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STRUGGLE FOR ATOMIC CONTROL

WILLIAM T. R. FOX



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THE STRUGGLE FOR ATOMIC CONTROL

AN 51 .P88 no.129

By WILLIAM T. R. FOX

HIROSHIMA, on the Inland Sea of Japan, was a city about the size of Rochester, New York, or Portland, Oregon, or Dallas, Texas. For all practical purposes, at a quarter past eight on the morning of August 6, 1945, Hiroshima ceased to exist. A single atomic bomb had destroyed two-thirds of its 90,000 buildings. It had killed or seriously injured three-fifths of its population. Nine-tenths of the city's doctors and an even larger proportion of its nurses were killed or disabled.

All but three of its forty-five civilian hospitals were destroyed. Three days later, as the curtain was being rung down on the Second World War, a second atomic bomb blasted another large Japanese city, Nagasaki.

Most Americans were thrilled at first by the news of the new miracle weapon which seemed to promise an early end of the war. With V-J Day, however, the events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were temporarily forgotten in the rejoicing over the surrender of Japan. When Americans again turned to consider the meaning of the atomic bomb, they were not quite so jubilant.

The new weapon has turned out to be like something out of Pandora's box. Now that it has been let out of the box, it can

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never be put back. There is no such thing as "undiscovering" an important new discovery. The next best thing to do might seem to be to keep it a secret from the rest of the world. But can we keep it a secret?

No Secret in the Atom

The present American monopoly does not depend primarily upon fundamental, scientific secrets known only to American scientists. It depends more upon secrets of production technique and upon experience in actual production of fissionable materials. It also depends on the United States being the only country in the world which has plants for the production of fissionable materials. To build these plants and gain the production experience required a combination of things. It took two billion dollars. It necessitated the highest priorities for every requirement of the men developing the atomic bomb. And it required the unstinting cooperation of European scientists who had been driven out of their homelands by Fascist tyranny, together with the concentrated research efforts of thousands of American scientists.

Easier for Another Country

Another nation will find it difficult to produce the bomb, but in some ways not so difficult as it was for the United States. There seems little doubt that foreign scientists and technologists can within a few years unravel the production secrets, build the necessary plants, and acquire the necessary raw materials.

For the time being, the United States alone appears to be able to manufacture atomic bombs. But the American monopoly is strictly temporary. Some scientists believe that other countries can have atomic weapons within five years. Few believe that the American monopoly will last more than ten or twenty years. In any case, American policy cannot be based on a naïve faith that ours is the only country which can produce the bomb.

Not "Just Another Weapon"

It is probably true that within the next decade this country could out-produce any other country which succeeded in making bombs of its own. Our industrial resources are so great that the United States might even be able to produce more fissionable materials than all the rest of the world combined. If the bomb were "just another weapon," this fact would be of the greatest

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

significance. But the bomb is not "just another weapon." It is a weapon which is peculiarly suited for destroying large cities. Already existing explosives were quite adequate for destroying lesser targets. Only a comparatively few cities are worth-while targets for atomic bombing. The number of bombs which a country would have to produce in order to be able to destroy all the larger cities of an enemy is, therefore, limited.

Atomic bombs more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki will in all probability be available when and if there is a next war. Even with bombs no more powerful than those already used, from one to ten would be sufficient to obliterate any city on this earth.

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Since a very few bombs can do so much damage, it may make little difference to major cities whether a warring nation has five hundred or five thousand bombs at its disposal. The critical damage would be done with the first five hundred. What this means for the United States is that there is no safety simply in trying to stay ahead in an atomic arms race. Once other nations have learned how to produce atomic weapons, they will soon produce enough so that our head start will not be of great importance.

Would Not Matter Much Who "Won" Atomic War

There is another reason why there is no safety for the United States in an atomic arms race, even though our country would almost certainly win. The kind of damage which atomic bombs do has already been described. In a two-way atomic war, that is, a war between states each of which has atomic weapons, the victor would find that it did not make very much difference which side "won" the war. For victor and vanquished alike, the larger cities would all be gone and the loss of life, particularly civilian life, would be staggering. Those who survived the war would find that modern civilized existence was no longer possible. The technological basis for modern civilization would have been destroyed. As one writer put it, "there may be some doubt as to which weapons will be used in the next war, but there is no doubt which ones will be used in the war after that. They will be the spear and the slingshot."

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ESSENTIAL

IT is sometimes argued that while no nation can attain anything like security by piling up a larger stock of atomic bombs, an atomic arms race offers the best assurance that there will be no atomic war. It is said that a prospective aggressor will not attack a country which is able to retaliate with atomic weapons. Thus, once the major powers have achieved a high level of atomic armament, none will make war on any of the others. It is doubtful, however, whether fear of retaliation would deter a man like Hitler if such a man should again seize power in a major state. Even without a new Hitler, political leaders would almost inevitably begin to trade on each other's unwillingness to make

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war. This would create a situation in which even atomic war might appear more desirable to some government than further national humiliation. Whatever system for the control of atomic energy is adopted, the possibility of retaliation will be a strong deterrent to an atomic aggressor. But we must have a stronger safeguard. Some other system of deterrents against atomic aggression, and against the other terrifying new weapons of destruction and germ warfare, must be organized if mankind is to have any real sense of security.

