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Allen W. Dulles & Beatrice Pitney Lamb

The UNITED NATIONS

With a Statement by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Headline Series

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YOU AND THE UNITED NATIONS

by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

At its first meeting in London last February, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution on public information policy initiated by the United States delegation that began with the words: "The United Nations cannot achieve the purposes for which it has been created unless the peoples of the world are fully informed of its aims and activities."

Those of us who were engaged in the task of bringing the United Nations into existence over the past two years, can testify to the essential importance of an informed public opinion. In the United States there was the fullest possible public discussion of all the issues involved between the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations and the end of the San Francisco Conference. Organizations like the Foreign Policy Association contributed greatly to this process of public education and of democratic give and take. There was similar public examination and discussion in other countries. In the end the United Nations Charter emerged a much stronger and more realistic constitutional document than would otherwise have been possible, and it had the virtually unanimous support of the American people. Yet only a few years before, the participation of the United States in a world organization had seemed an objective beyond reach.

Now the United Nations is in being and we have begun to use the machinery we have created. To do this successfully, a clear public understanding of the opportunities and limitations inherent

in the United Nations structure is an essential foundation. This Headline issue of the Foreign Policy Association will help to lay that foundation.

This volume necessarily deals almost wholly with the various organs for international action created by the Charter. It is, however, important not to overlook the fact that the whole United Nations constitutional structure is much broader than the Charter itself. Each of the specialized agencies—the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Labor Organization, and others either now in being or to be created—has its own Charter, although each is related to the others. These particular agencies operate in the economic and social field. The Atomic Development Authority proposed by the United States is an example of another type of specialized agency that would carry the most vital responsibilities in the field of security. It, too, would be established by separate treaty, with its own charter.

The constitutional structure of the United Nations—viewed as a whole—is thus very flexible and capable of a vast expansion limited only by the willingness of member governments and peoples to add to its authority in specific fields of activity. While the United Nations Charter itself may, and probably will, be amended from time to time by the formal methods provided in the Charter, this other process of amendment and enlargement of constitutional powers and activity is already going on. It is quite likely, moreover, that it will prove a more fruitful way of strengthening the United Nations, because it involves the practical approach of dealing with the specific and the concrete rather than with the general and theoretical.

It should not be necessary to add—as it seems to be—that the constitutional structure of the United Nations, either as it is today or as it may become, will serve its purposes only to the extent

that it is used for the adjustment or solution of those specific and concrete problems in which the member nations have a common interest. I know that there has been a sharp decline, during the past year, in public confidence in the capacity of the United Nations to prevent a third world war. I think this arises in large part from a confusion between ends and means. We have tended to forget that the United Nations is only a means to an end and not an end in itself. The United Nations cannot, of itself, bring either a secure peace, or economic advancement, or a wider observance of human rights and freedoms.

We knew the dangers and difficulties and disagreements we face today would be waiting for us when the fighting stopped. It was to help us deal with them that the United Nations was created. Yet now that we are in the midst of them we are shocked and discouraged, because the mere establishment of the United Nations has not banished them. We should not be. The problems with which the United Nations must deal were nourished by six years of war and have their roots in conflicts that in many cases go back for centuries. In some cases it will take years to resolve and adjust these problems; in other cases it may take generations. There is nothing new about our difficulties and dangers. What is significant is that we have begun trying to adjust and meet them by democratic and peaceful means through the organized procedures of collaboration created by the United Nations.

It is to this task that the American people need now to dedicate their effort and attention. Let us work for specific and concrete objectives in the fields of international security, control of atomic energy, economic reconstruction and development, and social advancement. We shall find that there are many differences of national interest and ideology that cannot be resolved for a long time, but we already have a large area of fundamental agreement within which we can and must work. We can at the same time

keep hammering away at the area of disagreement and gradually reduce it. The achievement of concrete results by collaboration within the present area of agreement will, in itself, contribute to that end.

The processes of international collaboration are hard and slow, but this is the only way to build strength and life into the United Nations and gradually to enlarge its scope and increase its power. It is by this evolutionary process of growth from the roots up that the United States became a nation. There is no other way by which the United Nations can become a true world society and realize the hopes that are placed upon it.

THE UNITED NATIONS

AN APPRAISAL

by Allen W. Dulles and Beatrice Pitney Lamb

I. OUR COMMON UNDERTAKING

On January 10, 1946, the United Nations formally initiated its work with the convening in London of the first General Assembly. In the time which has elapsed since then, the United Nations has finished its organizational phase, and public opinion can now begin to appraise the trends, the policies and the possibilities of the organization on which our hopes for a better world society so largely depend.

For twenty years the League of Nations at Geneva struggled with the problem of maintaining peace. The United States held aloof from the League of Nations. To what extent the League's failure may be attributed to this fact is a matter of conjecture, but in any event, today the scene is different. We are a participant, and a very active participant, in all the work of the United Nations, and we are pledged to use our best efforts to see to it that it shall not fail.

POPULAR SUPPORT ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS

Whatever chance of success the United Nations may have depends largely upon the quality of the public support it receives. In establishing it, we have not created some magic helper able to solve all our problems without further effort on our part. The United

Nations is not something separate and apart from the citizens of these nations. The Charter begins with the words "We, the peoples of the United Nations . . ." The realism of this approach to world organization needs to be more widely recognized. For "We, the peoples of the United Nations," acting through our governments, *are* the United Nations. Apart from us—and that means the peoples of all the member nations—and without our continued efforts, there is no United Nations.

Hence one of the important tasks for all of us, if we are to be of real help, is to understand the work of the United Nations. At first sight, this might seem a relatively small contribution and hardly worth the effort, but this is not so. Our support cannot be given wisely and effectively if we do not have a basic working knowledge about the organization and the problems which it faces. If each of us is not willing to give the time necessary for this study, others will not do so either, and in the face of apathy and misconception, no great common enterprise of this nature can succeed.

In the press there is always a tendency to play up crises, and on the other hand to minimize news of humdrum daily efforts. Whenever a conflict of national policies occurs in a United Nations meeting, the newspapers give it conspicuous headlines. Whenever there is smooth, unspectacular progress towards international cooperation, the story, if written up at all, is buried away insignificantly on an inner page. But in the very nature of things, the most significant work of the United Nations, as of any organization, must be that in which agreement rather than controversy prevails and must be composed of countless small steps which get no publicity. The crisis psychology of the press, with its tendency to lead us to undue discouragement about the fate of our discouraging world, makes it difficult to see the organization in perspective.

THIS SHRINKING WORLD

IN 1815





IN 1914





1 WEEK TO EUROPE

TODAY





1 DAY TO EUROPE

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

CHARTER AND COVENANT—A COMPARISON

The Charter of the United Nations, like the Covenant of the League of Nations, is a pact between sovereign nations. Like the League, the United Nations depends for its effectiveness upon the willingness of the sovereign member states to respect the rules of conduct laid down, or, if need be, to enforce respect for those rules of conduct in case they are broken.

The League of Nations did not prevent the outbreak of World War II. It would be a mistake, however, to overlook the influence which it exercised during its twenty years of work. Much has been said about what the League of Nations failed to do. Not enough has been said about what it succeeded in doing. It did settle thirty-six disputes of varying degrees of seriousness, and helped to solve many more. It played an active role in bringing nations closer together through cooperation in regard to common problems. The story of its work in the field of health has been called one of the great adventure stories of all time. Its economic activities substantially assisted in reestablishing international trade relations after the war of 1914–18. It drastically checked the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. It called together over fifty international conferences on vital matters; many of the resultant agreements are still in force. Its well-organized Secretariat, composed of men and women from over forty countries, not only prepared the factual data needed by these conferences, but also demonstrated that people of widely different national backgrounds can work together effectively in a truly international civil service. Above all, it accumulated a vast mass of experience as to techniques and methods of achieving world cooperation in a wide variety of fields.

The League helped to develop the principles of international conduct which brought together the coalition that finally took up

the fight against Fascist and Nazi tyranny. Whatever the power of a nation may be to block formal action through the United Nations by a veto, it cannot by such a veto change an aroused world public opinion which may have developed as a result of the public airing of international problems in the Assembly and Security Council, or escape the consequences of action flowing from public opinion.

The United Nations Charter has many features that the League Covenant did not contain, such as arrangements for enlisting military contingents for the enforcement of peace, elaborate provisions for dealing with economic and social problems, and a flexible program for dealing with problems in a number of fields through the establishment of important specialized agencies. In general, the Charter is probably a more workmanlike document; certainly it is far more detailed than the League Covenant. It lacks perhaps the Covenant's inspiration of language and expression which reflected the vision of men like Woodrow Wilson and Robert Cecil.

In weighing the relative chances of success of the United Nations as contrasted with that of the League, it is fair to conclude, however, that the United Nations will not succeed merely because of any formal differences between the two institutions, or because the United Nations Charter represents any great advantage in structure or draftsmanship over the Covenant. Our main hope for the success of the United Nations must be based upon an awakened sense of the necessity for international solidarity as the only alternative to a world conflict, in which will be unleashed all of the horrors of atomic warfare, of the rocket, and of the other scientific refinements of destructions, which we only began to envisage at the end of World War II.

It is under the sobering effects of this realization that the United Nations has started on its task. Fortunately it has two

great advantages over the League of Nations. In the first place, all of the great powers of the world today are members of it, whereas the League of Nations lacked American participation and also, during its early years, that of Soviet Russia. In the second place, unlike the League, it is not the first organization of its kind. It should profit by the experience of its predecessor.

If the United Nations receives the support which the League never received, if we proceed with faith and patience, the United Nations may succeed where the League failed. In our desire for peace we must use our energies wisely and steadily. We must neither hope for the impossible, nor become prophets of disaster because the United Nations has not always succeeded in immediately solving the difficult political problems laid before it at the very inception of its work. Finally, we should not base our judgments solely, or even perhaps principally, upon the work of the Security Council and its handling of political problems. There are other important functions of the United Nations in the social, economic, financial, legal, and trusteeship fields where cooperation may more readily be obtained. Success in these fields may yet point the way to easing and eventually solving certain of the thorny political issues which may not readily respond to direct frontal attack.

PEACE-MAKING VERSUS PEACE-KEEPING

At the end of World War I, the Paris Peace Conference drew up not only the Covenant of the League providing the machinery for international organization, but also the terms of peace—involving such matters as boundaries, reparations, disposal of colonies, and other provisions for the treatment of the defeated enemies. Both the Covenant and the terms of peace were embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, but there was a clear distinction between the two.

This same kind of distinction must be borne in mind today. Through the Charter of the United Nations, machinery for a world organization has been established, but since the ending of World War II there has as yet been no treaty of peace, and it was not until July 29, 1946, that the general peace conference was convened. Preliminary meetings of foreign ministers designed to lay the groundwork for agreement at this conference have, however, been held. In the public mind, these diplomatic conferences are sometimes confused with the meetings of the United Nations. But it must be remembered that the two are in a sense quite separate and distinct. It is not the function of the meetings held within the framework of the United Nations to decide on the terms of peace, but rather, among other things, to help create conditions which will preserve the peace. The new world organization as such cannot and should not be held responsible for the difficulties which the nations face in agreeing on the detailed arrangements for the treatment of the defeated countries.

HOW THE CHARTER CAME INTO BEING

Like the League of Nations, the United Nations grew out of a wartime coalition. But unlike the League it was created while the war was still in progress.

When the coalition was officially formed by the signing of the Declaration by the United Nations on January 1, 1942, less than a month after Pearl Harbor, the signatory states not only agreed to give one another full mutual aid during the war, but also they formally subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter which had been announced by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941. The eight principles of the Atlantic Charter—including the right of people to choose their own form of government, the right of self-determination and equality of economic opportunity—formed a group of ideals,

more Roosevelt-Wilsonian than Churchillian in content, which were not always easy to reconcile with the practical necessities of war-making, and which were often lost sight of in the complexities of international political maneuvering. Nevertheless, they constituted a rallying point for those who believed that international cooperation should be based on principles rather than opportunism.

