per cent of the total).

Major F. Szalasi, the chief Hungarian Nazi leader (now in jail), found followers among the landless peasants and those young city fellows who couldn't immediately find the fine jobs to which they thought they had a right. But the main Nazi impulse in Hungary, as everywhere else, came from the impoverished urban middle class. Grade A Nazi material always comes from the discontented middle classes, the frustrated intellectuals who feel born to better things and all the bored people who long for some exciting change.

Hungarian Nazi propaganda made headway by cleverly combining all three of the popular slogans of Hungarian politics: anti-Semitism, recovery of the territories lost in the war, redistribution of the big estates. Of course there is plenty of reason to doubt that the Green Shirts really mean to rescue the Magyar peasant; but the slogan is good strategy to unseat the well-entrenched landlords, who, in the absence of an absolute monarch, are the principal obstacle to Nazi success. These landlords readily subscribe to the first two Nazi slogans, but to cut up large estates is to them sheer bolshevism.

What the final outcome in Rumania and Hungary will be depends entirely on international events. The Nazi-Soviet pact shook the Nazis of both countries (as it did the parlor pinks in this country). In any case, with all their hullabaloo the native Nazis are not strong enough either in Rumania or in Hungary to take over power on their own. That they could do only with the help of armed German intervention, and then the German minority and the native Nazis of both countries would prove to be a powerful Fifth Column.

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VII. Germany in the Balkans

In his best-selling, although somewhat confused, book, *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler worked out a plan for German expansion in Eastern Europe—a plan only partially executed by the conquest of Poland and checked, at least temporarily, by the pact with Soviet Russia. But though Germany is now fighting in the West, she is not neglecting Southeastern Europe, for she believes it is a region which she has a natural claim to dominate.

History does sometimes repeat itself—but always in a new form. What Hitler is doing in the Balkans is to revive, in a new international set-up and with new tactics, the old *Drang nach Osten* (Push to the East) policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II. His words about the supremacy of the German race and the necessity for a German *Lebensraum* (living space) were heard thirty-five years ago from scores of imperial Pan-Germanists. They, too, demanded additional "living space" and cried, "More land! More race!"

WHAT GERMANY WANTS

What is there for Nazi Germany in this non-industrial Balkan "living room"?

There are some foodstuffs and raw materials—important to Germany now that she is cut off from overseas sources of supply—and markets for German industrial goods; there is the grain of the Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav plains; the timber of the Carpathian and Balkan Mountains; the hogs, cattle and sheep of Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania; some copper, zinc, lead, antimony and nickel in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece; the big Hungarian and Yugoslav deposits of bauxite (needed in the production of aluminum for airplanes); and, most important of all, the oil fields of Rumania.

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What Germany actually wants in the Balkans is plain from the trade treaty she made with Rumania in March 1939. This pact, which was to run for five years, called not for a mere exchange of goods but for a "coordination" of the entire Rumanian economy with Germany's. Rumania was to increase all production useful to the Reich—notably of oil, minerals, soya beans, flax and cotton—while Germany promised her financial and technical help in doing so. And that is where, from the economic field, we pass into the political. For once you have German technicians in your country you will have to accept more and more German advice in your political affairs too.

It is true that Nazi Germany bought the agricultural produce of the Balkan countries when those countries could not sell it elsewhere. But at the same time she encouraged throughout the Balkans only such industries as suited her own needs and tried to hamper all those which competed with the German industries.

Now if you look at the whole thing from a purely business point of view you will realize right away that there actually is a real economic interdependence between Germany and Southeastern Europe. All the small Balkan countries produce so much the same sort of things that they can hardly trade exclusively with one another. All are largely agricultural, and all have to buy most of their manufactured goods abroad. What more natural than that their commerce should be first of all with highly industrialized Germany? Their territory borders on hers; with better railroad equipment, transportation would be smooth and fast; and the great Danube River touches Germany, Hungary and all the major Balkan countries except Greece. In other words, Germany could be just as much of an industrial living room

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for the Balkans as the Balkans are supposed to be an agricultural living room for Germany.

That is as it should be—in theory. But in practice it works out as a one-sided partnership of one big nation with several small ones.

NAZI TRADE WITH SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Up to 1935 Italy was one of the chief customers of the Balkan countries. In that year she invaded Ethiopia, and—as you know—the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions on her. In those sanctions some of the Balkan countries participated. At the same time a severe agricultural depression reigned over all Southeastern Europe, and Nazi Germany seized the opportunity to begin a great program of trade penetration there. Her share in the exports and imports of Southeastern Europe rose steadily, until with the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia it became unmistakably the lion's share.

As the chart opposite shows, in 1938 Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia—the present Greater Reich—were supplying almost half of the imports of Southeastern Europe but were getting little more than 12 per cent of their own imports from there. In the same year the countries of Southeastern Europe were dependent on what is now the Greater Reich for the sale of nearly half of their total exports, but the Greater Reich was dependent on them for a market for only 11.7 per cent of its exports.

In the first eight months of 1939 the countries of Southeastern Europe were even more dependent on Germany for their imports and a market for their exports than they had been in 1938. The extreme case was Bulgaria, which came to depend on Germany for 80 per cent of her export market.