Five months before the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, responsible public officials who knew about the bomb had reached a conclusion with which thoughtful men everywhere have since agreed. The United States would have to choose and choose soon between a "sit-tight" policy aimed at preserving its own advantage and a policy aimed at setting up international control. The then Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, has recently revealed the record of his last conversation with President Roosevelt in mid-March 1945. He quotes, in the February 1947 *Harper's Magazine,* from his diary, as follows: "I went over with him the two schools of thought that exist in respect to the future control after the war of this project, in case it is successful, one of them being the secret close-in attempted control of the project by those who control it now, and the other being the international control based upon freedom both of science and of access." By April 25, 1945, Secretary Stimson, when he first discussed the atom bomb problem with President Truman, had rejected the first alternative on the ground that "it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position [position of the United States monopoly] indefinitely." He was thus driven to favor an attempt at international control.

In our own analysis we have examined and found wanting atomic energy policies which depend upon keeping the secret or staying ahead in an atomic arms race. We too are therefore driven to turn from such purely national approaches to the problem and consider instead an international approach. There is substantial unanimity on this point. There is also general agreement that an international approach will raise unprecedented and difficult problems. As Secretary Stimson warned the President on the day the United Nations Conference was convening in San Francisco, "No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any par-

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ticular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thoroughgoing rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated." When, however, one asks what system of control would be adequate, differences of opinion immediately arise.

Is World Government the Answer?

One group has insisted that nothing short of world government can possibly give mankind relief from the threat of atomic warfare. By world government, they mean a world authority strong enough to enforce its will against even the greatest powers. A strong case can be made for this point of view. But regardless of the merits of a world government, it is obvious that it could be created in only two ways. It would have to be created either by the *voluntary* act of all the great powers of the world, or by a victorious war waged by those governments wishing to set up a world government against those opposing it.

What are the prospects that a world government will be voluntarily created by the collective act of a group of states including each of the present five great powers? It is highly unlikely that American opinion can be brought to support world government as a short-run solution to the problem of atomic energy control. It is even less likely that Soviet policy will support the creation of a world government, particularly if it were dominated by capitalist countries. *Those who insist on world government or nothing are almost certain to get nothing.*

Conciliation in American-Soviet Relations?

A second international-minded group would readily admit that the present state of world affairs does not favor the voluntary creation of a strong world authority which could control the menace to mankind raised by the atomic bomb. This group hopes that much can be done to lessen the distrust which now seems to poison relations among the great powers and especially Soviet-American relations. Henry Wallace is the outstanding spokesman of this group. To break down Soviet suspicion, it proposes that the United States demonstrate its belief in Soviet good faith by conciliatory gestures. Once the barrier of mistrust is broken down, this group feels that it would be relatively easy to achieve Soviet-American agreement on international control.

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The Middle Ground

Between the two groups just mentioned, those who believe they must have world government or nothing and those who believe that it is to our interest to meet Russia halfway, lies a large body of opinion which believes that a great deal less than world government is the most that can be had and that American policy must be based upon more than merely fairness to the Soviet Union. This in-between group believes that in our diplomatic relations we should be not only conciliatory but also firm. It would agree with the advocates of world government that an atomic energy control scheme capable of being evaded is less than useless; but it believes that an almost foolproof system of control can be created without going so far as to set up a world government. This body of opinion would agree that a conciliatory and generous policy toward the Soviet Union is essential in our over-all relations, but it would not advocate weakening the present American monopoly in atomic weapons except as part of a comprehensive agreement by which international control is put into effect.

The Least that Is Needed

What is the least which governments committed to an international approach to the problem of atomic energy control should insist upon? It is not enough to say that the world must be satisfied with a great deal less than world government but must not accept a control plan which permits evasion. Each government which enters into an agreement to achieve some sort of international control over atomic energy will want to be assured that no other government can secretly produce or stockpile illicit atomic weapons or fissionable materials. These materials include the three known nuclear fuels, Uranium-235, Plutonium-239, and Uranium-233. If any production or stockpiling does take place, each government will want to make sure that it will have warning of this violation long before the violator can accumulate material for enough atomic weapons to terrorize other states.

Unless at least this much is achieved, a full-scale atomic arms race is inevitable. This would set the world on the road to a two-way atomic war. Even if such a race did not end in a two-way atomic war, nations would feel forced to keep themselves completely mobilized at all times for carrying on atomic war and defending themselves against atomic attack. Our free institu-

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tions could hardly survive prolonged total mobilization. If the war did finally come, it would be fought with extremely large stockpiles of bombs available from the first day of the war. The worst predictions of disaster would come to pass.

If, however, all nations can be assured that no fissionable materials can be secretly produced or stockpiled, the burden of preparedness will not be so staggering. An atomic war, if it came, would probably take place before the huge stockpiles of bombs which could wreak such total disaster would have been built up. International control of atomic energy is therefore worth striving for, even if only in the limited sense here described. An ideal plan would go much further.

FIRST STEPS TOWARD WORLD CONTROL

THE urgency and the difficulty of achieving international control were recognized by President Truman in the very first weeks after the bombing of Hiroshima. In his message to Congress on October 3, 1945, he said:

> In international relations, as in domestic affairs, the release of atomic energy constitutes a new force too revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas. We can no longer rely on the slow progress of time to develop a program of control among nations. Civilization demands that we shall reach at the earliest possible date a satisfactory arrangement for the control of this discovery, in order that it may become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world peace instead of an instrument of destruction. . . .
>
> The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing and encouraging the use of atomic energy and all future scientific information toward peaceful and humanitarian ends. The difficulties in working out such arrangements are great.

President Truman's first diplomatic step was to invite the British and Canadian prime ministers to confer with him. In a joint declaration issued November 15, 1945, at the conclusion of this conference, President Truman and Prime Ministers Atlee and King urged that a special commission be set up under the United Nations to make specific proposals to achieve the interna-

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tional control of atomic energy, to insure "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction," and by way of inspection and other safeguards "to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions." As a method of procedure, it was further suggested in the declaration that the commission begin its work by promoting a wide interchange of scientific information. Thus, in this first international declaration, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was forecast.