Shortly after the signing of the Declaration by the United Nations, there was considerable public discussion of the desirability of forming a permanent organization while the war was still in progress. Experience after World War I had shown how quickly wartime solidarity can fall to pieces once the war is won. It was important to act quickly to forestall this postwar disunity. Studies on international organization had begun in the State Department shortly after the outbreak of war. By 1942, Secretary Hull was meeting regularly with Senators and leaders of thought both inside and outside the government, in order to gather ideas on international organization and to keep them in touch with the administration's thinking on the subject. Meanwhile, to test out the solidarity of the United Nations in dealing with practical problems outside of the political sphere, a series of conferences were held, beginning with an UNRRA conference on relief and a conference on food and agriculture in 1943, which were followed in 1944 by the monetary conference at Bretton Woods and the civil aviation conference at Chicago.

When Secretary Hull went to Moscow in October 1943 for a conference with the leaders of the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union, he took with him the draft of a statement regarding the formation of an international organization. This draft became the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, in which the powers joined in declaring that they recognized "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general

HOW THE CHARTER CAME INTO BEING



ATLANTIC CHARTER
Aug. 14, 1941



DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS
Jan. 1, 1942



MOSCOW DECLARATION
Oct. 30, 1943



DUMBARTON OAKS
Aug.- Oct. 1944



YALTA CONFERENCE
Feb. 1945



SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE
Apr. – June 1945



PREPARATORY COMMISSION
Nov. – Dec. 1945



FIRST ASSEMBLY (IN LONDON)
Jan., 1946

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

During the following year, consultations were carried on, culminating in the Dumbarton Oaks meetings, attended by these same four powers. France, which was only then being liberated, was not yet included. On October 7, 1944, this conference adopted a proposed plan for an international organization which was widely discussed both in official conversations among governments and also by the public, and which served as a basis for the convening of the San Francisco Conference on April 25, 1945, attended by fifty states. On June 26, 1945, the existing Charter of the United Nations was signed at San Francisco. It was ratified by all the signatories by the time the General Assembly met in London the following January.

In marked contrast to the long fight over the Covenant of the League of Nations, it took the United States Senate only a little over three weeks to consider the Charter. When the vote was taken on July 28, 1945, there were only two dissenting votes.

On the basis of the Charter, a Preparatory Commission meeting in London during the fall of 1945, drew up the detailed plans for the actual organization of the United Nations, and the first Assembly convened in London in January 1946. It was thus that the United Nations came into being.

II. MAIN OUTLINES OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

The United Nations Charter provides for six main instruments of action. First there is the GENERAL ASSEMBLY, composed of representatives of all the member states, now 51 in number. This is the central deliberative body of the United Nations. Secondly there is the SECURITY COUNCIL, composed of 11 member states, which is entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Operating under the general direction of the General Assembly, an ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL has the responsibility for economic, social, and cultural matters. A TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL will deal with non-self-governing territories. An international SECRETARIAT is to furnish the permanent staff for the various policy-making bodies of the United Nations. And finally, there is the INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE for the settlement of legal disputes between nations. Subordinate to these various organs there are a host of commissions, committees, and sub-committees to handle specific tasks—including, for example, the vitally important commission to deal with the control of atomic energy, and the Commission on Human Rights.

Also part of the United Nations in a wide sense are the SPECIALIZED AGENCIES. These are autonomous inter-governmental organizations dealing with special fields such as health, labor, agriculture, education, trade, banking, and the like. Though the specialized agencies have their own constitutions, membership, and governing bodies, they are specifically recognized in the Charter as being part of the United Nations system.

1. The General Assembly

The General Assembly of the U.N. serves as a sounding board for the expression of the viewpoints of all nations. It may discuss any question "within the scope of the Charter" or relating to the powers and functions of any of the other organs of the United Nations. It may also make recommendations to the members of the United Nations and to the Security Council. There is, however, one important exception to these broad powers: namely, that while the Security Council has a dispute or a situation under consideration, the General Assembly may not make recommendations with regard to it unless the Security Council requests it to do so. This does not mean that the General Assembly must refrain from discussing the matter. There is nothing to prevent any delegate in the General Assembly from expressing his views on any subject of interest to his country or the world.

Each member state has one vote in the General Assembly, but it may have as many as five delegates, and of course such political and technical advisers as desired. Decisions on "important questions" require a two-thirds vote, other questions a simple majority. Among the important questions are recommendations as to peace and security, the admission of new members to the United Nations, the suspension or expulsion of members, questions relating to the trusteeship system, and most of the elective functions.

The Assembly's agenda is always to include a report by the Secretary General on the work of the organization as a whole, and special reports from the various organs of the United Nations, such as the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and any committees established by the General Assembly. Hence the Assembly can become a general clearing house and board of review for the year's work of the entire United Nations. It has a chance to see this work in some perspective, and

if it properly uses its authority and functions, can serve as a guide to direct the work along the lines which experience shows to be the most beneficial and fruitful.

The General Assembly chooses its own officers—a president and seven vice-presidents—who hold office only for one session. Like most deliberative bodies, the General Assembly, while holding plenary sessions, will do much of its work in committees where informal discussions and free give and take are the rule. In the plenary sessions, the tendency is to be formal, and not infrequently, the Assembly merely gives quick approval to some decision already worked out in committee. Not to be confused with the various permanent organs of the United Nations despite similarity of titles, the six main Assembly committees, as at present constituted, are:

1. Political and Security Committee.
2. Economic and Financial Committee.
3. Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee.
4. Trusteeship Committee.
5. Administrative and Budgetary Committee.
6. Legal Committee.

In addition, the Assembly has a General Committee, composed of the President and Vice-Presidents and of the Chairmen of the six committees listed above. This is a steering committee to assist the President in the general conduct of business before the Assembly. It has the important power to determine the priority of items under consideration.

The General Assembly's meetings are open to the public. While it may decide in exceptional cases that a particular meeting shall be private, any decisions upon items on the agenda taken at a private meeting must be announced at a public meeting. Elections, however, are held by secret ballot, and except in the case of the

Court, it is not required that nominations be made prior to the balloting. This procedure has been opposed by the Soviet representative on the ground that it tends to lead to the formation of secret blocs and to undercover negotiations among the delegations.

A delegate may address the Assembly in English, French, Russian, Chinese, or Spanish. Translations are made only into French and English, which are called the "working languages."

REVISION OF TREATIES

One of the dilemmas facing any international organization is that of reconciling established order with growth and change, and of promoting respect for international treaties without freezing the status quo. At the San Francisco Conference there was discussion of the desirability of giving the Assembly the specific power to review existing treaties from time to time in the light of changing circumstances. However, it was decided not to include in the Charter any specific mention of the revision of treaties, since to do so might seem to invite the revision of peace treaties with our former enemies and introduce a generally unsettling element into the international picture. It was felt that the Assembly's power "to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair" the peace, gave it the power to review outmoded treaties without placing undue emphasis upon treaty revision.

SUPERVISION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WORK

The functions of the Assembly in regard to economic and social problems are given special emphasis in the Charter. Article 55 calls attention to the close connection between such questions as the standard of living, full employment, and the solution of international economic, social, and health problems. In Article 56, the "members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in

cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."

The Assembly cannot, it is true, "pass laws" on these or on any other subject. It is a deliberative, not a legislative body. It can, however, make studies and recommendations, and prepare conventions or multilateral treaties which become law for the states ratifying them. One may justly criticize the slowness of law-making that requires so many separate steps by so many separate entities. Still, it is not clear that any practical short cut is available in the present state of the world. During the twenty years of the League of Nations, international law-making by the convention method developed considerably and further progress can be expected along these lines under the United Nations.

Principles of international law also come into being gradually by the growth of custom and common consent. Though many of these principles of law have never been officially formulated, their existence and validity has repeatedly been recognized by national courts as well as by international tribunals. Under the League of Nations, certain steps were taken towards formulating or "codifying" international law. Similarly, under the United Nations the General Assembly is given the responsibility of promoting the codification and development of international law.

The General Assembly has many important functions: deliberative, elective, supervisory, and budgetary. Whereas the Security Council has the more dramatic task of handling particular threats to the peace, the Assembly has the responsibility of directing and promoting many forms of international cooperation, which, if carried out successfully, should help to create a world in which threats to the peace are less likely to occur. The Assembly affords all nations a forum; the question remains as to how wisely and constructively it will be used.

2. The Security Council

The Security Council, which is entrusted with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," is composed of eleven members. Of these, five are the permanent members named in the Charter: China, France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. The other six are elected for two-year terms by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. The non-permanent members do not all retire at the same time: half of them are elected each year.

President Truman has indicated the importance he places upon our representation on the Security Council by the men he has assigned to the task; first, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who both as Secretary of State and then as the leader of our delegation to the San Francisco Conference played an important role in getting the United Nations under way, and in marshalling American support, both in Congress and throughout the country; and then Senator Warren R. Austin, whose career in the Senate marked him as a forward-looking statesman in the field of our foreign relations.

Under the Charter, the Council is set up to function continuously. For this purpose, each nation that is a member of the Council must have a permanent representative at the United Nations headquarters. The Council is not obligated to meet every day, but according to its own rules of procedure, it must meet at least every two weeks. At least twice a year, the Council also is to hold special meetings, attended presumably by prime ministers or foreign ministers who because of their other duties are unable to be present at the regular meetings of the Council.

The main duties of the Council in relation to peace fall under two headings: 1. the pacific settlement of disputes, and 2. enforcement action to prevent or suppress a breach of the peace.

The operations of the Security Council must be viewed in the light of the general obligations contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. Among other things, these articles contain a pledge that the members will settle their international disputes by peaceful means, that they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and that they will refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT

In regard to pacific settlement, the Council's concern is with disputes or situations whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. These may be brought to the attention of the Council in a number of ways—by any member of the United Nations, by the Secretary-General, by the General Assembly, or even by a state which is not a member of the United Nations. The Security Council, on its own initiative, may also take up the matter. Parties to a dispute are obligated, first of all, to seek a solution by peaceful means of their own choice. A number of specific methods are listed, including negotiation, arbitration, judicial settlement or voluntary submission of the case to the Security Council by both parties.

Once a matter is before the Council, it may investigate it and take action with respect to it. At any stage of a dispute, the Security Council may recommend appropriate methods of adjustment, though it must bear in mind whatever steps toward settlement have already been taken by the parties themselves. In addition, legal disputes should usually be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice.

Any member of the United Nations which is not represented on the Security Council may participate in the Council discussion



SECURITY COUNCIL IN SESSION (March 21, 1946): Andrei A. Gromyko, Russia; Lt. Gen. Ph. Vasiliev, Russian Military Delegate; Sir Alexander Cadogan, United Kingdom; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., U.S.; Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Asst. Secretary of State; James F. Byrnes, U.S. Secretary of State.

Press Association

of any dispute to which it is a party, or in which the Council considers that its interests are specially affected. A state which is not a member of the United Nations may similarly participate, but only if it is a party to a dispute. A state thus invited to the Council table does not have a right to vote on decisions in regard to the matter in question.

Besides recommending methods and techniques of adjustment, the Security Council is also empowered to recommend the actual terms of settlement in cases where the parties have failed to settle the matter themselves and have referred it to the Council.

ENFORCEMENT ACTION

As its second main responsibility, the Security Council is empowered to reach decisions as to joint action to be taken by the United Nations in the case of potential or actual breaches of the peace. In the Charter, this phase of its work is carefully distinguished from its activities in regard to the pacific settlement of disputes. Conceivably, however, both kinds of activity might go on simultaneously. Even after restraining or punitive action against an aggressor had been begun, attempts might still be made to find ways of settling the points at issue between the parties.

Several possible types of joint action are mentioned in the Charter. Short of the use of armed force, the Security Council may decide upon the complete or partial interruption of relations with the country in question. Diplomatic relations may be severed; communication by rail, sea, air, post, telegraph and radio may be cut; or there may be a joint decision to bring economic pressure to bear on the country by the cessation of trade or by the interruption of other economic relations.

League experience in the case of Ethiopia showed that even when there were flagrant violations of the peace, nations were reluctant to bring economic and other pressures to bear on an

aggressor because such measures were likely to affect adversely their own economy, or even their security. The Charter attempts to take this into consideration by specifically obligating the members to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, and by providing that any nation may consult the Security Council with regard to the solution of special economic problems arising out of joint action. This seems to imply that the economic burden indirectly resulting from the cutting of relations with an aggressor may be shared by the members.