That in itself would be nothing to worry about. What is alarming is that the Balkan countries, counting on the Reich's

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GERMANY'S TRADE WITH SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE — 1938



market for the sale of anywhere from 36 to 80 per cent of their exports, all together did not supply more than 12 per cent of Germany's total imports, and no one of them more than 3 per cent. This created an abnormal situation, practically a semi-colonial relationship, in which the Balkans were dependent on Germany, but Germany was not dependent on them.

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Italy's entry into the war and the defeat of France only increased this dependence: during the first quarter of 1940, for instance, Yugoslavia sent 17 per cent of her exports to England and France, and Rumania 27 per cent; now most of these exports will be added to the trade with Germany and Italy. Rumania sold 38.5 per cent of her oil to England alone; with the sea route to England blocked and Rumania dependent on the Reich for support against the Soviet Union, this oil will now go largely to Germany.

HOW EXCHANGE IN BARTER WORKS

"Export or die!" cried Hitler in his speech before the Reichstag in January 1939, thus revealing the plight of a great industrial nation which must buy foods and raw materials and has no cash to pay for them.

What are the things that Germany can export to the Balkans and that the Balkans need? They are industrial products: machinery, locomotives, motor vehicles, airplanes, electrical equipment, chemicals, textiles.

What are the Balkan foodstuffs and raw materials that Germany receives in return? They are: livestock, meat, grain, oil, ores, timber, tobacco, bauxite, flax.

Germany has insisted on paying for Balkan products not in money but in German exports. So a barter system was set up, with accounts—called clearing accounts—to keep track of all transactions. In this way Germany was able to pay for the Balkan products with goods priced anywhere from 30 to 60 per cent above the world market.

But in most figures on Germany's trade with the Balkans you could find that her imports have exceeded her exports. In other words, she has been a chronic debtor—and that was no accident. To force the Balkans to take more and more of its exports, the Reich started importing more and more from them, thus running up its debts. The accumulated

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debts it then paid with a mass of new exports. This process it repeated over and over again. Of course Germany sometimes paid these debts in free foreign exchange. But often she got out of them by increasing the exchange value of the Reichsmark or by forcing the Balkans to take goods she couldn't sell elsewhere—radios, cameras, toilet articles, razor blades, mouth organs, aspirin.

By and large, barter trade with the Nazis has not always been harmful to the Balkan countries. But it has never failed to be profitable to Germany.

THE ECONOMIC WAR IN THE BALKANS

When the present European war broke out, and the Anglo-French blockade cut off about one-half of all Germany's imports, it became a matter of extreme importance for the Nazis to maintain, and even to increase, the flow of foodstuffs and raw materials from the Balkans to the Reich.

During the first months of the war Germany's trade with Greece fell off considerably, but she managed to secure larger deliveries of foodstuffs from Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. With raw materials she was less successful, for most of them were under the thumb of Allied capital. Both the Rumanian and the Yugoslav governments had frequent disputes with the Germans and the Allies over their exports of oil and ores.

THE ALLIES' FAILURE

Even before huge masses of men, armed to the teeth, clashed on the Western Front, the European war was bitterly waged on the economic battlefields—on the seas and in the Balkans.

Swarms of German and Allied agents crowded the Balkan capitals with their pockets full of threats, guarantees and promises, and a gigantic war for supplies raged on the peaceful peninsula, with the Balkan governments tugged back and

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forth. To Germany every pound of Balkan exports meant one more minute of time gained in the fight against the blockade. And while the British and French didn't need a thing from the Balkans, they exerted every effort to cut Germany's supplies by offering to buy Balkan surpluses themselves—a thing they should have done long ago.

Germany's economic hold on the Balkans would have been impossible if England and France had made timely trade agreements with those countries. It is true that both powers have granted credits, especially to Rumania, Greece and Turkey. But both failed to realize in time that what was most needed was the purchase of native products, which otherwise must go elsewhere.

WHAT GOOD ARE THE BALKANS TO GERMANY?

The fact that Germany tries so hard to dominate the Balkans economically, when on the whole she can't get much from there, shows her economic quandary: anything is better than nothing.

Judge for yourself. As we said before, although in 1938 what is now the Greater Reich took nearly 50 per cent of all the exports of Southeastern Europe, these exports amounted to only about 12 per cent of that area's import requirements. Suppose Germany gets 100 per cent of everything that the Balkans produce. Simple arithmetic shows that even this would satisfy only about 25 per cent of her all-around import needs. Perhaps by increasing production in the Balkans with improved methods this percentage could be raised to 30. But in any case the entirely "coordinated" Balkans, producing at full capacity, could not provide more than one-third of Germany's total needs even in peacetime.

Whatever Germany tries to get from the Balkans during this war, she will first have to overcome serious transportation difficulties.

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Before the war about 30 per cent of the Balkans' supplies to Germany, and especially Rumanian oil, went by sea, another 30 per cent via the Danube, and the remaining 40 per cent by rail. The war shut off the sea avenue, and all shipments had to go via the Danube and the railroads.

For four months each year the Danube is frozen, and in the winter of 1939-40 the ice-blocks were so enormous that Yugoslav artillery and heavy bombers could not break them. In any case, both Germany and the Balkan countries are short of river barges and bottoms. This means that, if the British fleet is not swept off the Mediterranean, during the winter months absolutely all traffic with the Balkans will have to travel on the already congested railroads.