The Moscow Communiqué

Six weeks later the second step was taken in negotiations looking toward international control of atomic energy. On December 26, 1945, at the conclusion of a conference in Moscow, Messrs. Bevin, Byrnes, and Molotov, the foreign ministers of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, issued a communiqué which dealt in part with the subject of atomic energy. This statement followed the recommendation in the Truman-Atlee-King declaration of the previous month in urging that a special commission to study the problem of atomic energy be established by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The exact wording of the Truman-Atlee-King declaration was repeated in that part of the Moscow statement which described the proposals which the new commission was expected to make.

In one respect, however, the Moscow statement was more specific than the earlier declaration. It defined the relation of the proposed commission to the Security Council. It called for a commission which should be subordinated to the Security Council in all matters related to peace and security. This commission was to be made up of one representative from each of the states represented on the Security Council, together with a representative of Canada. Canada was added because of that nation's leading role in developing atomic energy. Thus, the new commission would reflect the same balance of forces as operate within the Security Council.

The Atomic Energy Commission Is Set Up

France and China, the other permanent members of the Security Council, were invited to join with the Big Three and Canada in sponsoring a resolution to create the Atomic Energy Commission at the first session of the General Assembly of the

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United Nations in January 1946. This six-nation resolution was adopted unanimously.

The first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission met in New York five months later. In the meantime, rapid steps were taken in the United States to develop American proposals for achieving international control. On January 7, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes created a State Department Committee on Atomic Energy with Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, as its chairman. This policy committee in turn appointed a Board of Consultants to advise with it. Mr. David E. Lilienthal, then chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, headed this board. The Board of Consultants began to draft the famous "Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy."

THREE ANALYSES OF THE PROBLEM

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report

This report, which has come to be known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, was the first to deal in any comprehensive fashion with problems of international control. It was completed in the remarkably short time of seven weeks. It was presented to the public not as a statement of American policy but as a "suitable starting point for the informed public discussion which is one of the essential factors in developing sound policy." The document is of basic importance because the proposals which Mr. Bernard Baruch later made in behalf of the United States government stem largely from it. The major conclusions of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report were as follows:

(1) A world-wide system of inspection to make sure that nations were living up to their obligations not to manufacture illicit atomic weapons could never *by itself* be enough. The inspecting authority must have not merely police-like functions but also positive functions of operating responsibility and research. Otherwise the highest type of personnel could not be recruited for the world authority.

(2) The international Atomic Development Authority should carry on itself the intrinsically dangerous activities involved in the production of fissionable materials. It should also have important research functions. The most dangerous activities—most dangerous because if carried on illegally, they could in the short-

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est time result in the possession of atomic weapons—such as those involved in the actual production of U-235, plutonium, and the most recently announced U-233, would have to be carried on by the ADA. The "intrinsically dangerous" activities were defined very broadly so as to include, in addition, all uranium and thorium mining in the world. To accomplish it the board proposed that title to all uranium and thorium mines be vested in the ADA.

(3) In public comment on the report great emphasis was placed on the possibility of "denaturing" fissionable materials. Such denatured material, it appeared, would permit the peacetime development of atomic energy. For denatured materials could be transformed only with difficulty and after a substantial lapse of time into material suitable for atomic weapons. Such material might be leased by the world authority for use by national authority.

(4) No control plan except a total control plan should be accepted by the United States. The report recognized that the United States had a present advantage which it should not be expected to sacrifice except in exchange for a truly effective system of international control. While the plan would have to be negotiated as a whole, it was recognized that such a total control plan would have to be put into operation by stages. Comprehensive world-wide prospecting for uranium and thorium resources was suggested as appropriate at an early stage.

(5) The report laid great stress upon the necessity for preserving what it called the "strategic balance" among nations participating in the control plan. This balance was to be preserved *whether the plan succeeded or whether it failed.* So far as the putting into effect of the control plan was concerned, this consideration meant that each stage would have to be so carefully worked out that at no stage would a major nation's capacity to defend itself against atomic aggression by other nations be seriously weakened. It also meant that, once the whole control plan was in effect, inherently dangerous activities would have to be distributed about the earth so as to preserve a strategic balance. With such a strategically planned distribution, if the plan broke down, no major state would be left defenseless. Furthermore, distribution would permit effective action to be taken against an atomic aggressor since there would always be facilities outside the aggressor's territory available for producing atomic weapons

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GIST OF ACHESON-LILIENTHAL PLAN

1 POLICING OF ILLEGAL PRODUCTION CAN NEVER BY ITSELF BE ADEQUATE. THE BEST SCIENTISTS WOULD NEVER BECOME JUST POLICEMEN



2 ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OWNS DANGEROUS ATOMIC ENERGY ACTIVITIES; CONDUCTS RESEARCH



3 "DENATURED MATERIALS" ARE LEASED BY ADA TO PRIVATE USERS TO PRODUCE ELECTRIC POWER



4 NO CONTROL PLAN EXCEPT TOTAL CONTROL PLAN. OTHERWISE U.S. SHOULD RETAIN ITS PRESENT MONOPOLY



5 "STRATEGIC BALANCE" — PLANTS ARE TO BE EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTED SO THAT IF PLAN SHOULD BREAK DOWN INNOCENT NATIONS COULD DEFEND THEMSELVES



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TO WHICH BARUCH ADDED · · ·

1 NO CONTROL PLAN EXCEPT ONE WHICH INSURES SWIFT AND SURE PUNISHMENT FOR ILLEGAL PRODUCTION



2 THIS MEANS NO VETO BY ANY POWER ON DECISION TO PUNISH ATOMIC VIOLATOR



to repel atomic aggression. Foreign governments will have no incentive to agree upon an international control plan which leaves them permanently in their present position, at the mercy of the United States. This section on strategic balance was especially important in bringing American opinion to an understanding of this fact.