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE

When measures short of armed force seem likely to prove ineffective, the Security Council is empowered to take certain steps involving the use of air, land, and sea forces. Such steps may consist merely of demonstrations and blockade or may include more forcible action.

One of the chief criticisms brought against the League of Nations, particularly by French spokesmen, was its failure to provide for an international police force. The Charter of the United Nations has attempted to bridge this gap. No member of the United Nations is obligated, however, to make any armed forces available for this purpose, except in accordance with special agreements still to be worked out between the United Nations and individual members. But each nation assumes the obligation to work out such an agreement, and, in accordance with it, to make available "armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." The agreement or agreements are to "govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided." Special mention is made of international air force contingents to be held

"immediately available . . . for combined international enforcement action."

At the San Francisco Conference, a number of nations, notably Canada, objected to the possibility that their contingents might be employed contrary to their wishes. They urged that any nation whose forces were to be used should be allowed to participate in the Security Council's decision on the subject. They cited the old slogan of "no taxation without representation" and argued that the use of force without representation was parallel. To meet their arguments, a provision was inserted in the Charter that any member not represented on the Security Council may participate in the decisions of the Council concerning the use of that member's armed forces. The member will have a vote, but if outvoted must submit to the Council's decision.

Until forces are made available to the Council, the Charter provides that the Big Five shall "consult with one another, and as occasion requires, with other members of the United Nations, with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Thus, for the interim period, the enforcement of peace is directly in the hands of the Big Five.

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

To advise the Security Council on all matters connected with the joint forces to be placed at its disposal, the Charter provides for a Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Other members of the United Nations may be invited to be associated with the work of the Committee "when the efficient discharge of its responsibilities requires the participation of that member in its work."

This Committee is to help the Security Council negotiate the special agreements under which armed forces are to be made available to the Security Council. Later its work will be to make plans for the use of those armed forces, and when joint action occurs to be responsible for their "strategic direction."

Under the Charter, it is not contemplated that there should be in permanence an international army quartered in some particular point and ready at the given command to move at the behest of the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee is a permanent body, but the international armed forces would have to be called up from the various member states according to the agreements which each might have concluded with the Security Council.

The Charter quite realistically suggests that military action may be taken either by all of the member states, or "by some of them." As a practical matter, it is fair to state that if these provisions of the Charter prove workable and if military action is taken, it will most likely be taken by a very limited number of states on behalf of the United Nations. The role of the other members would probably be limited to measures in aid of the active military participants, such as according the right of passage and possibly helping in supply and transportation matters.

Both world wars have demonstrated that, despite difficulties and friction, many nations can effectively fight side by side. Though many complex questions, such as the command, the financing, supplying, training, and transportation of any particular force remain to be worked out in principle and carried out in practice—the problem of making a real fighting force out of an international army is not technically insoluble. Far more difficult are the political aspects of the matter. It is not expected that nations will put at the disposal of the United Nations armed forces and modern weapons adequate to coerce any but the small and medium-sized powers. Indeed, there is little reason why the Military Staff Com-

mittee should plan for forces sufficient to coerce one of the Big Five, since the voting arrangements in the Security Council make it out of the question for the Council ever to reach a decision to use United Nations forces against one of the great powers.

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

The Covenant of the League of Nations contained a specific provision that in case the Council failed to agree on joint action against an aggressor, the members reserved to themselves "the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." The Charter contains no provision exactly comparable to this. It does, however, permit nations to employ "individual or collective self-defense" against an "armed attack" until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain peace. Thus, if the Security Council failed to take action against an aggressor because of disagreement among the great powers represented on the Council, joint action could presumably be taken outside of the United Nations by the countries menaced.

The Charter contains no definition of defense, armed attack, or aggression. At San Francisco, it was felt that a definition never covers all the possible contingencies, and that to define would inevitably be to leave loopholes. Yet most wars that have ever occurred have been wars of self-defense, at least in the eyes of their perpetrators, and there is therefore the danger that what one or more nations do in the name of "individual or collective self-defense" may seem to one or more other nations like unprovoked attack.

VOTING PROVISIONS

Probably no aspect of the United Nations has been so widely criticized as the so-called "veto power" of the Big Five. Some critics have gone so far as to say that as long as the veto power

remains, the United Nations is powerless to preserve peace or to take effective action of any kind. Unfortunately, much of the discussion of the subject is loose and not based on adequate knowledge as to what the "veto power" is, or when it operates.

Let us look at the question in detail. The general voting rule of the Security Council is that the affirmative vote of seven of the eleven members is required on all matters. No decision of the Security Council requires more than seven votes, and on "procedural" matters the votes of any seven members suffice. On all other matters, however, the votes of all the permanent members (Big Five) have to be included among the seven affirmative votes. The "veto power" is this ability of any one of the Big Five to block decisions on substantive matters in the Security Council.

There is, however, an important exception. Any nation which is a party to a dispute is deprived of its vote in any decision regarding the *pacific settlement* of that dispute. Thus the great powers have no veto over such decisions in disputes to which they are parties.

THE YALTA FORMULA

At the Dumbarton Oaks meetings, the powers represented were not able to reach any final conclusion on the subject of voting in the Security Council. The voting arrangement was arrived at by agreement between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt during the Yalta Conference of February 1945. It was formulated and proposed by President Roosevelt. While Russia insisted on the veto, the United States government also considered it essential, though it was willing to place a more liberal interpretation on the veto than Russia.

The basic concepts behind the veto are that the peace depends essentially on unanimity among the great powers of the world, and that the way to reach unanimity is never to force a decision

which will leave one of these powers on the outside and resentful.

On June 7, 1945, during the San Francisco Conference, the four sponsoring governments—the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China—issued a long statement interpreting the Yalta formula. This is the most authoritative statement of the intent of these powers on the subject, though it has no binding force as an official interpretation by the United Nations. It listed certain matters which would always require merely the vote of any seven Council members as follows:

> Adoption of rules of procedure
> Matters pertaining to the organization of the Council
> Decision as to time and place of meeting
> Establishment of agencies to help perform its functions
> Invitation to states not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions.

It also contained a discussion of the general theory back of the distinction between substantive and procedural decisions. It took the position that there is a point beyond which "decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of enforcement. . . . This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation," or calls upon states to settle their differences, or "makes recommendations to the parties." After the "chain of events" begins, the veto power applies. Before it begins, the veto power does not apply. In other words, discussion of any matter cannot be blocked by any one nation.

Having listed certain matters requiring only a procedural vote and certain others requiring a substantive vote, the four-power

statement set forth what should be done about borderline cases not explicitly listed in the one category or the other:

". . . it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members."

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

On the face of it, the above statement may seem clear enough but subsequent discussion has pointed up certain unsolved questions regarding its application.

In the first place, there has been considerable uncertainty as to the effect of the last paragraph. Under it, the preliminary question as to whether a matter is "procedural" or "substantive" must itself be treated as a substantive question. Will this preliminary question be raised only in bona fide borderline cases, as one might judge was the intent? Or will it be raised frequently, in such a way as to block action by the Council? There is clearly this danger. There is nothing to prevent the great powers from claiming that all kinds of seemingly procedural questions are substantive, except their good faith.

There is a second controversial question in regard to the veto. In the chapter on the pacific settlement of disputes, the Charter speaks of both "disputes" and "situations." In the case of disputes, a great power has no veto if it is a party to the dispute in question. But in regard to "situations" endangering the peace, the Charter does not similarly provide that interested parties will have no vote. Thus, curiously enough, it would seem that a great power involved in a "situation" would have a veto over all decisions

regarding it, whereas if it were a party to a "dispute" it would not.

Just what is a "dispute" and what is a "situation"? Where is the fine dividing line between the two? Above all, how is the Council to decide whether the case is a "dispute" or a "situation"? Does the great power veto apply to such a decision?

The Charter seems to indicate that a matter is a situation when the issues involved have not yet become entirely clear-cut. Article 34 implies that a situation is something which may later grow into a dispute, for it empowers the Council to investigate any situation which might give rise to a dispute. As an example of the distinction, it would be fair to say that the problem of Franco Spain should be viewed as a situation and the Iranian problem as a dispute. The dividing line between the two, however, may have to be defined more precisely in the future. Perhaps it will become clear only as instances arise, are dealt with, and thus turn into precedents.

A third much-discussed point is the legal effect of abstention from voting and absence from the Council. The Charter did not directly provide for either contingency, but since the affirmative vote of all the permanent members on substantive decisions is required, an abstention of one of the Big Five would presumably act as a veto, unless it specifically indicated that no veto is intended.

But today no one can speak authoritatively as to the exact extent and scope of the veto power. Much depends on future interpretations and decisions of the Council in regard to it, and upon precedents established in specific cases.

HOW EFFECTIVE CAN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BE?

In any event, one point is clear. The veto power will prevent enforcement action through the Security Council against any one of the Big Five. Although this may at first glance seem to be

a weakness, in effect it is really a recognition of the realities of the situation. At least two and possibly others among the Big Five *have* the power to defy decisions of the rest of the United Nations. Veto or no veto, action against such a power would require a major military effort as in World Wars I and II. The abolition of the veto on paper would not make the process easier nor the outcome more certain.

The fact that the Security Council may be unable to take binding action against one of the major powers does not mean that it has no role to fill in the maintenance of peace. In spite of the veto the Council has proved that it can serve as a forum for complaints, even against the major powers. As a result of the Council debates, Great Britain and France certainly expedited the withdrawal of their troops from Syria and Lebanon in spite of the fact that a resolution on this subject failed to become legally binding due to the veto of the Russian representative, who felt that the resolution was not strong enough. Possibly also, the Security Council had something indirectly to do with the British promise to withdraw from Egypt, which may have been due to the desire not to have this particular issue on the agenda of the Council.

Even in the case of Iran—one of the most troublesome of the cases that have come before the Council to date—it may well be that the Council's persistence in asking for facts and in keeping the matter on the agenda has had a deterrent effect upon Russia. One could come to an accurate judgment of the Council's effectiveness only if one were able to know exactly what would have happened if the Council had not existed. By the very nature of things, such questions can never be answered.

In the course of considering the Iranian question, incidentally, the Council established a number of valuable precedents: that the question of the adoption of an agenda and the question of postponing consideration of a matter are definitely procedural points

to be decided by the vote of any seven members of the Security Council, and that the Council may demand from governments a statement as to the current state of affairs in a given situation and before a given date.

The question of Franco Spain has also served as a severe test for the Security Council. Here the veto by the Russian delegate prevented a decision by the Council to refer the matter to the Assembly. Nevertheless, the Council was able to bring the issue out into the open, and the fact that no action has resulted was not really due to the exercise of a veto but to the fact that there was a serious difference of views as to the course of action to be followed in dealing with the Franco government. It was not merely a case of one power blocking substantive action. The Spanish issue did, however, furnish the first occasion where the veto was used to prevent a determination by a majority of the Council members that a matter was procedural and not substantive.

It should be recognized that the Security Council has been faced during the first six months of its existence with highly explosive and difficult questions and that it has not hesitated to debate these questions fully and frankly. The Security Council, like other international bodies, has been suffering under the stress and strains following a great world upheaval and we should not despair because of the failure to reach quick solutions of long-standing and perplexing problems.

3. The Economic and Social Council

The Charter of the United Nations represents an advance over the Covenant of the League in its emphasis upon the importance of economic and social cooperation, and its provision for special instrumentalities to deal with problems in these fields. Much attention has been paid in the press and elsewhere to the activities of the Security Council. Far less attention has been paid to the activities of the United Nations in the economic and social field, which are perhaps even more important from the long-range point of view.

Progress made towards the improvement of economic and social conditions in the member countries tends to develop an atmosphere more favorable for peace, and the experience of working together to solve concrete common problems is the very stuff out of which mutual understanding and tolerance are created.

The Charter states that the objectives of the United Nations in the field of international economic and social cooperation are the promotion of:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Furthermore, "all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth" above.