Here, too, in spite of the good connections, Germany is so deficient in rolling stock that during this war she has consistently used Yugoslav, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Greek and Rumanian freight and tank cars for her domestic needs without even a by-your-leave. Because of all this she obtained during the first three months of 1940 only 110,000 tons of Rumanian oil, instead of 390,000 tons, as provided in the German-Rumanian oil agreement.

No matter how many new treaties Germany signs with the Balkan countries calling for large and speedy deliveries, those treaties are likely to remain paper promises so long as she doesn't construct a great number of freight cars and barges.

HOW MUCH FOOD CAN GERMANY GET FROM THE BALKANS?

How much food can Germany get from the Balkans? Not much more than she is getting now. In the first place, Southeastern Europe is barely more than self-sufficient in foodstuffs; Hungary can export some food (one-fifth of her total production); Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria a little; but Greece must import one-fifth of hers. And even these exports are often made possible only by keeping the standard of

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living very low. Yugoslavia, for instance, sells meat when the majority of her people seldom see it on the table.

In the second place, Germany already gets practically all there is to export of several important Balkan foods, so that further increases of these exports to the Reich would hardly be possible. Before the war, Hungary sent to Germany 90 per cent of her agricultural exports, and Yugoslavia all of her exportable wheat and hogs and most of her cattle, bacon, eggs and poultry. There are more grains, meats and dairy products for Germany in Rumania and Bulgaria, but still not enough to satisfy her needs. In fats—the food element Germany lacks most—the Balkans are hardly any help at all.

In other words, there is little blood to be squeezed out of the Balkan turnip as far as foodstuffs are concerned.

Of course, Balkan farm lands, worked unscientifically, with poor implements, often with wooden plows, which never go deep, yield about one-half of what they could; and Nazi experts rightly believe that with the use of modern techniques the Balkan agricultural output could be stepped up to the Western level. But to make a Balkan peasant produce as much as a Western farmer would take not only a tremendous investment of capital but a generation or two—and it is a peacetime, not a wartime, undertaking anyway.

WHAT RAW MATERIALS CAN GERMANY GET?

Suppose Germany, through outright expropriation of foreign companies, gets all the raw materials of the Balkans and Hungary—what would she have?

She would not acquire any rubber at all, and she would gain a very little coal (of which she already has enough), cotton, iron, manganese, nickel, lead; some copper, chrome and antimony; much timber, textile plants and oil; and two-thirds of the bauxite she needs. All these things are essential in modern warfare.

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In mechanized warfare soldiers have to have food, and the machines fuel. But while men can tighten their belts and go on fighting, planes and tanks will stop running without enough, and proper, gasoline and oil.

For all her mighty army and splendid equipment, Germany doesn't produce enough oil. Even in peacetime she imported most of what she consumed—nearly five out of seven million tons a year—chiefly from the United States, Mexico, the Dutch West Indies and Venezuela. So when the war started and the British fleet began to patrol the Atlantic, Germany turned her eyes east for oil.

Soviet Russia gets a big yield from her wells in the Caucasus region—in fact, they produce about 24 million tons out of her total annual production of 30 million tons. But her exports have been falling off in recent years: in 1938 they reached the low of one million tons. Some experts point out that the Soviets need more and more of their oil for themselves, because their industry is growing all the time (and also because they don't want to be caught short in case of war with Germany). Nazi Germany, however, hopes that her able and thorough technicians may develop the vast untapped oil resources of Soviet Russia so well that there will be enough for both. But that will take some time. There are also Russia's transport peculiarities to contend with: not only are Russia's tracks set farther apart than others, but her supplies of tank and freight cars are woefully inadequate even for her own domestic needs. So far in this war, Russian oil shipments to Germany have been a mere drop in the bucket. The Bolsheviks do not seem to be over-zealous to serve the Nazis, and only the future will show whether the Germans have been expecting too much from their Russian friends.

In the meantime, the Nazis have been giving their full attention to the next largest European oil producer, Rumania.

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Rumania doesn't really produce much oil (six and a half million tons a year), but she sends abroad about three-quarters of what she does produce; and the entire Rumanian exports would just about satisfy Germany's peacetime imports. That would have been useful to Germany even in wartime—except that, you'll remember, Allied concerns owned the greater part of the Rumanian wells. Just as the French and British copper, zinc and lead companies in Yugoslavia refused to sell to Germany, so did their oil companies in Rumania. Thus the merry game began. Circumstances over which she had no control drew neutral Rumania into an unscrupulous oil war between Germany and the Allies, with threats and guarantees raining on her head from both sides—until every Rumanian wished to Heaven his country had never had any oil.

In such a ruthless tug of war, the only thing King Carol was able to do was to yield a little first to one side and then to the other. But this couldn't last forever, and with each victory in the west Germany headed toward a showdown over Rumanian oil.

Getting down to brass tacks, even the coveted Rumanian oil wells would not be as valuable to Germany as they seem. It's known that their flow has been decreasing steadily from year to year: between 1936 and 1938 the production dropped from eight and two-thirds million tons to six and a half million tons, and in 1939 it was less still. The Germans believe that they could stop this decline, and even raise the output, with new drilling methods. But if this were possible, the Anglo-Dutch engineers would probably have done it long ago. The disconcerting truth, in the opinion of Rumanian and foreign experts alike, is that these wells are rapidly nearing exhaustion.