The Baruch Proposals

Very shortly after the publication of the important Acheson-Lilienthal Report on March 16, 1946, President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch as American representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Representatives of other states naturally expected the United States to take the lead in formulating proposals for control. The responsibility which was placed upon the shoulders of this distinguished elder statesman was therefore very great. It was a tense moment when Baruch arose at the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, to state American policies.

Differences from Lilienthal Report

His statement was eloquent and dramatic. In its main outlines the Baruch proposals follow the recommendations of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. There are, however, differences in em-

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phasis and in spirit. To a much greater extent than did the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, Baruch stressed the necessity for including within the system of control provision for "immediate, swift, and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations." In this connection he challenged the unanimity principle contained in Article 27 of the United Nations Charter. According to this principle, which is more popularly called "the veto," no enforcement action of any kind may be taken through United Nations organs except by consent of each of the five permanent members of the Security Council—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, China, France, and the United States. Mr. Baruch declared: "There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed." As we shall see later, Mr. Baruch's insistence that the great powers relinquish their veto in dealing with violations of an atomic energy control agreement turned out to be the major sticking point which prevented unanimous action by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in its first report to the Security Council.

A second difference in emphasis between the Lilienthal and Baruch approaches is found in the importance assigned to denaturing in the control plan. Baruch stated: "Denaturing seems to have been overestimated by the public as a safety measure."

Similarities

In most other respects the Baruch plan follows in the directions suggested by the Lilienthal report. It provides for an "International Atomic Development Authority" with "complete managerial control of . . . all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities." It reserves to the authority the "sole and exclusive rights to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives." It emphasizes the necessity for a strategic distribution of all intrinsically dangerous activities and for an equitable distribution of stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials which help support a strategic balance. In order to make certain that the authority may always be able to control "dangerous activities," it recommends that the control agreement leave the

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line between dangerous and non-dangerous activities flexible. For activities which are dangerous but not so dangerous as to require that the authority have a sole monopoly in carrying them on, the plan relies upon inspection to make sure that such activities are carried on only in lawful ways.

Mr. Baruch stressed, as did the Lilienthal report, that a plan of control would have to come into effect in successive stages. Except to indicate that a world-wide survey of uranium and thorium resources should be completed at an early date, he did not set forth these stages. International agreements as to the stages will require the most difficult and complex negotiations. Among the difficult subjects to be negotiated will be the extent to which at each stage the United States is to make information available and to yield control over the manufacture, stockpiling, and disposal of fissionable materials.

The Soviet Counterproposals

At the second session of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 19, 1946, the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, brought forward counterproposals for dealing with the problems of atomic energy. The Soviet government proposed an international convention which would outlaw the use and prohibit the production of atomic weapons, and would require the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons within three months of the conclusion of the agreements.

Representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States were agreed on the necessity for outlawing the use of atomic weapons and prohibiting their manufacture. The Russian proposal, however, was to *begin* by outlawing atomic weapons, prohibiting their manufacture, and destroying existing stocks. This would have the effect of bringing the Soviet Union and the United States nearer equality before serious negotiations for international inspection and control were begun. The United States has insisted that outlawry of atomic weapons and destruction of existing stocks can be agreed to only as an integral part of a complete control plan. Such a plan would have to include an inspection process so efficient that the United States would not, once it had disarmed itself, be left defenseless against an evader of the plan. Thus the Americans apparently intended to surrender the new weapon only after effective safeguards were actually in operation.

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INSPECTION OF MINES PLANTS ETC. BY INTERNATIONAL BODY 	Y
CREATION OF ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY WITH POWER OF MANAGEMENT, RESEARCH AND LICENSE 	Y
PUNISHMENT FOR ILLEGAL PRODUCTION OF ATOMIC ENERGY 	PRESU BUT NO PROVIS
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VETO BY ANY MEMBER OF THE BIG FIVE 	NOT DI

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: THREE PROPOSALS

LILIENTHAL	OFFICIAL U.S. PROPOSAL	SOVIET PROPOSAL
;	YES	YES
;	YES	YES, WITHIN PRESCRIBED LIMITS
;	YES	NO
ABLY YES SPECIFIC ON	YES	YES, BUT ONLY BY SECURITY COUNCIL
TER MACHINLL SET UP	ONLY AFTER MACHINERY IS ALL SET UP	PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION IMMEDIATELY
CUSSED	NONE	NO VETO OVER DAY-TO-DAY INSPECTION; VETO RETAINED IN VOTE TO PUNISH ATOM VIOLATOR

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THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AT WORK

OF the twelve nations represented on the Atomic Energy Commission, all but Soviet Russia and Poland expressed a willingness to use the Baruch statement of June 14 as a basis for discussion. However, the deadlock that developed following the introduction of Gromyko's counterproposals suggested that the time was not yet ripe to attempt to negotiate a political agreement reconciling the two positions. The Commission therefore agreed to engage in technical studies of the problems involved before returning to the major political problem.

Technical Subcommittees Set Up

A working committee and four subcommittees were created to carry on this less spectacular work. These committees labored long and hard through the summer and fall of 1946 in work which was ultimately to bear important fruit.

Once a decision had been made to begin by examining informally certain technical questions, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission began to make progress. It was much easier to get the question "Is control possible?" answered than the question "Do we want international control, and if so, what kind?" Since there could be no agreement on an international control plan unless there was agreement that control is technically possible, this was a sensible way to begin.