To accomplish these undertakings, an elaborate organizational framework is established. Although the overall supervision is a

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL



function of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council bears the major responsibility. This body is to be composed of the representatives of eighteen member nations elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. Interestingly enough, no provision is made for any permanent members on this Council, and nothing comparable to the veto power exists in connection with its voting. On all questions a straight majority vote suffices. While the Council is due to meet only three times a year, extra sessions may be called if necessary. Because of the multitude of functions which it is to perform, some observers expect it to remain in session almost continuously. The American representative has been appointed to serve on a full-time basis.

Like the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council cannot coerce individual member states, but it is given wide powers to initiate studies and reports, to make recommendations to the General Assembly and to the member nations, to prepare draft treaties, and to call international conferences.

THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

A number of fields of activity which are stated in the Charter to be the concern of the United Nations and more particularly of the General Assembly, are to be dealt with not directly by the Assembly or the Economic and Social Council but rather by specialized international organizations established by inter-governmental agreements or charters of their own. These "specialized agencies" are to be brought into harmony with one another and with the United Nations by the action of the Economic and Social Council. Listed alphabetically, important agencies existing or in the process of formation include the following:

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Labor Organization (ILO)

International Monetary Fund
International Refugee Organization (IRO)
International Trade Organization (ITO)
Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO)
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
World Health Organization (WHO)

The interconnection of the fields of interest of these various agencies is quite apparent. To cite just one example, if the Food and Agriculture Organization is to succeed in one of its tasks—the improving of methods of agricultural production in backward areas—large international credits will probably be needed for such purposes as land reclamation, irrigation, and better agricultural implements. But if such credits and loans are to be made, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development may have to play a part. Another instance—the International Labor Organization is interested in raising labor standards the world over, but the level which labor standards can attain depends in large measure upon the degree of prosperity, and this in turn depends to considerable extent on world trade conditions, with which the International Trade Organization will be concerned. These conditions in turn depend in considerable measure upon the stability of international exchanges, which is the concern of the International Monetary Fund. Thus the policies of each of the "specialized agencies" may depend for their fulfillment on the actions of others of the specialized agencies.

The Economic and Social Council is empowered to coordinate their activities, but only through consultation with them and by means of recommendations to them, to the Assembly, and to the member nations of the United Nations. It is to receive regular reports from them, and it may communicate its observations on

these reports to the General Assembly. If the Council can indeed succeed in coordinating the work of all of these international bodies in spite of the loose nature of its authority, it will be a real achievement. The various obstacles to such coordination must be faced realistically. For one thing, experience seems to show that any organization tends to develop a will of its own, to emphasize the importance of its own work, and to minimize the work of any other organization. Furthermore, the problem of supervision of the specialized agencies is complicated by the fact that their membership is not identical with that of the United Nations, and that the composition of their governing bodies differs from the composition of the Economic and Social Council.

The most serious obstacles to coordination, however, would be the failure of individual countries to make sure that their policies in connection with each specialized agency are consistent with their policies in connection with other specialized agencies and with the United Nations itself. Consistency of this kind is not always easy to achieve, since within any one government, different executive departments usually carry on the relations with the different agencies. In the United States, for example, while the State Department has the overall responsibility for shaping our policies towards the United Nations itself, the Labor Department has a responsibility for our relations with the International Labor Organization; the Treasury Department guides the policies of our representative on the International Bank and Monetary Fund, and so on. In the attempt to eliminate resulting contradictions of policy, interdepartmental committees have been formed. But in the last analysis the only cure for such contradiction would be the alert leadership of a President determined that the United States will not act as a split personality in world affairs.

Besides watching over the work of the specialized agencies, which have constitutions and policies of their own, the Economic and

Social Council is itself empowered to set up commissions to help it carry out any of its functions.

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

One such commission is the Human Rights Commission, which has the function of making recommendations regarding an international bill of rights, the protection of minorities, the prevention of discrimination, freedom of information, and similar matters. At its meeting in New York City in May, this Commission made plans to begin the drafting of an international bill of rights which will eventually be submitted to the member nations for their comments and suggestions and will later presumably be considered by a special international conference.

One point that must be remembered, and that the Commission itself has pointed out, is that even after such a bill of rights is adopted, the problem of implementing it will be difficult. For there is the practical problem as to what an international organization can actually do to protect individuals against the actions of the sovereign states in which they reside.

Perhaps one of the most significant activities of the Human Rights Commission was the decision to establish a Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press. A most important step towards increasing international understanding would be to make available to all peoples accurate, reliable information both about the work of the United Nations and about the points of view of different countries. The Sub-Commission is to consider not only the problems caused by the suppression of information, but also the converse problem, the distortion and misrepresentation of information by supposedly "free" newspapers and news agencies. The Human Rights Commission emphasized that "freedom should always be coupled with responsibility and . . . that, in the future, measures should be considered

against the deliberate and systematic distortion of the truth." Two other Sub-Commissions will deal with the protection of minorities and the prevention of discrimination.

ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION

Another important commission is the Economic and Employment Commission, which is expected to serve as an expert advisory group to the Economic and Social Council on matters of general economic policy, and especially to advise the Council on problems which it believes require urgent attention. During the first session of this commission, stress was laid upon the problems of maintaining economic stability in an expanding world economy, and the importance of coordinating the economic policies of the various countries with this in view. Various sub-commissions will probably be established under this Commission to deal with such matters as the balance of international payments, economic stability, and economic development. The immediate problem of economic reconstruction in the devastated areas was recognized as so important, not only in itself but also in its relations to the long-term problem of stability, that a Sub-Commission on Economic Reconstruction of the Devastated Areas was established to make an immediate survey of urgent reconstruction problems and the bottlenecks encountered in dealing with them.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Meeting in New York in May, the Temporary Transport and Communications Commission, composed largely of technical experts, reviewed the work of the chief existing organizations dealing with postal services, telecommunications, shipping, inland transport and aviation, discussed the types of international cooperation needed in these fields and made suggestions for activities to be

carried on by a permanent transport commission. At first sight it might seem that the work of this Commission was far removed from world peace, since it was preoccupied largely with practical and technical matters. But we might well pause to consider the extent to which the feeling of national unity in the United States is connected with the integration of transport and communications within our country as a whole. This integration has not come about automatically and without effort. It is the result of the initiative of farseeing individuals and of hard work on the part of the various commissions of our government which, to begin with, faced problems not unlike those faced by the United Nations Transport Commission. As such problems are dealt with and solved, as political boundary lines thereby become less conspicuous in the everyday life of individuals, the basis is laid for achieving closer political unity among nations.

OTHER COMMISSIONS

The Temporary Social Commission, also meeting in May, made a broad outline of the social questions with which an international organization should concern itself, examined the extent to which these matters were now being dealt with by existing specialized agencies such as the International Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, and indicated the gaps which remained to be filled. It recommended the establishment of a permanent social commission to be responsible for advising the Economic and Social Council on the development of social policy and correlating existing agencies.

Since intelligent action and any form of international cooperation must be based on facts, the improvement of international statistics is of importance. A Statistical Commission has been established, with the responsibility of coordinating statistics from the various countries and improving their comparability. The Commission has

also laid plans for coordinating the work of the statistical projects of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies so as to avoid duplication.

A Narcotic Drugs Commission will have responsibility for the supervision of the drug control functions originally entrusted to the League of Nations by international agreements, and now to be taken over by the United Nations. Also, it will have the duty of reviewing the entire existing system of drug control and of recommending changes in this system.

A Commission on the Status of Women has submitted an ambitious report asking for all types of equality between the sexes: political, civil, social, economic, and educational. No very concrete steps for achieving these have yet been suggested.

Other commissions, projected but not yet established, include a Demographic Commission to consider problems connected with population pressures and a Fiscal Commission.

STATUS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

A controversial question before the Economic and Social Council has been the relation to be established between the Council and certain non-governmental organizations. The Charter provided that the Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Quite a variety of international organizations exist which might presumably be eligible for consultative status. Of these, the World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.) has been most active in pressing its claims. Since the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) is a member of the W.F.T.U., whereas the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) is not, rivalry between these two groups became a factor in the situation.

A special committee of the United Nations was set up to con-

sider what principles should govern both the choice of international organizations to be granted consultative status and the arrangements to be made with them.

The committee recommended that eligible organizations should sit as observers at the meetings of the Council, and may be permitted to submit communications which, however, would be reproduced and distributed only at the request of Council members. Actual consultation between the non-governmental organizations and the Council would take place only through the medium of a committee especially appointed for that purpose. The W.F.T.U. objected to these provisions and asked that it be allowed to submit its views both orally and in writing, not merely to a committee, but also to the full Council,—that it should, in fact, be permitted to participate without vote in the deliberations of the Council. The objection to this was that the Council would be overburdened and transformed into a mere forum for discussion if such rights were accorded to all of the eligible non-governmental organizations.

Under the detailed formula adopted by the Council, communications from non-governmental organizations whose field of interest is wide will automatically be submitted to the full Council. Participation without vote was definitely rejected.

Quite apart from the issue as between the W.F.T.U. and the A.F.L., the relationship to be established by the Economic and Social Council with non-governmental organizations is a matter of considerable importance. A number of such organizations, not only labor groups, but associations of employers as well, have a background of experience and detailed knowledge of the conditions and problems within their field which should be of great value to the Council; particularly, perhaps, associations of operators in the field of transport and communications and international trade. The problem is for the Council to find a way of making the

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MEMBER NA

INTERNATIONAL COURT



15 JUSTICES ELECTED JOINTLY BY
ASSEMBLY & SECURITY COUNCIL

ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL



18 MEMBERS ELECTED
BY ASSEMBLY

FOR DETAILS SEE SEPARATE CHART

SECURIT COUNCI



5 PERMANEN
6 ELECTED
ASSEMBL

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

11 OF SECURITY
COUNCIL + CANADA

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

CHIEFS OF STAFF
OF BIG FIVE

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

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DEPARTMENTS

SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
SOCIAL AFFAIRS
TRUSTEESHIP AND INFORMATION ON COLONIES
PUBLIC INFORMATION
LEGAL DEPARTMENT
CONFERENCE AND GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATIVE & FINANCIAL SERVICES

AND
V

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL



FOR COMPOSITION
SEE TEXT

INTERNATIONAL ARMED FORCES

NOT YET ORGANIZED

REGIONAL SECURITY AGENCIES

SUCH AS ARAB LEAGUE & INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
NO ARRANGEMENT YET

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

best possible use of such bodies without confusing their aims with the policies of the United Nations.

OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

The work of the Economic and Social Council is still in its early stages. The various instrumentalities, with whose help the Council is to function—specialized agencies, commissions, sub-commissions, committees, non-governmental organizations—have not yet found or been assigned a very precise niche in the scheme of things. The organizational framework as a whole is still very much in flux, still very much in the making—as are also the plans and projects for substantive undertakings. Under the guidance of the Council, the main outlines of a very ambitious program have been laid out. It is too soon to foretell which part of this program will result in important achievements. But it is clearly of real significance that economic and social problems have been recognized as a responsibility of the international community as a whole, and that certain of these problems are being explored in detail and not merely discussed in terms of generalities.

The importance of the undertaking has been well stated by the United States representative on the Economic and Social Council, John G. Winant, whose work both as Governor of New Hampshire and as Director of the International Labor Office has identified him with progressive action in the field of social relations:

> "In our age peace cannot be secured by political action unaccompanied by economic cooperation. If we are not to drift backward to catastrophe, we must go forward together toward a fuller life for all peoples everywhere. . . . The Council's task is a continuous one and it will never be finished. The 'economic and social advancement of all peoples' is limited by no horizon. This is the very substance of peace itself."

4. The Trusteeship Council

Chapters XI and XII of the Charter deal with non-self-governing territories, both those placed under the new trusteeship system and those which retain their colonial status. While popular attention is often focused on the trusteeship system which replaces the old mandate system of the League of Nations, it would be a mistake not to give equal attention to the important provisions of Chapter XI which deals with those dependent peoples who do not come under the trusteeship of the United Nations.