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A BALKAN ENTENTE CONFERENCE



A Scottish comment on the conference of representatives of the four *status-quo* Balkan countries in February 1940
—From *The Glasgow Record.*

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WOULD RUMANIAN OIL BE ENOUGH FOR NAZI WAR?

There has as yet been no exact calculation of how much oil a Great Power would need for a modern war. Estimates have varied between thirteen and forty million tons a year—and Nazi military experts figured out that they would need thirteen million tons annually for an offensive campaign in the West. If we accept the low German figure as accurate and add to the German home production the entire Rumanian oil production, we arrive at a little less than ten million tons —still far below what the Germans themselves think they must have for one year of offensive warfare.

Maybe this was one of the main reasons why Herr Hitler hesitated so long before launching his offensive in the West. And maybe this explains the fury of his offensive. What if irreplaceable quantities of precious oil had been squandered in a lightning attack as indecisive as was the one of 1914?

Again, no one knows how much oil Germany has stored up. But it is clear from the above that every bit of Rumanian oil would still leave her several million tons short of her war needs within a year.

OLD MOTHER HUBBARD'S CUPBOARD

In a nutshell, the importance of the Balkans as a warehouse for Germany has been much exaggerated. Many Balkan products would help her without a doubt. But there is hardly a Balkan food item or raw material that would make Germany self-sufficient either in war or in peace.

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VIII. Power Politics in the Balkans

For the Allies, and for the British Empire in particular, the Balkans and the Near East have had an obvious strategic value—unfortunately not realized until 1939. At the time Messrs. Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and Mussolini met at Munich (September 1938), the Allies had convinced themselves that they had absolutely no interest in the European East. But when in March 1939 German troops entered Prague, the Allies hastily guaranteed Poland, Rumania and Greece against aggression. A few weeks after the war started (September 1939), they made a military alliance with Turkey, valid against anybody except Soviet Russia. And this alignment was backed up by a mysterious mechanized Anglo-French army in Syria and Palestine.

All this became ancient history in June 1940, when Italy entered the war and France surrendered to Germany. The French commander of the Near East army accepted the armistice. Rumania renounced the Allied guarantee and snuggled up under the German wing. Turkey decided there was no cause for war and started a game of follow-the-leader with Russia.

WHAT GERMANY AND ITALY WANT

It's no secret what Germany wants of the Balkans. She wants them all—lock, stock and barrel. But until she has finished with England she would prefer the Balkans to remain as they are—as long, at least, as she can get Balkan foodstuffs and raw materials through trade and political pressure. Common sense tells her that she would get less, or maybe nothing at all, from the Balkans if they were torn by war. So the Nazi policy has been to keep peace in the Balkans and to urge Soviet Russia not to make too much trouble. But with each victory

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in the West, Germany needs Soviet friendship less and feels more like doing what she pleases.

How does Italy come into all this? Fascist Italy has always regarded the Balkans as her own back yard. But when Herr Hitler began to move eastward, she had to let him into Balkan trade and politics under the cloak of friendship. Then when the Nazis made their pact with the Bolsheviks, a third claimant entered the arena, reducing Italian prospects still further. The fact is that Italy can have in the Balkans just what Germany doles out to her. In June 1940 the idea was to put Hungary and Rumania under German influence, and Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria under Italian. But this distribution of the Balkans was what the Balkanites would call "making out the bill without consulting the innkeeper"—Soviet Russia.

THE RUSSIAN BEAR

In theory, Communists condemn imperialistic wars. In practice, an imperialistic war presents the Communists with their best chance for spreading world revolution. It is plain, for instance, that there would have been no Soviet government in Russia without the First World War.

Up to the summer of 1939 the Soviets were *the* Great Power to emphasize pacifism and denounce aggression. They appeared to have lost all desire to expand, and particularly all interest in the Balkans. The main ambition of the Soviets seemed to be to check Hitler, with the aid of the Western powers. But at that time England believed in the "appeasement" of Hitler. When the Allies, after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, changed their minds and guaranteed Poland in an effort to stop further German aggressions, the main thing that deterred Hitler from starting a European war was the fear of having to fight on two fronts. Then Soviet Russia suddenly signed a non-aggression pact with the Nazis, leaving Hitler free to fight in the West.

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When the Second Imperialist War, as it is called in the U. S. S. R., got under way, Soviet Russia annexed part of Poland, secured air and naval bases in the three small Baltic states and took parts of Finland by force of arms. In June 1940, as the German military machine rolled over helpless France, Soviet Russia fully occupied the Baltic states; and the moment King Carol lined his country up with victorious Germany, the Soviets by threatening military action forced Rumania to cede North Bukovina and Bessarabia, a Rumanian province in which the Rumanians are a majority of the population but which belonged to Russia before the First World War. Reputedly Russia also got control of Constanta, the Rumanian Black Sea port, and of Galati and Braila, two Rumanian ports dominating the estuary of the Danube. Thus the Red Kremlin came nearer than ever before to realizing the dream of generations of Russian Tsars who hoped to capture Constantinople and control the Dardanelles.

COMMUNIST PAN-SLAVISM IN THE BALKANS

If there is any important difference between the principles of Marxism and those of Nazism, it is that the first ignores national sentiments and rejects racial theories. The words "Russian" and "Slav" were deliberately left out of the name U. S. S. R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). For to orthodox Communists there are only workers and capitalists in this world, no Americans, Frenchmen, Anglo-Saxons, Slavs and so on. So among other surprises with which Stalin presented the world in this war was the launching of Pan-Slav propaganda in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Of course the Soviets have issued repeated official denials of any Pan-Slav program, calling it "ridiculous" and "reactionary." But the necessity for official denials is significant in itself—and the Communist Party press in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia continues its Pan-Slav agitation in spite of them.