By meeting privately and informally at first, the representatives of the different nations were able to understand each other's point of view and yield to each other on nonessentials. This enabled them to avoid unnecessary disagreements. Much of the technical data upon which the American program was based had to be explained patiently and at great length in order to demonstrate that the American participants were taking no unfair advantage of their less well-informed colleagues.

Thus, the "informal" conversations avoided altogether the question of the political feasibility of international control. The delegates were free to talk because nothing was said for public consumption. A delegate could change his mind without his government seeming to lose face. No nation was formally committed to any particular kind of international agreement.

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The Scientific and Technical Committee

In the first stage, the Scientific and Technical Committee carried the main burden of the work. This committee worked under the able leadership of Professor H. A. Kramers, a physicist-member of the Netherlands delegation to the Commission. His committee surprised and pleased the world by bringing in a unanimous report on the technical feasibility of atomic energy control.

The hard work of Kramers' committee was done during August 1946. Then followed a month's delay while the Soviet member of the Committee was determining whether his government would permit him to sign the committee's "First Report on the Scientific and Technical Aspects of the Problem of Control." Finally, on September 26, the report was adopted with the approval of the Soviet and American members, as well as that of all the other ten members of the committee.

They agreed that in the present state of scientific and technical knowledge only uranium and thorium need to be brought under close control. They agreed that the technical processes leading to the peaceful use of atomic energy and those leading to the warlike use were so similar that control of atomic weapons would require control of the peaceful development of atomic energy.

To the committee, it appeared possible and not too difficult to prevent illicit mining of uranium and thorium ores. On the other hand, the installations which produce nuclear fuels (U-235, plutonium, or U-233) would have to be kept under the strictest control. This conclusion was obviously based on the consideration that such nuclear fuels are immediately available for use in atomic bombs.

On the question of "whether effective control of atomic energy is possible," the committee did not "find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing the effective control is not technologically feasible." This is a commonsense conclusion, for nearly everybody has assumed that a *national* government is able to restrict the production of fissionable materials and atomic weapons within its territory to any degree it desires. Whether an international authority could be clothed with sufficient power to exercise an equally efficient degree of control remains to be determined. This is a political question which was beyond the scope of the Scientific and Technical Committee.

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"Committee 2"—Safeguards

Even with the unanimous report that control is technically feasible, the members of the Commission were not yet ready to turn directly to consider thorny political problems. Accordingly, another subcommittee, "Committee 2"—it has never had another name—set itself the task of preparing for the Commission a preliminary report on safeguards against the misuse of atomic energy. In this committee, as in the Scientific and Technical Committee, care was taken to discuss the question of safeguards in general terms rather than in terms of binding and precise commitments. Thus, the question asked was "What kinds of safeguards would be necessary to make sure that atomic energy is used only for peaceful purposes?" It was *not* "What powers will we agree to give the new world authority so as to make sure that atomic energy is used only for peaceful purposes?" This latter question is the "sixty-four-dollar" one. The time was not, and perhaps is not yet, ripe to ask it.

Committee 2 now called upon a series of technical specialists, chiefly American and Canadian, to discuss with its members the technical problems involved in preventing diversion at various stages in the production of atomic energy or the carrying on of clandestine forbidden activities. This enabled it to prepare a "First Report on Safeguards Required to Ensure the Use of Atomic Energy Only for Peaceful Purposes."

To prevent forbidden secret production, the control agency would "require broad privileges of movement and inspection, including rights to conduct surveys by ground and air." The committee concluded that a system of international inspection can provide adequate safeguards against diversion at the mining and refinery stages, but that safeguards at plants producing nuclear fuels depended on actual management by the international control agency.

Whether the unanimous approval for the report on safeguards could have been obtained, as was obtained for the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee, will never be known. This report was not voted on separately by the Commission. The Soviet delegate refused to participate in discussions relating to aerial photography and ground surveys but raised no specific objections to other parts of the report. On March 5, 1947, Mr. Gromyko criticized the proposal for international management of atomic energy installations and also the proposal for prac-

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tically unlimited right of inspection. In these two matters Committee 2's report followed the American suggestions. The report would therefore probably have had to be modified to secure uanimous approval.

The General Report

The safeguards report was never separately submitted to the Commission for approval because in mid-November Committee 2's task was greatly enlarged. It was given the responsibility of drafting the Commission's first report to the Security Council. The report was to describe the proceedings, the findings, and the recommendations on atomic energy to date and was to be completed for Commission consideration before December 31, 1946. The report on safeguards thus came to be included in the larger report, and the larger report failed to secure Soviet approval because it dealt with certain political questions which up to that time had been carefully avoided in Committee discussions. It thus forced a vote on troublesome issues on which there was not as yet complete Soviet-American agreement. So far as could then be judged, differences between the two countries' positions revolved around two not entirely separate issues: (1) the relation of atomic energy negotiations to the disarmament discussions in the General Assembly and the Security Council; and (2) the question of the veto, especially in enforcement action.

The Gap Is Narrowed

To understand the differences between the Russian and American positions it is necessary to examine the disarmament debate in the General Assembly during the fall of 1946. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on October 29 called for a general reduction of armaments and a total banning of atomic weapons. In the course of his speech he attacked the American proposals and seemed to be restating Ambassador Gromyko's earlier statement that the way to begin atomic energy control was by voting to outlaw atomic bombs.

When, however, specific General Assembly action was debated in committee, Mr. Molotov called for the establishment of a "commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes." Another Soviet delegate declared that this commission would have to have "specific organs of inspection." Thus, for

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the first time the Soviet delegation spoke of the necessity for a special international control authority with right of inspection. This recognition of international inspection "in principle" did not mean that the Soviet Union was committed to accepting the rigorous inspection system which the United States has advocated. But it opened the door to negotiation over the Baruch proposals. A way out of the deadlock which had barred discussion of political questions in the UNAEC was indicated.