COLONIAL OR DEPENDENT PEOPLES

In the world today there are some 750,000,000 people who are in a colonial or not fully self-governing status, as against some 15,000,000 of people who may eventually become, more directly, wards of the United Nations under the trusteeship system. With respect to these dependent peoples the Charter provides that the members of the United Nations who have colonial responsibilities accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories. Thus, for the first time, it is firmly established that colonial responsibilities have an international character and are not merely domestic affairs. The Assembly of the United Nations is within its rights in investigating any situation in these colonial areas which might affect the peace or which might involve a neglect of the obligations which the Powers have undertaken toward dependent peoples in the Charter. In this respect the Charter goes beyond the provisions of the old League Covenant, which largely concerned itself with the territories placed under mandate. In particular, the member nations having colonial responsibilities, in addition to their general undertakings to promote the welfare of such peoples and to develop self-government and social and economic betterment, have agreed to transmit

regularly to the Secretary General information relating to the economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are responsible. This important chapter of the Charter is not only a reflection of world opinion but it may also serve to accelerate progress in various parts of the colonial world, notably in India, to bring to fruition the effort of decades to find a solution which would spell self-government for hundreds of millions of dependent peoples.

THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

The theory underlying the trusteeship system (and also underlying its predecessor, the mandate system of the League of Nations) is that when colonies are taken away from defeated countries they should not be divided up among the victors for them to rule as they choose for their advantage, but should be the responsibility of the international community as a whole: in other words, the United Nations. Individual countries or groups of countries should then be designated by the United Nations to take over the administration of the territories in question, not as sovereigns, but rather as trustees obliged to follow certain principles outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, and made more specific in individual trust agreements drawn up for each territory in question. The Charter provides that these trust agreements shall be agreed upon "by the states directly concerned," and then submitted to the General Assembly for its approval by a two-thirds vote.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNCIL

General supervision over the carrying out of the trusteeship agreements is the function of the Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly. The Council is to consist of:

(a) those members administering trust territory
(b) any of the Big Five not included in the above
(c) additional members to be elected for a three-year term by the General Assembly.

It is provided that the membership on the Council should be equally divided between nations administering trust territories and those which do not, and the number of members to be elected should be adjusted in order to keep this balance. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council are to be made by a majority vote.

Under the Charter the trusteeship system is to apply to such of the territories described below as may be placed under that system by appropriate agreements.

1. Territories taken from enemy countries after the First World War.

2. Territories taken from the enemies in World War II.

3. Other territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for them.

TRUST TERRITORIES

This is obviously an invitation to the states holding or occupying former enemy territories to submit them to the trusteeship provisions. Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia, and Belgium have announced that they are preparing to transfer their mandates to the trusteeship system, other than Transjordan, shortly to become independent, and Palestine, whose status is the storm center of present controversy. On the other hand, at the Geneva meeting of the League of Nations in April, the Union of South Africa announced that it would ask the General Assembly of the United Nations to let it incorporate its mandate, South West Africa, as an integral part of the Union. Also, the United States, which has actual control over most of the Japanese-mandated islands of the southwest Pacific, has not finally determined

its policy with regard to them, though it has indicated that it expects to be sole trustee of any strategic area which it may consider necessary for its safety. The United Nations has no authority to force any country to place any territory whatever under the supervision of the trusteeship system.

The inclusion of the third category listed above—"other dependent territories"—is a new factor contrasting with the mandate system under the League of Nations, which concerned itself only with colonies of former enemies. Whether or not countries will agree in the future to place their own colonies under international supervision remains to be seen.

One complicated aspect of the trusteeship system is the fact that within the trusteeship territories certain areas may be designated as "strategic" and the Security Council is given prime jurisdiction over these areas, though in its political, economic, social and educational matters it may be assisted by the Trusteeship Council.

Several questions arise here. It is not entirely clear exactly by what process particular areas within the trusteeship territories are to be designated "strategic." There is, furthermore, the awkward fact that the Trusteeship Council must obey two masters simultaneously. In regard to non-strategic areas it is to operate under the supervision of the General Assembly. But in regard to strategic areas it is to receive orders from the Security Council.

HOW CONTROL IS EXERCISED

Under the League of Nations, supervision over the mandated territories was the function of the Council of the League, operating through the Permanent Mandates Commission. This was composed of qualified individuals chosen by the Council, not of government representatives. Under the Charter of the United Nations no similar provision has been made for a non-political commission

of experts. It may prove to be a step backward to put the administration in the hands of this Trusteeship Council, composed only of government representatives, half of whom will be representatives of the occupying powers.

One step forward, however, seems to be the provision for periodical visits to the trust territories, although this is limited by the fact that the visits must occur at times agreed upon by the administering authority. Another step forward may be that the Trusteeship Council is directed to accept not only written petitions from the natives, as the Mandates Commission did, but also oral ones.

The Trusteeship Council has not yet been established and cannot be established for the time being. The Charter provides that the Council is to be composed of states that hold territories in trust, and of an equal number of members which do not hold territories in trust. Hence, there must be trusteeship agreements before there can be a trusteeship council. So far, the reaching of these agreements has been delayed by arguments as to which are the "states directly concerned"—in other words, the states that must be consulted in the drawing up of the agreements. The Assembly, at its meeting in London, decided against an academic definition of this term and left the drafting of the agreements to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

Another factor slowing down the installation of the system has been the uncertainty as to the policy of the United States Government with respect to the former Japanese-mandated islands and other outlying Japanese islands which have been occupied. Still another delaying factor has been disagreement as to the disposition of former Italian colonies.

5. The Secretariat

The League of Nations made a signal advance over all previous attempts at international cooperation through the establishment of a permanent "Secretariat," or staff, to carry out the will of the organization as expressed in the meetings of its Assembly and Council. Various international conventions entered into prior to the League of Nations had proved ineffective in large part, because of the lack of any staff to take care of details connected with their execution. In many cases, such conventions require of the signatory states a series of detailed steps, any one of which might easily be overlooked. Often, the failure of nations to do their part in the carrying out of such provisions was due to inadvertence, rather than deliberate ill-will; no one had called the attention of the proper government official to action due to be taken.

The experience of the League of Nations indicates that an international secretariat offers great promise for the future. Particularly in the early days of the League, the Secretariat was composed of a group of men with a truly international outlook, no longer the servants of any one country but rather of the community of the nations as a whole. Properly chosen, directed, and led—and sincerely supported by member governments—a secretariat can do much towards the development of an international point of view and a feeling of solidarity between nations.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS STAFF

The provisions in the Charter regarding the Secretariat are quite brief. It is to comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the organization may require. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the organization and is to act in that capacity at all meetings of



TRYGVE LIE

Secretary-General of the United Nations

United Nations photograph by Al Fox

the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. He is to make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organization. He is to appoint the needed staff under regulations established by the General Assembly, and to assign appropriate staffs to help the work of each of the organs of the United Nations.

The Secretary-General is appointed for five years and is eligible for reappointment for a further five-year term. The man chosen by the General Assembly in January 1946 to be the first Secretary-General is Trygve Lie, Norwegian Foreign Minister and head of the Norwegian delegation to the London Assembly. Born in Oslo fifty years ago, the son of a carpenter, Trygve Lie has been associated with the Norwegian Labor Party ever since he secured a job with it as office boy in order to work his way through college. After graduating from Oslo University Law School, he became Secretary-General of the party and later its legal adviser. Since the Labor Party came into power in 1935, he held a number of cabinet positions, first as Minister of Justice, then as Minister of Commerce, and finally as Foreign Minister.

Under Article 99 the Secretary-General is given one very important power which the Secretary-General of the League of Nations did not have. He himself on his own initiative may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Under the rules of procedure adopted after several months of experience, the Secretary-General was specifically authorized to be heard or to submit memoranda on any matters before the Council.

Quite apart from his specific powers the Secretary-General is in a position to exercise real influence over all of the organs of the United Nations. League experience shows that when a council, committee or commission fails to make progress on matters

which are supposedly before it, the submission of factual material by the Secretariat is one way of prodding it into greater activity.

Furthermore, if the Secretary-General succeeds in retaining the confidence of the member nations, if he seems to them truly international in his approach, he will be in a position to make informal suggestions as to possible ways of handling matters under discussion. He can suggest compromises and techniques of dealing with questions which may end deadlocks. Many of his activities in this regard may never appear in the official record, but none the less his ability or inability to function in this way may be one of the determining factors in the success or lack of success of the organization.

DEPARTMENTS

Under the direction of the Secretary-General, the Secretariat of the United Nations is divided into the following eight departments, each in charge of an Assistant Secretary-General:

Department of Security Council Affairs.
Department of Economic Affairs.
Department of Social Affairs.
Department for Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.
Department of Public Information.
Legal Department.
Conference and General Services.
Administrative and Financial Services.

When these departments are fully constituted it is expected that the Secretariat will number over two thousand.

One matter of extreme importance, of course, is to secure sufficient balance among the various nationalities composing the Secretariat, so that all the member states will have confidence in its truly international character. This is not easy to achieve. The number of applicants from the country where headquarters are located inevitably is greater than the number of applicants from other countries, especially from distant ones. From the countries where the language is not one of the official or working languages of the United Nations, it is often hard to find qualified people with sufficient linguistic ability to work easily with the rest of the staff of the Secretariat. The difficulty of examining the qualifications and the personal qualities of candidates from distant countries must also be faced. In such circumstances personal interviews are often impossible, and if the applicant comes from a country with which neither the Secretary-General nor his Assistant Secretaries is familiar, it is often difficult for them to judge his qualifications merely from his record. In practice it often seems necessary to ask the member governments for their recommendations as to personnel, but if this is done there is sometimes the likelihood that the applicant will think of himself as having been chosen by his government and will therefore not approach his work as an international civil servant. These posts are important and the Secretary-General deserves to have the aid, but not the dictation, of the member nations in securing men of top caliber for his staff. So far he has not always received such help, and even in Washington the view apparently prevailed at one time that the important position of Assistant Secretary-General could be treated as just another political plum.

Once the necessary staff has been selected, there remains the enormous undertaking of fusing the various nationalities together

into a homogeneous and effective working unit. The attitude of the community in which the headquarters are located is also of considerable importance. For it is only as the separate individuals grow to feel at home and part of a community that they can function best as a group.

At San Francisco the issue was fought out as to whether the Secretariat should be a cohesive international entity, independent of the member governments, or whether there should be a number of virtually separate secretariats, more or less responsible to national governments. The decision was reached in favor of the single unified body, patterned after the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Undoubtedly the correct result was reached, and the provisions of the Charter give the Secretariat both independence and authority, but the establishment of an effective international secretariat cannot be accomplished overnight and will require both expert leadership and highly competent personnel.

6. The International Court of Justice

The sixth and last main body of the United Nations is the International Court of Justice, closely modeled after its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice which existed at The Hague throughout the inter-war period as part of the League system. All members of the United Nations are automatically members of the International Court.

The Court is declared to be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. But it would be misleading to think of it as a court comparable in its functions to the supreme court of a nation. For there are certain very definite limitations on what it may do. For one thing, it does not have the right to act as the final interpreter of the meaning of the Charter. Secondly, only states, not individuals, may be parties to cases before the Court. Thus it does not have jurisdiction over individuals. Actions of individuals in violation of the law of nations could not come before it, nor could financial claims of individuals for damages done them by the governments of other countries. Thirdly, legal disputes between members of the United Nations do not automatically come before it. It does not have jurisdiction unless *both* parties agree to refer to it the case in question. The Statute or constitution of the Court contains, however, a provision that individual nations may at any time declare that they will recognize the Court's jurisdiction as compulsory in all legal disputes involving a state accepting a like obligation and concerning:

a. the interpretation of a treaty,
b. any question of international law,
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation, and
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

At the present time, approximately twenty of the United Nations have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and measures are now pending before our Congress, approved by the Administration, to have the United States added to the list. Furthermore, under a considerable number of international treaties drawn up in the inter-war period, the parties to treaties agreed that they would refer to the old Court any questions arising as to the interpretation of the treaty. The new Court is to receive any cases which would have been referred to the old Court under such provisions.

Though nations are not always bound to bring cases before the Court or to submit to the Court's jurisdiction, nevertheless, once they have done so, they are bound by the Charter to abide by the Court's decision. If a nation fails to carry out a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may complain to the Security Council, which may decide upon measures to give effect to the judgment.

THE STATUTE OF THE COURT

General provisions regarding the International Court are contained in the Charter itself, but more detailed provisions are contained in what is known as the Statute of the Court. This is, in effect, an annex to the Charter and was agreed to by the member nations at the time they ratified the Charter.