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Affection for Russia has always been strong in the hearts of the Balkan Slavs, and it doesn't matter much to most of them whether the Russian government is Tsarist or Communist. The memory of the Russian wars in the Balkans, which helped the Serbs and Bulgars to free themselves, is still alive. To these small peoples, living in permanent dread of invasions, the thought of a Slav Big Brother gives an illusion of being protected; and Russia has been popularly called Uncle Ivan. Many students and young intellectuals in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia think that Soviet Russia will safeguard their twenty million people against Germany and Italy. And many a poor peasant expects more land from the Kremlin, believing that Soviet Russia is a country where there are no classes and where "everybody eats from the same platter."

Many people in the Balkans, however, are sceptical of Moscow's designs. Even in the Bulgarian Peasant Party, most friendly to Russia, the suspicion is growing that what Stalin is after is to sovietize Bulgaria, add her to the "Socialist Fatherland" and so get into position to seize Istanbul and the Straits.

After all, stripped of its trappings, Pan-Slavism emerges as simple Russianism. In the old days the idea was to federate all the small Slav nations under the Russian Tsar. Today the idea is the same, except that the Communist dictator replaces the Tsar. It is true that the Bulgars and Yugoslavs would prefer a Russian yoke to a German. But it is true too that they would rather have none at all.

ITS EFFECT ON GERMAN AMBITIONS

Whatever happens, the appearance of the Soviets on the Balkan scene has had a strange influence on the small Slav Balkan nations, so long terrified by the power of the Reich. Hitler and Mussolini, they feel, are no longer alone in the Balkans; they cannot stage an invasion there without Russian permission. Collide or compromise with Stalin, they can't have the Balkans

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all to themselves. In this whole fateful contest, the natives have a sad consolation, not unmixed with malice: their deadliest and most hated enemies have been stopped—at least temporarily.

After the successes of German arms in the West, even the anti-Communist governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have begun to pin their hopes on Soviet Russia. Yugoslavia, which has never recognized the Soviet government, established diplomatic relations with it in June 1940. That is as far as things have gone, however. A military alliance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other is still in the stage of wishful thinking.

"DOWN IN THE BALKANS"



Walker in The South Wales Echo

In this English comment on the Balkans the poacher is saying, "Hem, I didn't reckon on big game in this vicinity."

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To understand the Soviet policies in this war, try to put yourself in the place of a Russian Communist. What would he think was best for Soviet Russia? Naturally, a long drawn-out war between Germany and the Allies, with both sides exhausted in the end and ripe for a Communist revolution. In other words, neither a quick and smashing Allied victory nor a quick and smashing German victory is in the interest of Soviet Russia. That is probably why the Soviet leaders undertook in the beginning to supply the Reich with oil, fodder and raw materials. Apparently they believed that Germany's military chances were inferior to those of the Allies and that they could balance and prolong the war by helping Germany.

But the amazing speed and striking power which German armored divisions have displayed in the West may persuade the Soviets to change their policies. Should the Nazis and the Fascists take over the French and British Empires, the hour for a final German-Russian accounting would not be far away. If that happened, the Soviet leaders might have reason to regret the non-aggression pact they made with Hitler in August 1939.

In the meantime Soviet Russia, following what the Germans call *Realpolitik*, is grabbing while the grabbing is good —and getting prepared. Having taken Bessarabia, the Soviet Union is within less than forty miles of the Rumanian oil fields, which it can control or destroy whenever it wants to. Given a foothold at Constanta, Soviet Russia is half way to the Bosphorus; air bases in Bulgaria would not be hard to get; and with the Allies defeated, Turkey has no choice but to side with Moscow.

The Balkans, where the First World War was touched off, have been regarded by everybody for ten months as the place where the Allies and the Germans might open a new theatre of war. In the eleventh month of the Second World

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War this volcanic ground became the crossroads of the three dictators, where Hitler might clash with Stalin. True, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin may work out an agreement on a wholesale division of the Balkans and the Near East. But it is also likely that the three dictators, who control the European continent, may start the first round of an elimination contest in the Balkans.

THE WEAKNESS AND THE STRENGTH

The Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Turkish soldiers are considered among the best in the world. And if all the Balkan armies got together they would amount to several million men. But the Balkan armies are not equipped for mechanized war: they haven't enough planes, tanks, armored cars, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, steel and concrete fortifications, and the rest of it.

"Minding their own business" cannot save the Balkans. For whether there will be a war, a conquest, a distribution, a revision of the frontiers, does not depend at all on the small Balkan nations, but on the decision of any of the Big Three. When the Russians, for instance, invaded Bessarabia, the Bulgarians were ready to march into southern Dobrudja; but Russia, not wanting any trouble with Germany, advised them to keep quiet. The Hungarians made a lot of noise about taking Transylvania back; but Germany, not wanting any trouble with Russia, told them to pipe down.