The Veto Again

Mr. Molotov's insistence that his proposed control commission be set up "within the framework of the Security Council" seemed, on the other hand, to create a difficulty in another direction. The United States had continuously called for a system of international atomic energy control which would be based upon a special treaty dealing in a comprehensive way with atomic energy and nothing else. Molotov seemed to be proposing that the control agency should be set up by Security Council resolution and subject entirely to the Council's supervision. To those supporting the American proposals it appeared that Molotov sought in this fashion completely to bypass the veto question, since the Security Council can act only if no one of the great powers exercises its veto.

After the Assembly had debated the alleged necessity of abolishing or restricting the veto in atomic energy control, Molotov made a second statement which seemed to most observers a significant concession. He declared that the rule of unanimity in Article 27 of the United Nations Charter had nothing to do with the day-to-day operation of the control commission. Therefore, any attempt to prevent inspection would not be a lawful use of the veto but a violation of a decision of the Security Council. The issue of the veto, in view of the Soviet concession, was now confined to a single question. Could a great power by its veto in the Security Council prevent enforcement action against itself once it had been found by the international atomic energy control agency to have violated the control agreement? This question was not directly debated in the General Assembly.

The major Soviet concessions just described gave fresh hope and new meaning to the labors of the delegates to the General Assembly. They now found it possible on December 14 to agree unanimously to a disarmament resolution.

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OUR POSITION AND THE SOVIET'S

OUR POSITION	SOVIET POSITION
 WE WANT ATOMIC WEAPONS OUTLAWED	 WE TOO WANT THEM OUTLAWED
 WE HAVE ATOM BOMBS NOW	 WE DON'T HAVE THEM NOW BUT WE MAY LATER ON
1 2  IF CONTROL MACHINERY IS SET UP FIRST, *THEN* WE DESTROY OUR BOMBS	1 2  IF EXISTING BOMBS ARE DESTROYED, *THEN* WE CAN TALK ABOUT THE CONTROL PLAN
 THEN WE HAVE THE ADVANTAGE IF MACHINERY NEVER GETS SET UP	 THEN WE ARE AT LEAST ON EQUAL FOOTING IF NEGOTIATIONS FOR CONTROL COLLAPSE

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Atomic Control vs. General Disarmament

Meanwhile, the discussions in the Commission were not proceeding so harmoniously. Mr. Baruch's American delegation apparently was fearful that the question of atomic energy control was being submerged in the larger question of general disarmament. Taking advantage of the frequently expressed sentiment in the General Assembly that rapid action was essential, Mr. Baruch pressed on December 5 for approval by the Commission of the basic principles on which the American proposals were based. He introduced a resolution which would include in the report of the Commission the most controversial feature of his earlier proposals, abolition of the right of veto over enforcement action by nations violating the international control agreement. The Soviet representative at this time spoke neither for nor against the resolution. He asked only for time to study the proposal for action introduced by Baruch.

Before the next plenary meeting of the Commission on December 17, the General Assembly had passed its disarmament resolution. Since the Atomic Energy Commission was created by an act of the General Assembly, it is presumably subordinate to that body. It seemed reasonable therefore when several delegates, including the Soviet delegate, suggested that the wording of the Baruch resolution of December 5 be brought into harmony with the unanimously adopted Assembly resolution. Mr. Gromyko declared that the American proposal disregarded the plain language of the Charter. He concluded by demanding a further postponement of any final vote on Baruch's December 5 resolution in the following words:

> The reason we should take no decision now is because I imagine that we want to reach a unanimous agreement. I very strongly feel that it is necessary to find a common language to deal with this question and we must study the document which has been submitted and circulated by Mr. Baruch.

Several delegates representing other countries now sought to help Messrs. Baruch and Gromyko find some "common language." In this mediating role the Canadians took the lead. At the December 20 meeting the Commission voted 10–0, with the Soviet Union and Poland not voting, to adopt a Canadian proposal that the United States proposals be accepted for inclusion in the forthcoming report, provided that the wording of these proposals be brought into conformity with those parts

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of the Assembly disarmament resolution dealing with the same subject. This resolution did not satisfy the Soviet delegation since the veto was not mentioned in the disarmament resolution.

Mr. Baruch Forces a Showdown

Mr. Baruch, however, desired to make no further concessions as to either wording or time of voting. In a committee meeting on December 27, he declared: "Gentlemen, it is either—or." What he meant was either control agreement with veto renunciation or no control agreement at all. At the December 30 meeting, when a mediating role was no longer possible and each government had to declare itself, only Poland joined the U.S.S.R. in abstaining from the vote approving the Baruch resolution of December 5 (as reworded in Committee discussion) for inclusion in the UNAEC's first report to the Security Council. The other nine governments represented lined up behind the United States.

While matters were thus moving to a climax in the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Gromyko was introducing a resolution in the Security Council which would require it to submit plans for a general reduction in armaments, including total atomic disarmament, within three months. The United States representative would probably have opposed this in any case on two grounds. (1) The Military Staff Committee of the Security Council has not yet been able to collect and correlate the technical data on which a generally accepted plan for the regulation of armaments must be based. (2) The machinery of collective security, especially under Articles 43–47 of the Charter, has not yet been completed and thus the political basis for collective disarmament has not yet been laid. But there was a third and especially cogent reason for opposing what looked like a generous Soviet gesture for international cooperation. The United States delegation feared that the atomic energy negotiations, which our government believes to be central, would be submerged in the broader discussion of disarmament.

It sought at first to prevent this by asking that the Security Council consider problems of atomic energy control before it dealt with general disarmament at all. There was little support from other members of the Security Council for this position. The United States then agreed to simultaneous but separate discussion of atomic energy control and other types of disarmament. Over Soviet protest this was done by creating a "Commission

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for Conventional Armaments" which was specifically directed not to consider atomic armaments.

The Soviet position on atomic energy control was restated before the Security Council on February 18 and on March 5, 1947. The second of these two occasions was significant for its warning that the Soviet Union intends to restrict carefully the scope of its earlier concessions on inspection and on majority vote in the day-to-day operation of international inspection. Also at this time Mr. Gromyko revealed for the first time Soviet opposition to an international authority which would itself operate plants within the Soviet Union.

Areas of Agreement and Disagreement

In early 1947, the areas of agreement and disagreement on atomic energy control between the United States and the Soviet Union were about as follows:

(1) There was agreement that on the basis of available scientific knowledge, control appeared feasible.

(2) There was agreement that international control would require an international control authority to have broad rights of inspection, although the Soviet government would have these rights carefully circumscribed.

(3) There was agreement that the veto should not be used to obstruct the work of the international inspectorate and thereby conceal a violation of the control agreement, although here too the Soviet government made it clear that it did not intend to be unnecessarily outvoted.

(4) There was objection in principle by the Soviet delegate to endowing the international authority with power to carry on the most dangerous activities itself, at least within the Soviet Union.

(5) There was disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union as to whether to begin by outlawing atomic warfare or by negotiating a total control plan.

(6) There was disagreement in principle over the Baruch position forbidding use of the veto in the Security Council vote to order enforcement action after a violation of the control plan had been found.

Seemingly, the disagreement over the use of the veto in enforcement action is the greatest obstacle to adoption of a control plan. On the other hand, Soviet willingness to admit that an

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international control authority must have broad rights of inspection appeared to be an enormously important concession. There is recent evidence to suggest, however, that the disagreement over the veto is not so serious as it seems and that agreement on the principle of inspection is not quite so important as it seems.

Insistence on renunciation of the veto, it will be remembered, was Mr. Baruch's most distinctive contribution to the American proposals. He insisted that no nation should be allowed to use the veto to protect itself from the consequences of its own wrongdoing. Since he feels that any control agreement which leaves the veto intact would protect an atomic aggressor, he concludes that elimination of the veto in atomic energy matters is an absolute prerequisite to effective international control.

Baruch *vs.* Wallace

Until public attention was focused on this matter by a controversy which took place between Mr. Baruch and the then Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace, Mr. Baruch's insistence on veto renunciation went almost unchallenged. This otherwise unfortunate controversy had at least one beneficial consequence. It clarified several points at issue in the field of atomic energy control, especially on the veto question.

In a speech made in New York on September 12, 1946, and in a confidential letter of July 23 to President Truman which was published after the New York speech, Secretary Wallace expressed certain doubts and fears about American foreign policy, particularly in the field of atomic energy. Mr. Wallace characterized the veto question which Mr. Baruch had believed to be so important as "entirely irrelevant." On this point, Mr. Wallace is not without support from some students of the problem of international control. Although few would say that the veto issue is entirely irrelevant, they believe with him that the negotiation of punitive sanctions against an atomic aggressor can be entirely separated from the negotiation of a system of inspection which guarantees a clear and unambiguous danger signal in the event of any violation of the control plan. They point out that a great-power violator of an international atomic energy control plan has already exercised its veto by the act of violating the plan. Nothing is gained, therefore, by securing an agreement by the prospective violator that it has surrendered its veto over enforcement action to be taken against it.

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Veto Compromise Is Possible

Many who take a less extreme position than Henry Wallace hold that the veto issue is not one of those black-and-white issues on which no compromise is possible. Speaking for a government which has made strenuous efforts to steer a middle course between the Soviet and American points of view, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs declared on December 4 that "the existence of the requirement of unanimity appears to me to be in strict accord with the realities of the situation. . . . If there came about a situation where it was felt that sanctions would have to be applied against one of the Great Powers, it would be a condition of absolute war whether the opposition of the one power took the form of resistance or took the form of a veto. The only way in which it could be overcome would be by the use of force, and the use of force against a Great Power means war. . . . It will be evident, I think, that we must be very careful in the phrasing of this report."

All this suggests that it is the veto as a symbol rather than as a real issue which has created the present deadlock. It is unfortunately true that a large amount of "face" is now involved. Neither the Soviet nor the American government will find it easy to give way without losing prestige in the sight of the world. On the American side, important men like Senator Vandenberg have declared that the United States Senate will never approve an atomic energy control plan which leaves the veto intact. On the Soviet side, the importance which their representatives have attached to "the unanimity principle" is so great that there can be no formal yielding.

Basis for Compromise

Is there a basis for compromise? Those who are asking for a modification of the veto will at least want to be sure that the veto does not make enforcement action illegal against a violator of an atomic energy control agreement. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter seems to provide a basis for such assurance. It declares: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations. . . ." If it could be agreed that illicit production or storing of fissionable materials constitutes evidence of intent to commit armed attack, then nations could automatically, once a violation had been certified,

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proceed to take enforcement action without waiting for explicit Security Council approval.

Pravda, semi-official Moscow newspaper, has recently objected to statements in the American press that Article 51 constitutes a way of bypassing the unanimity requirement. According to *Pravda,* to say that a violation of the atomic energy control pact is equivalent to an armed attack is to put in each nation's hands a pretext for declaring that whatever other nation it wishes to make war on is an atomic aggressor. This would be true if a single state's judgment were all that were required to authorize action. If, however, action under Article 51 is made to depend upon a declaration of violation by a disinterested international control commission, the objection no longer appears to be sound.

Simply to *permit* unilateral enforcement action would not be enough for those who want to make enforcement action as nearly certain as possible. Enforcement action under Article 51 might be made compulsory by a treaty requiring each country to take immediate action once a violation had been officially declared. This treaty would provide for the "collective act of self-defense" referred to in Article 51. Such action would be within the framework of the Charter but would not have to wait for the Security Council. The veto would not give even legal protection to an atomic aggressor.

This analysis of a possible basis for compromise is not put forward as another plan for atomic energy control. It is intended merely to show that a way can be found for agreement *if the will exists on both sides.* The withdrawal of Bernard Baruch from the Atomic Energy Commission and the resignation of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State at the beginning of 1947, and their replacement by Senator Austin and General Marshall, have made a fresh attempt to break the veto deadlock well worth trying. Guarded references by Senator Austin to Article 51 indicate that he hopes through it to resolve the veto difficulty.

Agreement "in Principle" Not Enough

Whether the will to agree does exist on both sides is another matter. Henry Wallace addressed himself to this in his New York speech and his July letter. He correctly pointed out that Soviet-American negotiations on atomic energy are carried on in the same atmosphere of trust or distrust and respect or disrespect as other subjects under negotiation. He deplored the pressures

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in this country for a "get-tough" policy towards the U.S.S.R. He attributed the many manifestations of Soviet disbelief in the good intentions of American diplomacy to pressures of this kind. To reinstate Soviet belief in American good intentions he proposed that the United States make some substantial gesture to show American faith in Soviet good intentions. One such gesture might be, he suggested, that the United States discontinue the production and further stockpiling of atomic weapons pending the conclusion and implementation of a control agreement. Such a gesture would, he hoped, provoke a Soviet countergesture.

The United States has made no such dramatic gesture as Wallace would favor. The admission by Soviet statesmen that international inspection is necessary to atomic energy control may have suggested to some that the Soviet Union had made the initial friendly gesture and had taken Mr. Wallace's advice even if the United States government had not. Mr. Gromyko's Security Council speech of March 5, however, demonstrates the limited nature of the Soviet concession. It is too soon to tell whether acceptance "in principle" of international inspection will be followed by acceptance in detail of an airtight inspection system. The problem is not simply one of negotiation but of discovering ways by which the closely organized Soviet system can open itself up sufficiently to permit complete inspection.

Task Ahead Is Complicated

It should be clear now that to translate Soviet-American agreement on the necessity for inspection into a binding and detailed treaty will be an herculean task. The task will be complicated because there are many political conditions which a control treaty must meet. Some of them are:

(1) No country wishes to give up its capacity to defend itself if the atomic control plan breaks down. The Acheson-Lilienthal report took account of this point when it declared that in distributing atomic energy installations about the face of the earth the necessity for maintaining a strategic balance be recognized. The problems which meeting this condition will involve have hardly even been defined.

(2) Although plans for enforcement action may not have to be negotiated simultaneously, the plan of setting up the world control authority must be negotiated as a whole and put into effect as rapidly as possible.

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(3) Prestige and power considerations alike demand that the major countries seem to sacrifice about equally at each stage of putting the plan into effect. One must not expect the Soviet Union to open its territory for unobstructed inspection in the first stage if the United States is to keep all its secrets and keep on producing fissionable materials until the last stage.

(4) The minimum grant of power to the world authority sufficient to permit airtight inspection is certain to be so unprecedentedly great that governments should not be asked at this time to surrender further powers not required for atomic energy control. The urgency of the atomic energy problem is so great that the success of a control plan should not be jeopardized by making its acceptance unnecessarily onerous. Before the publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, many believed that nothing less than full-fledged world government would be sufficient. This report suggests that an effective plan which takes maximum advantage of the technical peculiarities of atomic energy production will require a less sweeping surrender of national sovereignty.

(5) Since all nations except the United States, and it is only a partial exception, are negotiating the international control of atomic energy in almost complete ignorance, impasses in negotiation should be avoided so long as there is any alternative available. The procedure so far followed in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission of discussing first the technical problems, then turning to discussions of principle, and only later turning to the negotiation of a detailed agreement, meets this condition.

(6) The deterrent effect of the prospect of retaliatory action against a violator should be preserved. Mr. Baruch emphasized the necessity of swift and sure punishment. One may agree, even though one does not share his belief that renunciation of the veto would make such punishment swifter or surer.

History's Most Challenging Problem

What are the prospects for general acceptance of an international control plan which meets the conditions outlined above? Disagreement over the veto does not necessarily mean that negotiations will fail; but even if this difficulty is surmounted, a long and difficult task lies ahead. The difficult problems of how to distribute atomic energy facilities among the nations of the world have not yet even been discussed. Negotiation of ratios of productive facilities, of rates of extraction of raw materials, and of the location of installations, will be incredibly complex. Inspec-

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tion has only been agreed on in principle. An agreement is meaningless if it does not lead to an international inspection system in which the world can have full reliance. But if there can be agreement in these two fields, the way will be open to harnessing atomic energy to the requirements of peace.

We have recognized the extreme urgency of the problem. Beside it, other problems pale into insignificance. We have begun to feel our way toward a system of international control. We are not yet far along the way. No one can say whether the goal will be reached, for the prophets of gloom and the professional optimists are both speaking too soon. The faint-hearted will decide that atomic energy control is too difficult to think about. But it is too important to put aside. The solution of the problem will require the best brains of our time. Support for that solution will require a public opinion educated to understand the complexities of history's most challenging problem.

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