The Court is to be composed of fifteen judges of recognized competence in international law. No two of these may be nationals of the same state. They are to be chosen by the majority vote of both the Assembly and the Security Council. The nominations are not to be made by governments, but indirectly by men chosen by governments through a complicated system adopted to minimize the danger of political control over the selection of judges.

The judges are elected for a nine-year term and may be re-

elected. In order that there may be continuity in the personnel of the Court, a system of rotation is provided. Five of the fifteen judges are elected every three years.

The seat of the Court is at The Hague, although it may sit elsewhere when it chooses. It is to remain permanently in session except during judicial vacations.

Nations which are not members of the United Nations may bring cases before the court subject to conditions to be laid down by the Security Council. When this happens, the Court is to fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards expenses of the Court. Also, the Charter provides that states not members of the United Nations may join the Court on terms to be determined by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.

HOW THE COURT FUNCTIONS

The International Court must find the facts of the case, define what legal issue is involved, what principle of law applies, and which party to the dispute is at fault.

Unlike a commission of inquiry, the Court does not go out and investigate the facts for itself. Instead, it calls upon various individuals and organizations to produce the facts which it needs. It is specifically empowered to call upon any of the specialized agencies for facts and to receive information from them on their own initiative. Furthermore, it is empowered to entrust any individual or commission or other organization that it may select with the task of carrying out an inquiry.

After the Court has heard witnesses, experts, and the oral argument of the lawyers for both parties, and after it has received the written memoranda and other documents from both parties, it is to consider its judgment in secret session. Its decisions are to be reached by a majority of the judges present. It is then to hand

down a written judgment stating the reasons on which its decision is based. This decision has no binding force except between the parties and in respect to that particular case.

ADVISORY OPINIONS

Under the League of Nations it frequently happened that political disputes which came before the League Council contained some legal question which could be detached from the political complexities of the case, and which, once decided, made the political issues themselves seem less insoluble. For advice on such points the League frequently turned to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an "advisory opinion." In such cases the Court's decision came not as a judgment applicable to the two parties, but merely as advice to the Council to aid it in dealing with the dispute as a whole. Under the Charter, the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations is empowered to ask the new International Court for similar advisory opinions on legal questions. Other organs of United Nations are likewise empowered to ask for advisory opinions.

THE LAW OF THE COURT

Skeptics who argue that there is no such thing as international law have often queried on what basis an international court may decide questions coming before it. The Statute of the Court lists the following four sources of international law to be applied:

(a) international conventions—in other words, multilateral treaties,
(b) international custom,
(c) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, whether international law or not,
(d) judicial decisions, and the teachings of the most qualified experts.

If the parties agree, it may also decide cases on the basis of equity and fairness rather than on the basis of strictly legal principles.

Many people have the idea that law is something solely created by legislatures. Actually this idea is a misleading over-simplification of how law comes into being, particularly in what we usually refer to as the "common law" countries. Often law first takes concrete form in decisions in local courts, the words of the judges in these decisions being, as it were, the first statement of the law in question. Later these judicial opinions are used as precedents in subsequent cases and a continuous legal tradition thus comes into being. Many of the laws passed by legislatures are no more than a restatement and codification of existing case law. Similarly, international lawyers feel that one important role which the International Court can fill is in the gradual development of an increasing body of international law by the precedents created and the opinions expressed in its decisions.

7. Regional Arrangements

When the Charter was being drafted, the point was frequently made that in certain kinds of situations, particularly in the pacific settlement of disputes, a regional organization might possibly do a better job in maintaining the peace than could the United Nations itself, or might supplement the action of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Charter permits the existence of regional organizations within the framework of the United Nations and provides that "the Security Council shall encourage the development of the pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements," but that "the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements. . . ." On occasions, the Security Council may also use such agencies "for enforcement action under its authority," but no such action may be taken without the express authorization of the Security Council.

An exception to this is permitted, however, by the fact that "collective self-defense" is specifically allowed under the Charter. Thus nations with close ties may use "collective self-defense" at their own discretion or in the event of an armed attack, if the Council has not yet acted, and providing that they report their action to the Council immediately afterward.

One regional organization now in existence is the Arab League. Another is the inter-American system which the United States Government is very much interested in maintaining and strengthening. Just how their relationship to the United Nations will work out in actual practice remains to be seen. There is, of course, the likelihood that any marked strengthening of regional ties might be interpreted by other countries as the formation of a hostile bloc; and it may not prove entirely easy to keep the purposes and objectives of regional agencies in harmony with the United Nations.

8. Atom Control

The United Nations faces no single problem of greater magnitude than that of the control of atomic energy. So far as the machinery for dealing with this complex problem is concerned, a first step was taken by the General Assembly in January 1946. At that time it established an Atomic Energy Commission to be composed of representatives of states members of the Security Council, plus Canada. The Commission is to report to the Security Council and be under the direction of the Security Council. It is to inquire into all phases of the problem and make recommendations, especially in regard to:

1. Extending between all nations an exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends.

2. Control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

3. The elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

4. Effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect the complying States against the hazards of violations and divisions.

Some delegates expressed the view that the composition of the Commission set up by the Resolution should be such as to make it more representative of the United Nations as a whole, and concern was also expressed over the fact that the membership of the Commission would change whenever there was a change of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. The role of the Commission is to make recommendations to the Security Council, but as the membership of the two bodies is almost identical, what the Commission has to recommend will probably be the decisive word on the subject.

The problem of controlling weapons of warfare is one that has

so far eluded the ingenuity of man, and we should be careful not to expect a commission to produce overnight some miraculous formula which would end our well-justified fears as to the possible future uses of atomic energy. Various suggestions have been made for the international control of this energy, but none are perfect. In the first place, it has been advocated that all nations should renounce for the future the use of atomic energy in warfare. The difficulty with this is that, although various other weapons have been outlawed in the past, they have nevertheless sometimes been used.

An international inspection system is another possibility often discussed, but unless its scope can be limited and defined, world-wide inspection would prove a Herculean task. Further, to be successful, it would require the honest, whole-hearted support of the governments of all states where there is any possibility that atomic energy could be developed.

As the United States is certainly in the lead in the development of atomic energy and is very probably the only nation which has any atomic bombs, the world has naturally looked to us to lead off with proposals as to how the atomic menace is to be met. How long we would hold any such advantage over other nations is a point on which scientists conjecture and also differ, many of them placing it anywhere from three to fifteen years. What is important is not the difference in the time period, but the practical certainty that the scientists of countries other than Great Britain and Canada, which already share the secret with us, will eventually arrive at, and put into effect, the same scientific and technical conclusions which our own scientists have reached under the pressure of the war emergency.

Conscious of this situation and of our responsibility because of our present technical advantage, the United States has come forward with proposals. A first series of proposals which represented

a concrete and important advance was contained in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, published in March 1946 by our own State Department.

ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT; BARUCH PLAN

Under this plan an international atomic energy authority would be established to own and work all usable uranium deposits and to have a monopoly over the dangerous processing of uranium throughout the world. For peaceful purposes the authority would distribute denatured uranium to individual nations, which in turn would control its use for scientific and industrial purposes by their own citizens. The United States Government would not, at first, give to the atomic development authority all of American knowledge about uranium, but only enough to enable it to plan its work. Gradually, however, the authority would survey and gain control of raw uranium and build and operate atomic energy plants in various countries. According to the report: "The real protection will lie in the fact that if any nation seizes the plants or the stockpiles that are situated in its territory, other nations will have similar facilities and materials situated within their own borders. . . ." Thus the plan envisages so wide a distribution both of stockpiles and of plants that no nation would dare make use of atomic energy in warfare—for it would know that retaliation could surely come to it from some area, even if it destroyed large parts of what are now thought of as the chief industrial areas. As the authority worked up this dispersion of atomic energy plants, the United States, according to the report, would transfer to it the knowledge which our government now has on the subject.

Following along the trail blazed by the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, the American member of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, dramatically submitted a concrete and far-reaching program to the Commission on

June 14. This program really deserves to be read as a whole, since the plan is so carefully integrated that summarization is difficult. In general, Mr. Baruch, on behalf of the United States, proposed that an International Atomic Development Authority should be entrusted with all phases of atomic energy development, with a world monopoly in this field, except as it might license and foster the development of atomic energy for peaceful ends. Closely linked with this is the provision for an adequate system of control and inspection, and for effective and summary punishment of violations. It was to be "a program not composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforcible sanctions—an international law with teeth in it."

When the international authority is established and the controls set up, further manufacture of atomic bombs is to cease, existing bombs to be disposed of, and the Authority to have the full "know-how" for the production of atomic energy.

The program contained one particularly important suggestion affecting the procedure of the United Nations. The imposition of sanctions for the violation of agreements to control atomic energy is not to be impeded by a veto. No one power, no matter how great, is to prevent the United Nations or the members of the United Nations from taking action against anyone who transgresses the code of international control and regulation in the atomic energy field. Exactly what voting procedure is to be adopted to set sanctions in motion has not yet been suggested.

Under the plan the United States delegate expressed our readiness, proceeding by stages, to give up, step by step, any technical advantage we might now have—an advantage which we might retain for many years, even though others knew the scientific secret of the bomb's construction, since our industrial and technical leadership for the actual production of bombs is something which could hardly be equalled elsewhere for a considerable

time. In return we insist upon guarantees, controls and sanctions.

To set up the elaborate program of the Baruch Report will, of course, require an international treaty, to which the United States, Russia, and all the major powers of the world must be parties. It may require some modification of the Charter of the United Nations in so far as the veto question is concerned, though this could probably be accomplished parallel with, and possibly as a part of, the general treaty arrangements to be concluded among the United Nations to set up the Atomic Development Authority.

If the language of the treaty were precise in its provisions as to the action to be taken upon evidence of violation and if it were not necessary to lean on the Security Council for measures of enforcement, the veto power would disappear without the need for mentioning it. Certainly, no state which violates a treaty has any inherent veto on action which may be taken by other Powers to the treaty.

REACTION TO THE BARUCH PLAN

All of the Powers represented on the Atomic Energy Commission, with the exception of Russia and Poland, have expressed general approval of the American plan. The U.S.S.R. without taking a definite stand on the Baruch proposals, presented their own scheme which was, in effect, to outlaw by means of an international convention the production and use for destructive purposes of weapons based on atomic energy. All stocks of finished and unfinished weapons were to be destroyed within three months of the coming into force of the convention. Two committees were to be set up under the Atomic Energy Commission: one to foster the exchange of scientific information and the other to prevent the wrongful use of atomic energy.

Past experience with mere prohibitions of the use of particular

methods of warfare has been so unsatisfactory that it seems a foregone conclusion that the United States would not be satisfied with the Russian proposal standing alone, and that we would not, on the faith of a mere prohibition, surrender either our stock piles of bombs or our technical knowledge. There are, however, no inherent inconsistencies which would prevent the combination of the American and Russian plans into a scheme which would unite prohibitions with effective controls and sanctions.

THE CRUCIAL TEST

We have only started on the road, but at least in the year that has elapsed since the bomb was first proved at Los Alamos and used over Japan, we have faced the issues involved and we are using the machinery of the United Nations to attempt to reach its solution. Certainly, here the United Nations faces one of its most crucial tests. The vigor and courage which is shown in dealing with the control of atomic energy will be a gauge of the effectiveness of the institution.

9. Regulation of Armaments

The discouraging experience of the League of Nations in dealing with the problem of disarmament, which was one of the cornerstones of the Covenant, obviously had its effect upon the drafters of the United Nations Charter, and is doubtless in part responsible for the modest provisions of the Charter as contrasted with the strong language of the League Covenant on the subject. This time security receives more emphasis than disarmament.

Another factor was doubtless the general feeling of ignorance as to the type of arms which we should now strive to control. After the last war the disarmament conferences concentrated on manpower, on heavy artillery, and above all on naval vessels, whose existence and size admitted of control and regulation. Today, these elements are only a part of the story. Even if they could be regulated our problem would not be solved, for large areas of potential military power would be left unregulated.

Under the Charter, the General Assembly is to consider the general principles governing disarmament, while the Security Council, working with the assistance of its Military Staff Committee, is to submit actual plans for the establishment of a system for the "regulation of armaments and possible disarmament."