The thing that has made the Balkans weak is that they could not work out a common alliance. The reasons are easy to understand. First, Germany has warned the Balkans that she would consider the formation of any bloc an unneutral action—that is, an action calling for immediate invasion; Italy and Soviet Russia have also expressed their hostility to a Balkan bloc, because it would restrain their free hand in the peninsula. Second, as we have already seen, the Balkan coun-

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tries have territorial grievances against each other: Hungary against Rumania and Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria against Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece.

The real trouble with these small peoples is that they not only have failed to get together but that some of them are continuing the old, hazardous game of getting even with each other by playing one imperialism against another. Rumania and Yugoslavia have been unwilling to make any amicable concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria; and Hungary and Bulgaria are ready to take advantage of any foreign attack on Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece to snatch parts of their lands—thus repeating the tragedy of Poland, who conspired with Germany against Czechoslovakia only to meet her own doom ten months later.

But if Germany and Italy should conquer the Balkans in a lightning war, with Soviet Russia eventually participating in the spoils—or even subdue them without a fight—this European peninsula would probably remain the most restless corner of the totalitarian realm. For the Balkan nations have already passed through almost unendurable periods of foreign domination and they possess a highly developed spirit and technique of resistance. With all their low cultural and economic standards, their native autocracies, their mutual quarrels, these small peoples have not yet learned how to live—but they have learned a more important thing; they have learned how not to die.

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IX. The Peace of the Future

"What sort of peace should be made when this war is over?" is the question that many people in Europe and America ask themselves at least once every day.

Ask any man in the street, and he'll have something to say about what he thinks should be done with Europe if the Allies should finally come out on top. One fellow will tell you that Germany should be broken up into dozens of small states; another, that a world federation is the answer. And you'll hear scores of schemes and opinions between these two extremes.

THE TROUBLE WITH THE LEAGUE

If Britain should win, one possibility would be to return to the principles of the League of Nations. But the weakness of the League was that it was not a federation but an organization of good will. It had no sovereign authority over its members and no army of its own. It gave the small nations theoretical equality with the Big Powers but no real protection against aggression. It relied mainly on its members' sense of moral duty. And so it is fair to say that the failure of the League was not so much the fault of the League as of its members. If they had lived up to the obligations they undertook in joining it, the League might have worked. And it is a big question whether any plan for lasting peace *will* work as long as nations continue to insist on absolute sovereignty—the right to do as they please.

A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE?

Many people think that what Europe needs is a federation—a United States of Europe. But Americans, who have a long and successful experience with federalism, are apt to forget

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that Europe has never had a try at it, except in tiny Switzerland.

For instance, federation means that the member states must give up some of their national rights in favor of a central government, particularly the right to maintain independent armies and establish tariffs. Can one expect any dictator to renounce such privileges? Then a European federation must rest on the same currency-business-labor foundation. Which is it going to be—capitalism, socialism or some new form of state control? Finally, when this war is over, much hatred will remain in the hearts of millions of men and women. We in this country know only too well how much rancor there still is because of a civil war seventy-five years ago.

MULTUM IN PARVO

Just before France signed the armistice, England offered her an Anglo-French federation. The idea, in fact, had been popular in both countries for some time—and if it had been translated into fact it would have given an example to the many small European nations. For these nations are learning in this war that isolation and neutrality are no guarantees of safety.

Few of us pay much attention to the fact that out of Europe's population of more than half a billion nearly one-third live in small nations, no one of which has more than twenty million people. After the First World War there were some twenty small states on the European map. The bulk of them were located along a vertical belt extending from the Scandinavian Arctic over the Baltic, Central Europe and the Balkans, down to the Mediterranean—a belt separating Germany from Russia and totaling 130 million people. In a way, independent small countries are dangerous to peace. Not that they are troublesome but that their mere existence is a temptation for aggressions which then lead to general wars.

But if there had been solid local federations of the Near

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Eastern, Danubian and Scandinavian-Baltic states, each based on the community of immediate interests, the aggressors would have thought twice before attacking them. Regional federations of small countries are like labor unions: little nations, like little fellows, can't stand up against the big ones unless they unionize.

A DANUBIAN FEDERATION?

The vision of a federation has long moved many prominent men in the Balkans and Central Europe, but no blueprint has as yet been drawn for it. In the first place it does not now look as if Britain would win the war. But the arguments can be summed up roughly in this way. Central Europe and the Balkans should form one economic unit. If Austria and Czechoslovakia joined Hungary and the Balkans, a union of them all would be nearly self-supporting, with industry almost balancing agriculture. Make it like the Swiss cantons, ignoring racial boundaries, and such a federation would be the best way out of the baffling nationality tangle of Central Europe and the Balkans. Should Poland join this union, we would have there a huge territory extending from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and embracing one hundred million people, powerful enough to protect the independence of each of its small member-nations and to hold in check the expansion of both Germany and Russia.

THERE IS NO COMMON CREED

But it's easier to talk about a Danubian federation—and a European federation—than to achieve it. Aside from high-pitched nationalisms and different economies, there is this thing that stands in its way: lack of a common creed.

The U. S. federation has a common political creed—democracy—proclaimed by its federal Constitution and guarded by its Supreme Court. Over in the Danube valley and the Balkan

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Mountains—and in all of Europe for that matter—you'll find almost as many creeds as there are countries: republics, monarchies, democracies, Nazi-Fascist and Communist governments, semi-feudal régimes and royal or military dictatorships.

People living together must have a common way of thinking, and democracy is the only creed which encourages understanding and compromise. Obviously not all Europeans are yet ripe for the democratic way of thinking, and so their unity can be achieved only by one nation enforcing its own creed and economy on all the others.

THE NAZI PEACE

Some day discussion of a Danubian and a European federation may become very timely. At present it has only an academic value. For the Nazis seem to be well on the way to making their own peace terms.

We do not yet know the details of the Nazi peace plan. But from what we read about Hitler's intentions, it looks as if Germany would take over the greater, and Italy the smaller, part of the British and French colonial empires; while the English and the French peoples themselves—as well as the peoples of the Low Countries, Scandinavia and the Balkans—would remain independent only in name. Maybe they would be governed by native Fascist groups, but all of them would be controlled by Berlin—and some of the Balkan peoples (Greeks and some Yugoslavs) by Rome.

In other words, we can assume that the result of a complete Nazi victory in this war would be the creation of a huge German Empire, where hundreds of millions of non-German serfs, white and colored, would obey and work for the German master race.

Of this empire Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey would be a most important part. The Nazis would probably encour-

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age agriculture in all these lands and step it up with scientific methods to its maximum productive capacity. The Germans would hold the Istanbul Straits, which separate Europe from Asia. They would at last realize the forty-year-old dream of a Berlin-Bagdad railroad line, and so the Nazi Empire could easily turn the Suez Canal over to Italy. For railroads and highways running through the Balkans and Asia Minor would connect Germany directly with Iraq, Persia and India.

NAZI EUROPE

The Nazis believe that the only way to organize Europe is for one country to rule all the others. A super-nation must have the final say in all matters concerning Europe as a whole—and Germany, being the largest European country next to Russia and situated in the center of Europe, claims the role of such a super-nation. To put it another way, the Germans also want a "United States of Europe," but with Germany as its boss.

Such a German-run United States of Europe would, of course, be an economic unit: individual nations would trade with one another on a barter basis and supply one another with what they produce under direction from Berlin. Eventually a customs union would be set up, with a single currency, possibly the Reichsmark. The Germans maintain that such an economic organization of Europe would not exclude trade with the rest of the world. Only, this trade would be carried on primarily by Europe as a whole; and separate states would be permitted to send overseas only such of their surpluses as would remain after satisfying European needs.

Thus uniting Europe economically, the Germans would also "adjust" the political thinking of European nations to the ideology of the Fuehrer nation. The sovereignty of each state would be limited by Germany's right to make the final

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decisions. Each country would have such a form of government as would cooperate most smoothly with the government of the Reich. Separate nationalisms would be tolerated, but only insofar as they recognized the supremacy of German interests and leadership. And the German propaganda machine would undertake to carry into every European home the philosophy of National Socialism.

German leaders like to cite the Balkans to show what they would do with the whole continent. Economically the Balkan peninsula is already a vassal of Germany's, and now the Balkan governments are also being "coordinated." Yet these countries still have some sovereignty.

All this is rather vague, but one thing is clear: if Germany consolidates her domination of Europe, the liberal-democratic ideology, born of the French Revolution a century and a half ago, will be replaced by the ideology of the German National Socialist Revolution, tightly fastened on the economies and governments of European nations.

THE STORY OF PRINCE MILOSH

So we see that the Nazi plan also comes down to the three essential principles of a European federation: one economy, one creed and a limitation of national sovereignties. The trouble with the Nazi plan is that the European economy and creed would be the German economy and creed, and that all national sovereignties would be limited except the German. In the long run that would be the weakness of a Nazi-made United States of Europe.

With their instinct for discipline and organization, the Germans might run Europe very efficiently for some time. But it is doubtful whether a union, based solely on the military force of one nation, can guarantee peace and order in Europe for any length of time. Yet it might be beneficial for other nations in a way: hard experience would teach them to

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huddle together like sheep in a storm—and if Nazi rule in Europe were ended one day, some of that unity might remain. After all, it was Napoleon, not Bismarck, who first forced the Germans into a united nation.

The Nazi argument that the Balkans are a proving ground for German methods of controlling other nations works both ways; for with the Balkans, as with the Bible, you can prove almost anything. For instance, you can point out that during a thousand years no foreign power has been able to establish itself in the Balkans permanently.

There is a story of Prince Milosh, a nineteenth-century Serbian autocrat, who used to send his secret agents among the people. Each time that they came back alarmed, with the report that everybody criticized his government and shouted against him, the Prince would smile, "That's fine, let them shout." One day the spies returned content. "Everything is nice and quiet, nobody breathes a word against Your Highness," they said. The Prince shook his head, "That's bad, that means trouble." Prince Milosh was exiled after two decades of iron rule.



Elderman in The Washington Post

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SUGGESTED READING

If we don't count travel books and books written from a sensational angle, literature on the Balkans in English is not too extensive. Here are a few suggestions for reading:

FODOR, M. W. *Plot and Counterplot in Central Europe.* New York. Houghton Mifflin. 1939. Interesting, readable stuff on Balkan politics and personalities.

JÀSZI, OSCAR. *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy.* Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. 1929. One of the best histories of the Hapsburg Empire. Scholarly, but not technical.

LENGYEL, EMIL. *The Danube.* New York. Random House. 1940. The story of the Danubian nations written as the story of a river. Informative and very readable.

MCCARTNEY, C. A. *Hungary and Her Successors.* New York. Oxford University Press. 1937. Intelligent, serious, readable.

MITRANY, DAVID. *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania.* New Haven. Yale University Press. 1930. Parts of this book are technical and devoted to the agrarian problem in Rumania alone, but there are valuable, readable chapters about the Balkan peasantry in general.

PRIBICHEVICH, STOYAN (P. B. STOYAN). *World Without End.* New York. Reynal and Hitchcock. 1940. Informative and very readable. Most valuable are the descriptions of the peasantry and the peoples' characters.

ROUCEK, J. S. *Politics of the Balkans.* New York. McGraw Hill. 1938. A good summary of the Balkan political parties for those who already have a certain background.

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ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *Southeastern Europe*. New York. Oxford University Press. 1939. One of the most authoritative books on the Balkans, particularly on their economics. Somewhat technical.

SCHEVILL F., and GEWEHR W. M. *History of the Balkan Peninsula*. New York. Harcourt Brace. 1933. One of the best histories of the Balkans, written lightly and with clarity.

SETON-WATSON, R. W. *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*. London. Constable and Co. 1934. The story of power politics in the Balkans leading to the First World War. Authoritative, a little discursive but informal in style.

TILTMANN, H. H. *Peasant Europe*. Toronto. Ryerson Press. 1934. A travel document combining personal observation with general information on the Balkan peasantry. Light and readable, though not comprehensive.

Character sketches and comments on Balkan politics can be found in many pages of John Gunther's *Inside Europe* (Revised Edition, New York, Harper, 1940).

Two comprehensive but rather technical short studies of the Balkans have been published recently by the Foreign Policy Association. They are Stoyan Pribichevich's (P. B. Stoyan's) "The Nazi Drive to the East" (*Foreign Policy Reports*, October 15, 1938) and J. C. deWilde's "The Struggle for the Balkans" (*Foreign Policy Reports*, December 15, 1939).

Reliable and up-to-date information on Balkan economics is printed every once in a while in the London weekly, *The Economist*.

In American magazine literature the Balkans are a remarkably neglected subject. *Harper's Magazine* of January 1939

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and of April 1940 contained instructive articles by P. F. Drucker on Balkan social conditions and the importance of the Balkans in the European tangle ("Can Germany Win in the Balkans?" and "Europe's Frontier Lies on the Danube").

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

P. B. Stoyan (Stoyan Pribichevich) comes from that part of Yugoslavia which formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary. He is the son of the late Svetozar Pribichevich, who was Minister of the Interior of Yugoslavia for several years after the First World War. Mr. Stoyan studied law and political science in Belgrade and Paris, and is a doctor of political science of the University of Belgrade. His first job after he came to America in 1935 was in a machine shop. He plans to become a citizen of the United States this year. He has contributed on various subjects, both international and domestic, to the following publications: *Harper's Magazine*, *The New York Times*, *Foreign Policy Reports*, *Fortune*, *Current History*. His book, *World Without End*, a popular, comprehensive treatment of the Balkans, first published in 1939 by Reynal and Hitchcock, is now in the second edition. Mr. Stoyan is at present preparing a book on the American scene for the same publisher.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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



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OTHER HEADLINE BOOKS

THE BRITISH EMPIRE UNDER FIRE—By James Frederick Green. Headline Books have issued no more useful and pertinent title than their latest, "The British Empire."
—Providence (R. I.) Journal

WAR ATLAS—By Emil Herlin and Varian Fry. "The best thing I've seen yet on the subject and in about one-twentieth the space."
—William Philip Simms

NEW HOMES FOR OLD—Public Housing in Europe and America. By William V. Reed and Elizabeth Ogg. "A magnificent job of condensing the problem and the promise of shelter into 116 pages, with over 90 photographs and charts."
—Common Sense

THE PEACE THAT FAILED—How Europe Sowed the Seeds of War. By Varian Fry. "By all odds the best brief diagnosis of European developments from the First World War to the Second which has yet appeared." —Professor Frederick L. Schuman

HUMAN DYNAMITE—The Story of Europe's Minorities. By Henry C. Wolfe. "As potent a small book as its title implies. Furnishes a background for events in Europe plus a sane solution for the problem." —Tulsa (Oklahoma) World

IN QUEST OF EMPIRE—The Problem of Colonies. By Walter Consuelo Langsam. "This brief but exceedingly informative book tells . . . about the colonizing activities of the European nations. Very fine charts add greatly to the text."
—Boston (Massachusetts) Transcript

BATTLES WITHOUT BULLETS—The Story of Economic Warfare. By Thomas Brockway. "One of the great tasks of our time is to make complicated economic facts accessible. Thomas Brockway has achieved this most effectively in his story of economic warfare. I recommend this Headline Book to every student of current affairs." —H. V. Kaltenborn

THE GOOD NEIGHBORS—The Story of the Two Americas. By Delia Goetz and Varian Fry. "A meaty little history of Latin America and our interest in it, from Columbus to Nazi penetration."
—Common Sense

BRICKS WITHOUT MORTAR—The Story of International Cooperation. By Varian Fry. "An excellent survey of the progress and failures of the efforts to achieve a peaceful and integrated world order." —Washington (D.C.) Post

SHADOW OVER EUROPE—The Challenge of Nazi Germany. By Shepard Stone. "One of the brilliant Headline Books. What Germany wants and her whole political setup in a nutshell."
—Winnipeg (Manitoba) Tribune

Single copies, 25c

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