If some progress can be made toward the control of atomic energy, possibly the same techniques could be applied to the control of other types of armament. After all, it will be no consolation to be assured that danger of death from atomic bombs has been minimized but that the field is still open for every other type of death from the air.

The attempt through the ages to make war more humane, or to reduce its scope by weakening the weapons of war, has proved largely futile. The United Nations Charter, in effect, recognizes this. It is a waste of time to try to regulate war; our efforts should be concentrated on trying to prevent it.

10. Site

At the San Francisco Conference no decision was reached as to the permanent location of the United Nations. Geneva was apparently out of the running, despite the fact that the magnificent building constructed for the League of Nations stood idle and half empty. Russia had not yet resumed diplomatic relations with Switzerland and was opposed to it as a possible site, and there were others who felt that the Swiss tradition of neutrality might prove hampering to an international organization, which left no place for neutrals in the event of a breach of peace. Then, too, through no fault of its own or of Swiss hospitality, Geneva was associated with the League's failure.

The first General Assembly, which met in London in January of 1946, ratified the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission that the headquarters should be placed in the United States. A seven-man inspection committee had already been despatched to investigate sites in the neighborhood of New York and Boston—areas then favored over the chief American rival, San Francisco.

THE CHOICE OF THE UNITED STATES

The decision to come to the United States was due to a variety of reasons. In part, it was merely the recognition of a fact—namely, that with the destruction which had been wrought in Europe by the war the political and economic center of gravity of the world had to some extent shifted westward from Europe, while Asia was also surging forward. The United States thus became a logical meeting ground for the future. It was also difficult to find any appropriate spot in Europe which could house and furnish adequate facilities for such a large organization, at least until it had further recovered from the ravages of war. Both Russia and most of the South American countries preferred the United States to

western Europe. Undoubtedly there was also the feeling that American cooperation could more likely be obtained and retained if we were hosts to the United Nations.

There were long debates as to the desired characteristics of the new site. It should be near a metropolis, but not dominated by it. It should be in a location where there were no marked tendencies toward racial or other forms of discrimination. Boston's candidacy, vigorously pressed by local groups, was eliminated, in part, because of a speech, made during the visit of the inspection group, which was deemed by certain delegates to be intolerant in character.

The inspection committee, on its return to London, reported to the Assembly that their first choice was a large tract near New York City, in Fairfield and Westchester Counties, of Connecticut and New York respectively.

The size of the proposed headquarters came as somewhat of a shock to the inhabitants of the area which had been tentatively favored. Vigorous protests from certain of the landowners affected reached the ears of the Assembly at about the same time as the committee's report. These protests, together with the high cost of land in the area, led to a reconsideration of the entire site question in the Assembly, where the states which had consistently opposed the location of the United Nations in the northeastern section of the United States urged postponement of a decision on the permanent headquarters.

Finally, on February 14, the Assembly voted in favor of the Fairfield-Westchester area, but left open the possibility of a considerable reduction in the size of the site. The resolution provided for the appointment of a Planning Commission to visit the area, and to make proposals on sites of various sizes from two to forty square miles. The final decision on the whole matter is left to the Assembly meeting in September 1946.

As temporary headquarters the buildings at Hunter College in the Bronx in New York were used from March until July. Inadequate office space at these quarters was one factor which led to the decision to move to the Sperry plant at Lake Success, Long Island. The New York City Building on the World's Fair grounds at Flushing, Long Island, has been made available by the city as a meeting place for the General Assembly.

TERMS OF TENURE

To define the terms under which the United Nations would occupy its permanent site, the Report of the Preparatory Commission recommended that a treaty be concluded between the United Nations and the United States. According to the draft treaty proposed in the Report, the United States would arrange for the United Nations to enjoy full ownership of all land in the zone and all buildings thereon. The land would be acquired by purchase or condemnation and in the latter case the Federal or State authorities would lend their aid, the costs being defrayed by the United Nations.

The zone would be under the control and authority of the United Nations, but the sovereignty and laws of the United States would generally be applicable, subject to the diplomatic privileges and immunities which the officials of the United Nations might enjoy. The United Nations would have the right to make regulations and provisions of an administrative character and also to regulate admittance to the zone and who might reside in it. The United States would provide police to maintain order within the zone and also prevent unauthorized persons from entering it. Questions regarding the interpretation of this treaty would be submitted to the International Court of Justice.

It has been frequently urged that the various specialized agencies should have their headquarters at the seat of the United Nations.

But so far these agencies show signs of a will of their own on the subject. At least for the present, the decision has been reached that the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Food and Agricultural Organization will have their headquarters in Washington, that the International Labor Office will return to Geneva, that the Aviation organization will remain in Montreal, and that the Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization will establish itself in Paris.

AMERICAN HOSPITALITY

While in general the American people have expressed pleasure at the decision of the United Nations to settle in their midst, this sentiment has not always found practical expression when anyone's personal interests were unfavorably affected by the inevitable demands for housing, office space and other facilities required by the United Nations. It is no exaggeration to say that the United Nations officials have had some disappointing experiences in the early days of their work in the United States. Certainly it would be most unfortunate if some way cannot be found to smooth over these practical problems and to eliminate the unfortunate impression that our hospitality fails when it involves any hardship on us. At the same time our own authorities should do what is possible to see that the necessary facilities are extended to the United Nations in such a form and under such conditions as to minimize the sacrifices asked of any particular community. Cordial relations between the organization and the community in which headquarters are located is a matter of more than superficial importance. It may have a real effect upon the success of the effort towards world peace.

11. Membership

The original members of the United Nations are those states which signed the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, twenty-six in number, the twenty-one states which subsequently adhered to the Declaration prior to March 1, 1945, when the lists were closed, and the Argentine, Denmark, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, which were represented at the San Francisco Conference. These states, fifty-one in all, have now ratified the United Nations Charter and are full-fledged members.

Two chief categories of states remain outside the United Nations, (1) the neutrals and (2) the former Axis powers plus their satellites and certain of their victims: Germany, Italy and Japan, plus Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Albania (which is pressing for admission), and Siam in the Far East, to list the chief states in this second category.

Most of the ex-enemy states would welcome admission as soon as the United Nations is willing to accord it, but at the time of the Potsdam Conference it was agreed that their admission should await the conclusion of peace treaties. The problem of peace-making, which might to some extent devolve upon the United Nations if these states were now admitted, has been wisely left to diplomatic and conference channels and is not a United Nations responsibility.

POLICY ADOPTED AT POTSDAM

There also remain outside of the United Nations certain new states, such as Transjordan and Iceland, and the few European states which were neutral; to list them alphabetically, Eire, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. There is also the issue as to whether the Soviet Union will press for admission of other units within its federation, having already gained admission for two of its states, Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

At Potsdam, the Soviet, British, and American governments jointly declared that membership was open to all peace-loving states which accept, and are able to carry out, the obligations of the Charter, and that they would support the application for membership from the states which remained neutral during the war and which met those qualifications. They went on to say, however, that they "would not favor any application put forward by the present Spanish government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership." This hostile attitude towards the Franco government in Spain has been even more clearly set forth in the debates of the Security Council, when certain delegates termed this government a potential menace to peace, and advocated a break between the members of the United Nations and the Spain of Franco. It is safe to say that Spain will not become a member of the United Nations as long as Franco remains in power.

Neither Eire nor Portugal has made any public announcement of a desire to seek admission, but that is, in all likelihood, only a question of time. Sweden has already evidenced its desire to join.

The situation of Switzerland is more complicated. In the Treaty of Versailles, the special provisions of the Treaty of 1815 guaranteeing Swiss neutrality were recognized as constituting obligations for the maintenance of peace. Thus the position of Switzerland as a "guaranteed" neutral was given renewed sanction. When Switzerland joined the League of Nations, it was recognized that she should not be expected to take action which would affect her position as a guaranteed neutral. Since the United Nations Charter places its members under an obligation to take action inconsistent with the maintenance of neutrality, the government of Switzer-

land may have to decide whether it will abandon its insistence upon the asserted right to remain neutral under any and all conditions and remain outside of the United Nations, or abandon or qualify this claim and accept membership. It seems unlikely, in the light of a declaration made at San Francisco and the Potsdam decision quoted above, that any blanket exception would be made in favor of Switzerland at this time, despite the fact that it would undoubtedly be desirable to include this country among the United Nations. Possibly some middle course can be found to reconcile the obligations of the Charter with the special problems which Switzerland faces, and meanwhile a way should be sought to associate Switzerland with the work of those organs of the United Nations which may be open to non-member states, particularly in the fields of social work, economics, and finance. By its traditions, its high culture, its humanitarian work and geographical location, Switzerland plays a role in European affairs which bears little relation to its modest size and population. Switzerland, the home of the League of Nations, the International Red Cross and many international bodies, is associated, both sentimentally and practically, with the work of international cooperation. Also, it would be a pity if the monumental buildings which once housed the League could not again be used for some purposes closely associated with the work of the new organization. These buildings have now passed to the United Nations, as have all the League's other assets and non-political activities. Now that the Soviet Union has normal diplomatic relations with Switzerland, a way may be opened for Switzerland to become a member.

The actual mechanics of adding new members requires a two-thirds vote of the Assembly after recommendation by the Security Council adopted by the vote of seven members, including the permanent members.

WITHDRAWAL, EXPULSION, SUSPENSION

Unlike the League of Nations Covenant, the Charter contains no provision for withdrawal. Profiting from the experience of the League of Nations, the drafters of the Charter felt that it would be a mistake to hold out an open invitation for withdrawal and to specify the exact steps required to effect this. They had before them the fact that one after another, Japan, Germany, and Italy, the powers that brought on World War II, had availed themselves of these very provisions to make their exit from the League. When this matter came up for discussion at San Francisco, it was therefore decided not to specify any right of withdrawal, but an interpretive declaration was voted to the general effect that it was not the purpose of the organization to compel a member to continue its cooperation if that member felt that, because of exceptional circumstances, it must withdraw and leave the burden of maintaining peace to the other members. The resolution went on to say that the adoption of amendments disapproved by certain members, or the failure to secure ratification of amendments approved by the requisite vote of the United Nations, might constitute legitimate grounds for withdrawal. Thus if a state should block amendments desired by others, there is an implied threat that the others would be justified in going their own way.

12. Amending the Charter

The process of amending the Charter is not an easy one. All Amendments must go through two separate processes.

In the first place they must be "adopted." This can be done in either of two ways—by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, or by a two-thirds vote of a General Conference called together for the specific purpose of considering amendments to the Charter. In itself, the decision to hold such a conference requires a two-thirds vote of the Assembly plus the approval of any seven members of the Security Council. To promote reconsideration of the Charter at the end of ten years, however, there is a provision that at that time a majority instead of a two-thirds vote of the Assembly will suffice to call a conference.

After amendments have been "approved" in either of the above ways they must be submitted to the member nations for ratification. They will come into force only after they have been ratified by two-thirds of the member nations, including all five permanent members of the Security Council. Within each member nation, of course, the action required for ratification would depend upon the constitutional processes of that nation. In the United States, presumably, amendments to the Charter would require the same approval as international treaties—namely, a two-thirds vote of the Senate and signature by the President.

Clearly an amendment could easily be blocked at any one of a number of different stages in the process of approval and ratification. There has been much talk of the ease with which the Soviet Government could impede the development of the United Nations, but it should not be forgotten that one-third of the members of the United States Senate could likewise prevent the adoption of any amendment, even one that had received the overwhelming approval of all the other member nations.

III. WORLD GOVERNMENT OR THE UNITED NATIONS

Criticism of the United Nations Charter stems from two very different quarters. There still remain those isolationists who are skeptical of any world organization and skeptical of cooperation with other nations. They are the remnant of those who fought the League of Nations, who fought lend-lease and any steps leading to American participation in the war prior to Pearl Harbor. Today the voices of these critics are stilled, but they remain a latent danger, ready to assert themselves if they should find signs of failure or disintegration in the ranks of the United Nations.

ADVOCATES OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

On the other flank, there are critics of the United Nations who are today more vocal. Their position is that the United Nations does not go far enough, that no league of sovereign states can meet the needs of the world today, and that we must proceed immediately to transform the United Nations into a world government. These critics go on to say that the United Nations is merely the old League of Nations under a new name, and will be shipwrecked on this same rock of unrestricted sovereignty.

Able and conscientious men have joined the World Government movement and they have presented their case widely. Their thesis deserves consideration and analysis.

Obviously, the conception of a world government under which all peoples would accept the authority of one central body is an appealing idea. The problem facing these advocates is to get their idea down to earth in some concrete form. Certain prominent figures in this group have attempted to do this in proposals for the amendment of the United Nations Charter, adopted in principle at a conference held at Dublin, N. H., in October 1945.

This conference was sponsored and attended by forty-seven private individuals. Of these, thirty signed a majority report urging the United States to lead a movement to promote world government, either through the United Nations, or a world constitutional convention called outside the United Nations framework. Five more agreed with this proposal, but urged a "nuclear" union should be formed of those nations where individual liberties exist.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE CHARTER

Following the Dublin conference a petition was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations urging certain amendments to the Charter of the United Nations. First, "Instead of an Assembly in which the smallest and weakest country has an equal voice with the most populous or the most powerful," the petition urged that the Assembly should be reconstituted upon the principle of weighted or balanced representation—each member to be represented "in proportion, not only to its population but also in relation to such factors as resources, production and current ability to contribute to world order and progress." In the second place, they asked that the delegates to it should be selected not by the governments of the member nations, but should be chosen directly by the peoples of the world through elections participated in by all the voters qualified to elect members of the national parliament in their own countries. Furthermore, these delegates, or rather representatives, should be free to vote as individuals and not as representatives of their individual countries.

Pending a final apportionment, it was proposed that the U.S.S.R. (including Byelorussia and the Ukraine), the United Kingdom and the Dominions, and the United States (plus the Philippines), should each have 65 representatives; China and France 25; Netherlands 12; Belgium, Brazil and Poland 9; Argentina 8; Czecho-

slovakia and Mexico 7. The remaining 31 of the 51 members of the United Nations would have between them 61 representatives, making 367 representatives in all.

The petition also asked that the Assembly be given wider and more important powers and be permitted definitely to legislate "by binding enactment" on matters "plainly and directly related to the prevention of war." Under these proposals the authority now vested in the Security Council would be transferred to the Assembly, and the Security Council would be made an executive committee of the Assembly, rather than an independent body with independent authority.

REQUISITES OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

Although the ultimate need for an organization stronger than the United Nations must be clear to any thoughtful observer, the question of what type of organization is realistically possible at the present time is the real issue. Russia is by no means the sole obstacle. There is no indication that American public opinion, for example, would approve the establishment of a super state, or permit American membership in it. In other words, time—a long time—will be needed before world government is politically feasible. Though this time element might seemingly be shortened so far as American opinion is concerned by an active propaganda campaign in this country, there is no similar possibility of affecting the Russian attitude toward world government. Any nuclear union entered into without Russia would, quite naturally, be interpreted by Russia as a coalition against her, would lead to bad relations with her, almost certainly to an atomic armament race, and quite possibly to war.

At any level, government, to be successful, must be based on real foundations, on a feeling of solidarity, on increasing economic, racial, and other ties, on a real consciousness of common goals,

and on the experience of working together in many fields of common interest. Such a feeling of solidarity, on the international level, is something that must grow gradually. It is true that certain steps can be taken to promote it. For example, under the United Nations and its specialized agencies, many kinds of activities are now planned or in progress which will give the nations greater experience in working together and which will lead gradually to greater mutual understanding. Given time, these and other common activities should help to build up the necessary basis for world government. But the process of developing a feeling of common interest cannot be quickly realized. A very profound, and hence a very gradual, change must occur before the sovereign states relinquish their sovereignty. In the foreseeable future, no matter what is written on paper, certain states will continue to have great power. Even if it should somehow prove possible to set a world government over them, there is no apparent possibility of that world government enforcing its will if that will proved to be directly counter to the will of any of the major powers. The fact that we might be able to outvote Russia—or any other power for that matter—in a world assembly, does not mean that we could successfully coerce that power. The attempt to do so would result in civil war within the world government. There is no reason to believe that such a war would be even slightly less disastrous than an international war of the kind that remains so dreadfully possible.

One dangerous aspect of the world government movement is its tendency to gloss over and minimize the practical difficulties that would have to be worked out in the setting up of any such scheme. One's own field is never as green as the world government field is made to seem. The United Nations encounters difficulties—selfishness, fear, delay, and above all, power politics. Would all these human frailties miraculously disappear in a

world government? Ordinary mortals guide the destinies of the United Nations and no paper agreement to limit sovereignty would bring a race of perfect men into existence to guide our destinies. Nor would any world parliament be free of minor squabblings over petty advantages unless the men elected to it would do what neither our representatives in the United Nations, nor our Congressmen, nor we ourselves always succeed in doing —keep steadily in mind the long-range common objectives so easily obscured by divergent immediate interests.

Like most panaceas, the world government program tends to deflect time, energy and attention away from where it is sorely needed—away from the hard, perplexing, knotty immediate problems of the unsatisfactorily real world in which we live. It tends to transport us in a leap to an imaginary world where we would certainly like to be, but to which we can progress in reality only by the solution of problems still more difficult than those right before us. We would all certainly like to be in a world where there was sufficient feeling of common interest and mutual trust so that a world government could have some foundations and some chance of success. It is easy to draw up, on paper, constitutions to fit such a world. It is less easy to create the necessary feeling of common interest and mutual trust.

Systems of governments by themselves do not create peace and the will to cooperate. It is the other way around. Peace and the will to cooperate must come first. Then the establishment of government inevitably follows.

IS OUR OWN HISTORY A PARALLEL?

The world government advocates continually cite our early experience under the Article of Confederation as contrasted with the Federal Constitution. What they do not point out is the development of the feeling of common interest under the Articles

of Confederation which made not only possible, but also logical and even inevitable, the adoption of the Federal Constitution. True, the states under the Articles of Confederation had their squabbles and seemed to some contemporary observers impossibly far apart in their interests. But they had a common language, a common culture, a common country of origin, and also economic and political ties of increasing importance. It was these that made the Constitution possible, desirable, and effective.

The British Commonwealth of Nations is, after all, a league of states. Though loose in its form of government, it has shown great powers of maintaining peace, order and cooperation among its members. The necessary common ties were there—language, democratic institutions, and a common culture. Even under a supposedly loose form of confederation, peace, cooperation and orderly relations have existed within the British Commonwealth.

Insofar as world government advocates tend to focus thinking on an ultimate objective which must surely be borne in mind, they no doubt perform a very real service, but unfortunately their criticisms of the United Nations in some instances have the effect of making people so discouraged with it that they will not give it the support necessary to enable it to achieve even the limited degree of effectiveness of which it is capable. Thus, the indirect result of the world government argument all too often is to weaken, not strengthen, the one organization which we actually have. Indeed, although the more responsible advocates of world government usually urge that we work towards it *through* the United Nations—by attempting gradually to strengthen and develop the United Nations—some extremists advocate abandoning the United Nations as hopeless. "There is an atom bomb in the world," they say; "there is not time to work through the United Nations." By that same token, there is an atom bomb in the world,

there is not time to work for world government, which practically every informed person agrees could not soon be established.

THE UNITED NATIONS—A CHALLENGE

We cannot wait for years to develop a new organization to deal with the immediate complex problems confronting us including control of atomic energy. Today we have only one organization and that is the United Nations. We may be able to reform and strengthen it in time. We can possibly amend its Charter and cure its defects over the years. We cannot substitute for it today, tomorrow, or for many weary years, another and possibly more perfect organization. Today more than ever there is the need to grapple directly with the problems and difficulties of the organization which we have at hand. There is the need to work steadily and courageously within the framework of the United Nations, neither hoping for impossible utopias nor giving up too soon the admittedly difficult attempt to achieve international cooperation, even with our present imperfect institutions and our equally imperfect human nature.

MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(As of August 1, 1946)

Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
India
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Liberia
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippine Commonwealth
Poland
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Union of South Africa
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia

WARREN R. AUSTIN ON U.N. PEACE GOALS

Warren Robinson Austin, United States delegate to the United Nations Security Council beginning January 1, 1947, at a dinner of the Foreign Policy Association on June 26, 1946, outlined United Nations peace goals. Mr. Austin, who served as U.S. Senator from Vermont from 1931 to 1946, said in part:

The machinery of general international organization cannot run itself. Only men who know what they want to achieve, and who have the united support of their several peoples, can supply the energy that will make the wheels turn.

Therefore, through national organizations of business, labor, agriculture, veterans, women, education, religion and international relations, we strive to:

Plan a nation-wide educational program on the United Nations;

Inspire Americans, especially such citizens' organizations as the one hundred fifty conferring under the sponsorship of The Foreign Policy Association today, to look ahead and discuss what they hope to see accomplished through United Nations machinery, particularly the goals toward which they want their representatives in the various organs, commissions, and specialized agencies to work;

Relate the main lines of American Foreign Policy to the task of clarifying our peace goals;

To suggest a few of the specific goals on which to exercise the relatively new function of acting together internationally.

In warfare we have defeated the enemy. In peace we have not consolidated the victory. This will not be achieved unless the purposes and principles of the United Nations are made living motives in the souls of men.

To bring this about, two immediate steps are necessary:

The holding action to prevent threats to peace, defined in ARTICLE 2 of the Charter. Thus, as in the shadow of a great rock, we could enjoy the security in which the other, and corresponding step, can be taken—

Operation of the machinery in definite, specific, common enterprises.

For example, the International Labor Organization, having more than fifty member States, has the basic purpose of promoting improved labor standards and social security in all countries. It aims to eliminate sub-labor standards, which cause unrest and disturbance, socially and economically. It is one of the specialized agencies enabled by ARTICLE 57 of the Charter to be brought into relationship with the United Nations. . . .

Another illustration of positive operation of United Nations machinery in common enterprises is the Food and Agriculture Organization, consisting of forty-two member States. This is a world organization for pooling the best knowledge and experience relating to nutrition, agriculture, production, and marketing, and the best use of farm, fishery and forestry resources. It is strictly a fact-finding and advisory body. It does not put into effect any of its recommendations. This approach, unspectacular though it be, implements one of our specific peace goals.

The work of the Food and Agriculture Organization is designed to be integrated with that of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. It can, without loss of identity, constitute a part of the United Nations. . . .

Definitely, one peace goal is to give the power of active public opinion to this common enterprise.

Another good habit-forming exercise should have positive stimulation, namely: the system of consultation consolidated by the Act of Chapultepec. . . .

The Act of Chapultepec, which provided especially for reciprocal assistance and American solidarity, was so designed that

it must conform to the principles and policies of the United Nations Charter subsequently to be adopted. . . .

Other illustrations of goals and of public participation are the high points advanced by speakers today covering eight areas. They avoided generalities and advanced highly significant and realizable objectives. Categorically, they are: Expansion of Trade and Employment; Reconstruction and Development; Human Rights—freedom of information and education; Health and Social Welfare; Peaceful Settlements; United Military Defense; Atomic Energy—Control and Utilization; Trusteeship and Self-Government for Dependent Areas. . . .

Our best hope for preventing war is international collaboration on positive goals:

(1) Developing large-scale plans to which each country can contribute in terms of its ability—really investing in peaceful struggles as we did in the violent struggle. . . .

(2) Concentrating the forces and facilities we have on specific objectives that we feel confident we can take within a reasonable time—and then to apply the principles of logistics to make an effective and concerted drive.

(3) By doing important things together at a few strategic points we will gain strength and build up morale in the peaceful struggles as we did in the war. . . .

(4) Behind whatever programs we agree on must be a popular will and determination to risk and sacrifice and persist. . . .

We in the United States assert the belief that we can do cooperatively and by agreement what must somehow be done—that we can peacefully apply what science has taught us—that we can find ways of releasing and organizing the productive and creative powers of people on a world-wide basis through the processes of democracy. To make good on this belief, we must move quickly to collaborate with other free peoples on a program of action through the machinery of the United Nations.

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COMING IN NOVEMBER

Who Makes Our

FOREIGN POLICY?

by Blair Bolles

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION