Chapter 5
United by Action: Neurath in England

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Abstract The aim of this paper is to give a biographical, historical, and philosophical reconstruction of Neurath's final years in England. Besides reconstructing Neurath's arrival to England, in the context of his life and philosophical introduction at Oxford, I will argue that since the 1930s, Neurath was eager to develop a brand for logical empiricism. This brand was based not on theoretical commitments, but on practical considerations and decisions. Using a detailed case study on Neurath's relation to the Hungarian sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim, I show that the development of their connections documents how Neurath gave more and more priority to practical aims during his English years. Finally, the concluding section points to some further considerations on Neurath's legacy.

5.1 Introduction

When Otto Neurath settled down in Oxford after his 8 months long imprisonment in 1941, he arrived at a well-prepared field for logical empiricism.[1] After he attended the *Seventh International Congress of Philosophy* (1930), Schlick was invited to deliver three talks at King's College, London (1932). Just 2 years later, the British philosopher and logician Susan Stebbing invited Carnap to talk about "Philosophy

[1] This paper was supported by the MTA BTK Lendület *Morals and Science* Research Group; by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and by the "Empiricism and atomism in the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy" NKFI project (124970), and by the MTA Premium Postdoctoral Scholarship. I am indebted to Amy Wuest for correcting many linguistic errors in the paper. I am also indebted to the Carnap Archive at Pittsburgh (Rudolf Carnap Papers, 1905–1970, ASP.1974.01, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh) and to the Otto Neurath Nachlass (ONN, Wiener Kreis Archiv, Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands) for the permission to quote the archive materials. All rights reserved. All the translations from the archive files are mine.

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J. Cat, A. T. Tuboly (eds.), *Neurath Reconsidered*,
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 336,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02128-3_5

and Logical Syntax." Four years later, Cambridge University hosted the *Congress for the Unity of Science*, organized by Stebbing and Neurath.

In addition to these developments, individual scholars reached out to Viennese philosophers as well. A. J. Ayer attended some meetings of the Vienna Circle in 1932–1933 and published his famous text that determined the future course of logical empiricism in the English-speaking world for decades, *Language, Truth and Logic* in 1936. Max Black, who gave a talk at the *Fourth Congress for the Unity of Science*, wrote to Neurath in 1935 that he wanted to edit a collection of papers on "Logical Positivism […] partly by members of the Viennese Circle and partly by English and American writers of empirical sympathies." Black named Ayer, Richard Braithwaite, Carl Hempel, Charles Morris, Hans Reichenbach, Schlick, Carnap, and Stebbing. Neurath was asked to write about physicalism, which he happily accepted; for unknown reasons though, nothing resulted from that project.[2]

Neurath started his new career in Oxford in the context of these communications. Nevertheless, he worked not with philosophers, but mainly with anthropologists, sociologist, and educators. Even though he published some academic papers and his monograph in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, he praised England mainly for its "muddle," i.e. for its practice-oriented, pluralist, and tolerant worldview. This is also reflected by his legacy; while he was remembered by many as the developer of ISOTYPE works, a public intellectual in debates about Germany, his philosophical legacy was overshadowed by such oversimplified accounts of logical empiricism such as Ayer's, which achieved a Bible-like status after the war in Oxford.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct some cornerstones of this highly and unfortunately neglected period of Neurath's life and works. Section 5.2 describes Neurath's arrival to England, in the context of his life and philosophical introduction at Oxford. Section 5.3. argues for the thesis that since the 1930s, Neurath was eager to develop a brand for logical empiricism, which was based not on theoretical commitments, but on practical considerations and decisions. Section 5.3.2. gives a detailed case study on Neurath's relation to the Hungarian sociologist of knowledge, Karl Mannheim, who worked during the 1940s in London; the development of their connections documents how Neurath gave priority to practical aims during his English years. Finally, Sect. 5.4. points to some further considerations on Neurath's legacy.

5.2 Arriving and Settling Down in England

Neurath was a traveler – sometimes by his own decisions, but occasionally he was forced to move throughout Europe. These events occasionally caused permanent troubles and resulted in significant personal difficulties for him as can be seen from his letter to Rudolf Carnap that was written with some emotional overtones in 1933:

[2] Max Black to Neurath, 16 November 1935 and Neurath to Max Black, 4 December 1935 (ONN).

"I hope to see all of you before the possible longer separation begins. After the German revolution [1918/19] I did not see my friends for six years… That is a long time. It passes. […] Everything is awful and it is very difficult to keep up the hope which belief in the overall trend of history gives us."[3]

In the letter, Neurath presumably had in mind those dramatic events that took place between fascist and socialist groups in Vienna during 1933 and 1934. After all, his nightmares came true when fascist forces took power after the short-lived civil war in February 1934. At that time, Neurath was in the Soviet Union and when he heard the news from Marie Reidemeister (later his third wife, then a collaborator on pictorial statistics), he was advised not to return to Vienna but instead to visit his friends – Philipp Frank and Rudolf Carnap – in Prague. Neurath was never able to return to Austria, and his forced exile just began: traveling through Poland and Denmark, he fled to The Hague where he settled with his second wife Olga Hahn, and Marie.

During his time in The Hague, Neurath did not rest, not even for a second. Rather, he immediately started to organize the *International Congresses for the Unity of Science*, arranged the publication of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, and published popularizing accounts of his ISOTYPE-work for the English-speaking world (Neurath 1936, 1937, 1939). As the word spread about his work internationally, Neurath was invited to lecture about ISOTYPE and to establish further ISOTYPE related museums and institutions around the world: he traveled to Mexico, the Soviet Union and to the United States. Nevertheless, his work in the Netherlands was interrupted – as he used to say – by the spreading "Nazi-plague."[4]

5.2.1 From The Hague to the Isle of Man

On May 10, 1940, the Third Reich parachuted into the Netherlands. Neurath and Marie hid in their house where "[f]ood was brought to the door; many visitors even came to see [them]. In between [they] played chess and listened to the radio" (M. Neurath 1973, 68). Within 4 days, the little country, caught between Germany and Belgium, surrendered; when Neurath heard the news from the radio he knew he had to make a move. His fears were well-founded: he was half-Jewish and frequently accused of communism, so he had to flee from The Hague as soon as possible.

Since the Netherlands was officially a neutral country, many Jews sought refuge there prior 1940. When the major cities fall on the eve of May 14th, a fishing harbor (and a district) of The Hague, called Scheveningen, was filled with desperate people

[3] See Neurath to Carnap, 13 March 1933 (RC 029-11-20). Quoted and translated by Thomas Uebel (2007, 300).

[4] For more on ISOTYPE, see the chapters of Angélique Groß, Sophie Hochhäusl and Silke Körber in the present volume. On Neurath's Holland-period see Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996, 82–85), Sandner (2014, 234–263 and forthcoming), and Marie Neurath's memoirs (1973, 62–64).

looking for any way to escape the advancing German troops. Neurath and Marie also reached the harbors that evening, but when they arrived no evacuation ship was left. According to Marie (1973, 69), Neurath said that "if we do not find a boat I am going on a piece of wood." "After long searching," Neurath wrote to John and Jet Pront, his friends from The Hague, that "a last corner [of the harbor] remained uninspected," and they discovered one of the last boats, called "Seaman's Hope" ("Zeemanshoop"), which was hijacked earlier that evening by a crew of four students, led by their captain, Harry Hack.

With some help from the harbor and a bit of luck the crew was able to work the engines. Shortly after, people started to occupy the little boat, which was suitable for only 20–25 people. However, 44 people ultimately boarded the vessel. When Neurath and Marie discovered familiar faces, they "jumped into the boat from the wall, because it left just the shores."[5] None of the other accounts of the event describes a couple jumping to the boot after its departure, so it appears that Neurath may have exaggerated this detail. Nonetheless, after Neurath and Marie found their places at the back of the boat, a soldier fired a warning shot over the heads of those waiting to jump from the quayside, while others fell in the water.

The heavily overcrowded lifeboat pulled out from the harbor, into the dark, cold evening, heading directly to England and watching Rotterdam burn. With the usual exhilaration and trust in the future, Marie described the night as follows:

> For us this was a great adventure indeed. We were immersed in the stories of the Huguenots and their flights in fog and night over the frontiers and the sea – so there we are, now we know how it feels. We were leaving behind us the burning Rotterdam in an occupied country about to suffer foreseeable agonies. Trusting our luck to this tiny nutshell of a boat, we felt extremely happy to have found it and to be alive together, shoulder to shoulder. (M. Neurath 1973, 70.)

With an uncertain engine and a useless compass, the tiny ship followed the stars. The boat carried entire families, including children and older people, and it even navigated through minefields. By the following afternoon, they completed two-thirds of the trip. At that time, a British Royal Navy destroyer called "Venomous" stopped them and picked up all the passengers to take them to Dover.

As many other refugees, Neurath and Marie had German passports, therefore they were treated as "enemy aliens," representing the country that British soldiers were fighting against (Kochan 1983). Since he entered the country as on official enemy, Neurath was arrested immediately and brought to Pentonville Prison in London, and later to Kempton Park. He was kept – with nearly a hundred other men – in a racecourse, sleeping on mattresses on stone floors. After a few weeks, he was shipped to the Isle of Man. Marie was first kept at the Fulham Institute, where she was able to contact Stebbing. Later, she was placed in Holloway Prison before being taken to the Isle of Man.

On the Isle of Man, there were various internment towns, nonetheless men and women lived separately on different sides of the island. Many accounts exist about daily life, general conditions, and private feelings. Neurath and Marie were doing

[5] Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 30 June 1945 (ONN).

their best to keep up their spirits. As Marie (1973, 71) later recalled, "Otto was most interested in experiencing prison life." The interment, at least for the first few months, was like an international congress for Neurath: they lived in houses (Marie and Neurath were house captains in their homes), they met many scholars, made new friendships, and Neurath even gave at least one lecture to the fellow internees.[6] They went to the cinema where they could watch films "under military control," and in the camp for men they organized plays in Neurath's attic. He wrote to the Pronts that there was in the "attic no artificial light, therefore I used Christmas candles in masses, it was a great show. A dozen of them burning – and smelling."[7]

The Neuraths were in a quite exceptional position; since they had a typewriter and other related materials, they "worked out Isotypes for the USA and got even money from there,"[8] thus they were able to buy things and bring them to each other at the regular meetings. Men and women internees were allowed to meet at first monthly. Later, more regular meetings were permitted at the women's camp. Neurath was in Onchan Camp, at the mid-east part, next to the island's capital, Douglas, while Marie was interned in Port Erin, at the southwest corner. Neurath described one of these "love meetings either on a lawn or in a big dancing palace" as follows:

> We crossed the island marching to a station, from where we had to reach our ladies. That was a day, this first meeting in this women town, imagine many thousands of women, nicely dressed assembled in one town. The railroad station overcrowded with waiting girls and women, partly in bathing suits …. I have never seen before such a mass of females together. Then we marching into the town in military order, getting ice cream from nice girls, female police in bobby uniform, and then gradually splitting up of people, who met their wives or fiancées, and then sitting down on a meadow with a view on the sea, couple shoulder on shoulder the next couple and the military authorities with dame Joana on the balcony of a big hotel looking down on this love garden ….. what a story. (Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 28 July 1945. ONN.)

Altogether Neurath was pleased; when he arrived at the camp he only had slippers for shoes. Over time, he got new shoes, clothes, and books. He recalled other small luxuries, "cakes came and even Worcester Sauce, wonderful pyjamas […] complete suits and coats from the USA from one of the great department store owners" (ibid.).

Even though Neurath and Marie developed many new friendships that turned out to be quite fruitful for Neurath in England, they got bored after a while. "In the beginning," he wrote to the Pronts, "we looked at all the imprisonment as at a kind of holidays or higher joke after the Dutch tension and the lifeboat flight…." (ibid.). As Neurath summarized the whole situation, "not tormented, not persecuted, just 'interned'" (ibid.).

The news about Neurath's internment quickly spread, and after Marie notified Stebbing about their situation, the latter asked a Leonard Marsden, a lawyer, to help them get out as quickly as possible and arrange their marriage. (Though Neurath

[6] On Neurath's lecture see Michelle Henning's chapter in the present volume.

[7] Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 28 July 1945 (ONN).

[8] Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 28 July 1945 (ONN).

and Marie were fortunate to be treated as a married couple on the Isle, they got married only after their release). Marsden did everything he could: wrote applications, forwarded other's messages and kept Neurath informed through the process. Despite the support, their release was not that easy. Neurath and Marie's case was discussed in the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, in the British Academy Tribunal; their recommendation for release was forwarded to the Home Office on September 26, 1940. As Marsden wrote to Neurath, "[t]his seems a decided step forward and it ought not to be long now before you are both at liberty."[9]

Nevertheless, the Home Office forwarded their case to another Advisory Committee and they only came to a decision about the release in early December. Then attention turned to the fight to expedite their actual release. After everything, their release only happened on February 7th (Marie) and 8th (Neurath) in 1941, after 8 months spent in various British camps. It is well known that Neurath's application for release was supported by Stebbing and Albert Einstein, but Marsden notified Neurath (on his request) about a much longer list of supporters: the evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley, Ernest Jäckh (the international director of the *New Commonwealth Society*, later a professor at Columbia), Felix Kaufmann, John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Charles Morris, Egon Brunswik, Rudolf Carnap, Philipps Bradley, Edgar J. Kaufmann (a German-American businessman), G. J. Laing from the National Tuberculosis Association, the publisher Alfred A. Knopf, Neurath's cousin Waldemar Kaempffert, and F. E. Compton & Co.[10]

After the Neuraths were released, they went to Oxford enjoying the hospitality of the socialist political theorist (and detective story writer) George D. H. Cole, who wrote the *History of Socialist Thought* in 7 volumes. At first, they also worked in Cole's private library that was related to the *International Institute of Social History* in its exile,[11] but then they rented an entire house overlooking the hills of Oxford. Later they had to move because the landlord came back, but their friends bought a similar house a few blocks away, which the Neuraths might have rented. They loved this new life: they grew vegetables and fruits, enjoyed visiting neighborhood cats and dogs. Their home allowed them to enjoy a view of the town and cows grazing on the surrounding meadows. In addition, their home featured nice furniture and a bathtub "which is really of my size," Neurath happily reported: "usually I could not get my full pleasure, because I could not cover me … this is now possible."[12] They also rebuilt their library with the help of friends sending articles, clippings, reprints, duplicates etc. For someone living through the terrible consequences of World War One, the hunger of the years after the war and the Great Depression, this new

[9] Leonard Marsden to Neurath, 7 October 1940 (ONN).

[10] See Leonard Marsden to Neurath, 13 December 1940 (ONN). On Kaempffert's relation and its significance to Neurath, see George Reisch's chapter in the present volume.

[11] See Neurath to Carnap, 21 September 1941 and 29 July 1942 (RC 102-55-18 and RC 115-07-58). See letters 7 and 13 in this volume. On Cole and Neurath see Günther Sandner's chapter in the present volume.

[12] See Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 25 July 1945 (ONN).

lifestyle meant a radical change (the Neuraths lived in poor conditions in The Hague as well):

> In England [there] is plenty of food, if you are not so interested in particular types of food, bread is free, as you know, there are many vegetables and a real glut in milk, we enjoy it very much, dried eggs now from the US come etc we enjoy it, too. Fine fruit etc fish free (if not canned). Not the slightest similarity with the Central European situation in the last war. Not much meat, but you can get Vitamin[s] in various forms, e.g. as pills if you are very interested in these things. (Neurath to Carnap, 17 July 1942. RC 102-56-04. See letter 11 in the volume.)

What is to be noted here is the congruence of what Neurath emphasized frequently in the letters to his friends and his theoretical-economic ideas on the standard of living: "I want they [Neurath's German friends] should drop the interest in order as such, in stressing 'rights' more than peace and happiness, in stressing 'ideals' (ecstasy, enthusiasm, arts, etc science etc impartiality, etc) more than the *daily happiness of the neighbours, the own happiness, the happiness of people more far away*" (emphasis added).[13]

Neurath loved being in England: he quickly made a name for himself among many new circles, became as active as ever and enjoyed the walks, the community, as well as supporting the fight against Nazism. As he wrote to an old friend from Vienna, they "gradually become a kind of British Furniture" (quoted by Sandner 2011, 73).

5.2.2 Oxford Lectures, Terminology, and Life in England

Neurath was absorbed in various projects after his release. Though he was able to reestablish the longstanding Isotype Institute in 1942 with the help of Stebbing, from a philosophical point of view the most important event was his lectures at the All Souls College, Oxford. The lectures provided both difficulties and opportunities for Neurath:

> Then I had to lecture at Oxford University […], the Professor invited me and attended kindly the lectures is an anthropologist and therefore I spoke more of anthropology as I did usually. I liked it very much, but it needs some time to see how "functionalism" goes on, and how the discussion stands just at the moment. Of course I know the main lines be heart. I had to look through the history of anthropology as you had to look another day through the history of philosophy. (Neurath to Carnap, 1 April 1944. RC 102-55-05. See letter 26 in this volume.)[14]

Neurath was invited to give a course on "Logical Empiricism and the Social Sciences" by the social anthropologist Alfred Reginald Radcliff-Brown, who was

[13] See Neurath to Ina Carnap, 24 September 1945 (RC 102-55-13). See letter 35 in this volume.

[14] The Oxford course was the only official academic appointment of Neurath: though he habilitated at Heidelberg in 1917, he never taught a course and his permission was suspended two years later. See Sandner (2014, 103–108).

known for his structural-functionalist theory of social relations and actions. Though Neurath has dealt (sometimes critically) with the ideas of anthropologists (especially of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and James Frazer) on magic, religion, technique and primitive mentality during the early 1930s (1930/1983, 1931, 1931/1973, 319–330), the Oxford atmosphere was different: Radcliff-Brown (1939) just published his "Frazer Lecture" on taboos, and his vocabulary on folklore might have been new and promising to Neurath's ears.

In order to facilitate the discussion, Neurath had to dig into the newest achievements of anthropology. This task was somewhat challenging even though the discussions on anthropology and the social sciences were beneficial. Neurath adapted the terms and ideas and made use of them in his *Foundations of Social Sciences* (1944/1970) and in his last manuscript, "Visual Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation" (1996) written for Karl Mannheim.[15]

According to a letter to Cambridge University Press, he was already teaching on the 22nd of February (Hilary Term), and he continued with a discussion group through the Trinity Term between April and June. In the same letter, he asked for copies of the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* sending them to the following scholars: the above mentioned Julian Huxley (London), the Nobel Prize winner physiologist Archibald Vivien Hill (London), Radcliff-Brown (Oxford), G. D. H. Cole (Oxford), H. H. Price (Oxford), and Edward Stuart Cartwright (who was the organizing secretary of the new tutorial classes committee until 1945 in Oxford).[16] Though it is quite unlikely that all of these scholars attended Neurath's lectures, it is still an impressive list of interested colleagues and acquaintances. Furthermore, it is known that the Neuraths wanted to participate at Price's lectures, who gave them permission to attend.[17]

Through the lectures Neurath tried to reach out to possible collaborators, old and new friends, and sympathizers as much as he could. He even invited many of them to participate at the 1941 Chicago Congress for the Unity of Science. Due to the war, however, many European scholars were simply unable to attend a conference in the United States. For them, Neurath organized the "Terminology" workshop (often mentioned by him as "our Unity of Science meeting") with Stebbing and the pedagogue Joseph A. Lauwerys (who later played an important role in developing UNESCO), on October 3–5 of 1941 in Oxford. Almost nothing is known about this conference. Yet there is evidence that demonstrates that Neurath invited the sociologist Karl Mannheim, the philosopher C. E. M. Joad, the aforementioned H. H. Price, Leonard Russell (professor of philosophy in Birmingham), and presumably many others.[18]

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[15] Neurath has sent a copy of the *Foundations* to Radcliff-Brown, thanking him all the discussions and remarks. See Neurath to Radcliff-Brown, 13 January 1945 (ONN).

[16] Neurath to Cambridge University Press, 22 February 1941 (ONN).

[17] H. H. Price to Radcliff-Brown, copy to Neurath, 13 February 1941 (ONN). During the 1941 Trinity Term Price lectured on Hume's Theory of Knowledge after publishing a book on the subject (1940); though it is unknown in which semester did Neurath attend the lectures.

[18] Neurath to Price, 13 September 1941 (ONN) and Neurath to Joad, 13 September 1941 (ONN). According to the hotel-room reservation plans, Stefan Vajda (mathematician), Martin Strauss (philosopher), Patrick Meredith (lecturer in visual education), C. H. Waddington (biologist), Charles Henry Whiteley (philosopher), Leonard Russell, and a certain A. Pinsent were attending the event. See Neurath to Talbot, 25 and 29 September 1941 (ONN).

The only indication of what might have happened at the terminology workshop comes from two articles that appeared shortly after the conference: "The Danger of Careless Terminology" (1941) and "Universal Jargon and Terminology" (1941/1983), though the same account was published later in the *Foundations of the Social Sciences* (1944/1970, 2–4). Terminology is the discipline that deals with terms, expressions, phrases and linguistic items. It might be regarded as Neurath's own version of the linguistic technique that dominated English-speaking philosophy. In these works he argued that there are various forms of terminologies, e.g. empiricist and unempiricist, pluralist and anti-pluralist, scientific and metaphysical, and that the task of logical empiricism is to analyze these expressions, and, for example, to weed out non-scientific terms. This task is a never-ending job since terminology "will always be in the making" (1944/1970, 2), thus even Neurath's (1941, 147) *index verborum prohibitorum* will undergo constant revising (cf. Reisch 1996).

This process of linguistic analysis is not meant only to identify metaphysical terms in scientific papers. Neurath also wanted to call attention to the force of words by indicating how terminology might obscure or uncover ideologies and philosophical commitments:

> [W]e propose to avoid praising and blaming words in articles and books on history: one man 'kills' another man, he does not 'murder' or 'assassinate' him. An additional statements such as 'this killing, was not in concordance with the rules of the group to which the killer belonged and was regarded as murder' would be a historical one; and we would say the same of an additional statement such as 'I – the writer of the book – and my group disapprove this actions as murder'. (Neurath 1941, 147.)

While in the case of normative terms, such as those given in this example, might seem to present a somewhat manageable task, the danger associated with normative language in purely scientific texts is harder to reveal. From Neurath's perspectives, many of his fellow logical empiricists – like Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and Carl Hempel – who worked on purely technical and formal logical issues, just tried to get rid of the practical side of science by building ideal languages with abstract rigor. Neurath explained that "sharp definition and pedantic speaking" will not help in understanding how science works, "certain vagueness is unavoidable, and a pseudo-clearness is even particularly dangerous" (1941, 146); or as he said in the other paper, presented to the Aristotelian Society, "formalization is no magic sieve" (1941/1983, 213).

This may be Neurath's attempt to get closer to various British traditions: he even mentions Jeremy Bentham, Charles Ogden, I. A. Richards, Stebbing and the Cambridge School of Analysis, and Bertrand Russell (even though Neurath was highly critical of Russell's (1940) latest book). Neurath was likely well aware of the distinct British philosophy (relying on common sense, linguistic analysis and Moore's ideas) that was becoming institutionally and professionally entrenched during the 1940s in Oxford and Cambridge. Thus "Terminology" bridged his Viennese work while also allowing him to reach out to his new colleagues in England.[19]

[19] Neurath gave a lecture also in Cambridge (19 November 1941) under the title "Logical Empiricism and everyday problems" (ONN, K.50).

5.3 Building a Brand for Logical Empiricism: From Reichenbach to Mannheim

Considering the wide range of published material of logical empiricists, such as brochures, pamphlets, monographs, articles, reviews and reports, one might come to understand the logical empiricists' tradition as a *unified* and *harmonized movement*. There were, of course, internal debates, divergences and infightings. Many of these debates might have seemed to be signs of a *progressive research program*, rather than of a collapsing collaboration and a fragile, thin slide of ice, heated continuously by hatred, social contempt, and disdainful mockery.

We should sit back for a moment, however, and think about the history of the Vienna Circle. Since Friedrich Stadler's (2001/2015) reconstruction, the "(non-) public phase" terminology has been rigidified in the academic literature. He locates the non-public, preparatory phase between the years 1924 and 1929, and the public phase after 1929 when Carnap, Hahn and Neurath's joint manifesto appeared. Nonetheless, it might be interesting to note that Carnap taught in Vienna from 1926 until 1931, then moved to Prague, where Philipp Frank was already a professor at the German University of Prague since 1912; as a result of his work there, he only participated in the meetings of the Vienna Circle occasionally. It is not surprising thus that many scholars of the Circle described him as just a really close outsider, who attended the meetings sometimes when he came home. After 1930, Neurath was continuously on the move, spending much of his time in the Netherlands and in the Soviet Union: in 1934 he fled to The Hague as I mentioned above. Feigl emigrated to the United States in 1930, while Menger first went to Amsterdam (1925–1927) and later to America (1930–1931). Likewise Schlick traveled to North America: he went to Stanford (1929) and to Berkeley, California (1931–1932).

All of this resulted in the overturn of power relations within the Circle. Neurath wrote to Carnap in 1930 that if neither him, nor his wife, nor Menger, Feigl or Carnap is in the Circle (which was already quite usual), then Schlick and Waismann "announce to the true people, in the wreath of their two in-the-house-phenomenologists [Felix] Kaufmann and [Robert] Neumann. Hans [Hahn], the last member of 'our group' will not hold out long."[20] Gustav Bergmann (1993, 195) wrote to Neurath in 1938 (thinking about the Wittgensteinians), that "[t]he Boltzmanngasse group [i.e. the Circle], […] had, as I see it, already reached its highpoint in 1927/28, maintained momentum for several years and by 1931/32 already showed clear signs of splintering and, as a consequence, declining."

The Circle showed the signs of decline from Schlick's point of view as well. He wrote to the English translator of his *Fragen der Ethik* in 1933: "I am not going to have any meetings of the 'Wiener Kreis' this winter. Some of our old members have grown too dogmatic and might discredit the whole movement; so I am now trying to form a new circle out of younger men who are still free from principles."[21] The

[20] Neurath to Carnap, 15 July 1930 (RC 029-14-14).

[21] Schlick to David Rynin, 4 November 1933 (MSN).

same ideas were suggested by Bergmann (1993, 199–200) as well: "the later Circle was of a completely different sort. […] From the original radical, rationalistic outlook there was nothing remaining […]; mathematicians, physicists and the absent members of the old Circle were replaced, in growing numbers, by the pupils of Mr. and Mrs. [Karl and Charlotte] Bühler." Due to the absence of the so-called "left wing" of the Circle, most of the attendants and visitors of the Circle reported about the enormous and quasi-religious influence of Wittgenstein on the remainders.[22]

According to Neurath, the situation did not get any better over time. The "real founder" of the Circle, Hans Hahn, died unexpectedly after a surgery. His sister (who was Neurath's wife), wrote to Carnap almost desperately:

> Our philos. front has lost a good soldier & what the Vienna Circle was earlier ceased to exist. [sic] Only [Heinrich] Neider left to counteract the Schlick-W. Group, but he is short of the mathematical-physical qualifications & with his sociological-historical knowledge he is unable to do much in this Circle. (Olga Hahn-Neurath to Carnap, 1 August 1934. RC 029-10-41.)

In the same year, the *Verein Ernst Mach* was disbanded for political reasons. Carnap described Frank's visit to the Circle in 1935 to Neurath as follows: "Frank's visit to the Schlick Circle seems to bring its end. Waismann became so furious because Frank called him publicly a 'scholastic', that he does not want to appear in the public anymore."[23]

These reports do not show a harmonized or movement-like picture of the Circle: how did the unified "Vienna Circle" or "Logical Empiricism" narrative emerge, overcoming so much hatred, tension both in personalities, attitudes and theoretical commitments? Logical empiricism, as it eventually became known, especially its Viennese form, was a result of a massive, deliberate, and direct process of *brand building*. Logical empiricists had to fashion a common terminology and a seemingly shared stance on many questions such that their shared philosophical project would be easily recognizable: one should have been able to tell who is with them, and who is not. Mapping the "us" versus "them" approach (Creath 2012) was also useful to safeguard their projects and fields of publication. For example, Neurath was often concerned that Reichenbach was taking too much power as co-editor in the *Erkenntnis* (the other editor was Carnap from Prague). Once he even wrote to Carnap that he is always angry when he sees that Reichenbach's name appears on the front page of the journal with bigger characters.[24]

Neurath's goal was to make logical empiricism "identifiable" and to show a picture of a working enterprise. The "brand" should have also guaranteed the quality of the work, since as Neurath wrote, "[w]e are known in the world as the 'Vienna Circle.'"[25] Being a fellow traveler would come with many advantages, thus Carnap's

[22] This picture is drawn, for example, by Ernest Nagel, who participated at the meetings at the turn of 1934/1935. See Nagel to Carnap, 5 January 1935 (RC 029-05-16) and 6 March 1935 (RC 029-05-14).

[23] See Carnap to Neurath, 26 March 1935 (RC 029-09-66).

[24] See Neurath to Carnap, 26 October 1932 (RC 029-12-17).

[25] See Neurath to Carnap, 10 August 1932 (RC 029-12-36).

wife wrote to Ernest Nagel that Popper's way of overestimating the minor differences between himself and the Circle is "quite stupid, because he would have more success under the banners of the Wiener Kreis, quite well known and discussed now."[26] Because of the enormous, conscious and conscientious self-management, the intended readers were able to find the works of logical empiricists. Their unified appearance and purposeful cohesive strategy provided insurance for quality and sameness in appearance. By arranging their own translations, reports of their congresses, commenting on their own works, logical empiricists aimed at dispelling misunderstandings and misinterpretations of their works.[27]

5.3.1 Early Attempts at Practical Unification

Building a brand did come with a price: to smooth things out, members of the movement had to fight over the dominant themes, expressions, ideas, and goals. According to Carnap's diaries, when Neurath saw Reichenbach's invitation to the Prague Conference, he started to "inveigh against him" because Reichenbach used the word "philosophy."[28] Neurath took things into his own hands, and wrote a letter to Reichenbach, trying to persuade him not to use "Naturphilosophie," since it is misleading and points to a "philosophical," "internal," "introspective" conception of knowledge, which is not characteristic of the movement. Neurath did not suggest "exact philosophy" ("exakter Philosophie") either since it sounds like an "ersatz" for the old philosophy.

Neurath did suggest the moniker "scientific world-conception," but by 1932 he ceased to use the word "world." So, after he left behind "worldview" because of its irrational connotations, and "world-conception" because of metaphysical implications, he had to develop with a new term. His preferred replacement was "unified science," which indeed became internationally recognized and adopted.[29]

It is to be noted that Reichenbach persisted in using "Naturphilosophie": in October 1929 (just after Neurath's letter) he wrote a report on the Prague conference in which he discussed the tasks and aims of philosophy of nature. "[I]n addition to the individual sciences," said Reichenbach (1929/1978, 258), "there exists a mode of treating and evaluating its subjects matter that is itself not scientific but philosophical instead," which is, after all, epistemological, since it explores the nature and essence of knowledge-processes.

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[26] Ina Carnap to Ernest Nagel, 23 January 1935 (RC 029-05-15).

[27] Whether Neurath was successful after all, is a further question: he wrote to Carnap, 21 September 1941, that "[s]uch is life, successively we [logical empiricists], the opposition become classics. Now we form a branch like others, as I learned from Laird's Introduction to modern philosophy" (RC 102-55-18). See letter 7 in the present volume.

[28] See Carnap's diary entry, 15 July 1929 (RC 025-73-03).

[29] Neurath to Reichenbach, 22 July 1929 (RC 029-15-15) and Neurath to Carnap, 9 October 1932 (RC 029-12-24). Cf. Neurath to Reichenbach and Carnap, 17 January 1935 (RC 029-09-97).

Despite the fact that Neurath was strongly opposed to the term "philosophy of nature," the expression surfaced again in the title of Reichenbach's 1931 brochure on the subject, "Aims and Methods of Modern Philosophy of Nature." Even though Reichenbach opposed the idea that philosophy shall be a "super science," or a science that holds the key to fundamental and infallible knowledge, he devoted still more space to talk about philosophy and how to deprive it of its classic character, than Neurath could have tolerated.

Reichenbach's brochure is an important document, not just because it reflects the core of a naturalization-debate, but because it was one of the first public and widely read attacks against what Reichenbach called "positivism." By marking off his Berlin-view from the Viennese outlook, Reichenbach might have impeded the unified brand-building process of Neurath, and thus sabotaged the common cause.[30] Nevertheless, for example, Carnap took Reichenbach's side and wrote in a letter that he "was especially happy because of the actual system-proposals" to be found in the "Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre." Though Carnap contrasted the "system-proposals" with Schlick's and Wittgenstein's philosophical considerations ("Erörterungen"), his conception opposed Neurath's attack on systems as well.[31]

Another example and form of brand building is provided by the series *Einheitswissenschaft*, edited by Neurath, Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, and Jörgen Jörgensen. In the usual historiographies and narratives, the series is depicted as a common effort in spreading the word, just like *Erkenntnis* and the Frank-Schlick series. Nonetheless, besides the formal editorial board, the origins of the series have an interesting lesson for us. In 1944, Neurath wrote the following to Carnap:

> Your letter on my articles hardly acceptable for the Erkenntnis immediately induced me to create the series EINHEITSWISSENSCHAFT, where I could publish my own stuff whenever I wanted to do it, without any consent from my strong teacher. Of course I did not insult you but invited you to be with me and to publish there, you by me highly admired giant of Logical analysis and a man who unveils the secrets of so many metaphysicians … (Neurath to Carnap, 18 November 1944. RC 102-55-06. See letter 28 in this volume.)

Given that the letter was written during an especially stormy period of their friendship, one might warn that we should take this passage with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, considering Neurath's intense and vehement character, it is not at all implausible to believe that he started the monograph series for himself, as an independent forum, as I would say, for brand building.[32] The fact that Neurath wrote two monographs (1933/1987; 1935/1987) and one article (1937/1987) for his new series seems to justify this idea.

The creation of *Einheitswissenschaft* was not enough in itself; Neurath left nothing to chance! He tried to arrange some positive reviews of his first brochure

[30] Neurath to Carnap, 12 April and 28 June 1930 (RC 029-14-18 and RC 029-13-10); see further Neurath's 14 April circular letter about his debate with Reichenbach (RC 029-14-17).

[31] Carnap to Reichenbach, 1 February 1935 (RC 102-64-05).

[32] On the history of the series see Hegselmann (1987, xiv–xviii). Cf. Neurath to Carnap, Frank and Hahn, 2 November 1932 (RC 029-12-15).

(1933/1987), Hahn's contribution (1933/1987) and Carnap's submission (1934/1987). He suggested that Hempel review his monograph, Frank review Hahn's paper, and Jörgensen review Carnap's work. But it was too late since Kurt Grelling (1935) had already started to review Hahn's work, and Carnap asked him to write about his and Neurath's brochures. Neurath's fears proved to be justified. He claimed that Grelling was "not standing entirely on their side" and his remarks in the review turned out to be quite negative – not helping the common cause.[33]

Building the brand of logical empiricism was a practical task, not a theoretical commitment for Neurath. This meant that after the early 1930s, he was willing to *overcome* philosophical conflicts, theoretical disagreements and oppositions for the greater practical good. A nice example of Neurath's "united by action" attitude is provided by the case of his relation to Karl Mannheim.

5.3.2 Neurath and Mannheim: From Rejection to Cooperation

Neurath and Mannheim's relation goes back to the turn of 1930 when the latter's *Ideology and Utopia* appeared in German. The book contained detailed discussions on themes such as how thinking is shaped by social positions, how collective conditions form the contents of experience, and how sociology and politics might become sciences. *Ideology and Utopia* is also considered to be one of the founding documents of Sociology of Knowledge as a discipline.

Neurath was happy in general with Mannheim's approach and with the idea of the social determinateness of knowledge. His behavioristic analysis of scientists and his sociology of sociology (1944/1970) shared many common themes with Mannheim's book. As Markus Seidel (2016) has recently pointed out that despite their different backgrounds, Neurath's and Mannheim's *politicized philosophy and sociology of science* have more in common than previously thought. Nevertheless, when Neurath (1930/1981) reviewed Mannheim's book, he was quite critical of it.

Neurath's criticism focused on a peculiar idea of Mannheim's. According to Mannheim (1929/1936, 104), knowledge has both social and political determinants, it is existentially related:

> It could be shown in all cases that not only do fundamental orientations, evaluations, and the content of ideas differ but that the manner of stating a problem, the sort of approach made, and even the categories in which experiences are subsumed, collected, and ordered vary according to the social position of the observer. (Mannheim 1929/1936, 130.)

Sociology of science aims at showing that not only our opinions, judgments, and commitments depend on our political and social status, but also what we recognize as *facts*, *problems*, or the *content* of experience! Thus "in the realm of politics," Mannheim claimed (1929/1936, 131), "the only knowledge that we have is a

[33] Neurath to Carnap, 5 and 16 March 1935 (RC 029-09-78 and RC 029-09-70). See further Carnap to Neurath, 13 March 1935 (RC 029-09-72).

knowledge which is limited by the position which we occupy." (Neurath and Frank will say later, however, that *all* our knowledge – including logical and natural scientific knowledge – has a substantial social and political dimension in Mannheim's sense.)[34]

From different political stances and social positions, different values and commitments arise, which always bring different perspectives into relief. Mannheim's asked how can the various political perspectives *synthetised* in order to avoid shoreless relativism and to enforce objectivity through the *scientific perspective*. In order to exceed individual and class interests, the intelligentsia will become "a relatively classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the social order" – this is what Mannheim (1929/1936, 137) calls the "socially unattached intelligentsia."

In Neurath's eyes Mannheim was right in emphasizing the social embeddedness of thinking and arguing, but Neurath disagreed with Mannheim's view that the scientific perspective could be instantiated only by a "socially unattached" social stratum. In his review, "Bürgerlicher Marxismus" ("Bourgeois Marxism"), published in *Der Kampf*, Neurath wrote about the synthesizing process as follows:

> It is as if one thinks that 2 times 2 equals 7 since it is what the orbits say, the other that 2 times 2 equals 5 since this is God's decree, the third that 2 times 2 equals 8 since this corresponds to the cosmic view, whereas the scientist maintains that 2 times 2 equals 4. And now there is the one who synthesizes all four 'one-sided' viewpoints or takes the average viewpoint that consists in the claim that 2 times 2 equals 6. (Neurath 1930/1981, 352. Seidel's (2016) translation.)

By making the intelligentsia's *synthesizing process* equal with the mathematical *counting of average*, Neurath tried to ridicule Mannheim's idea and rhetorically played into his own hands the vantage point. But even Mannheim (1929/1936, 135) claimed that such a simple "additive synthesis" (as presented in Neurath's quote too) would not work.

So *that* critique of Neurath won't be relevant against Mannheim simply because he did not say anything like that of which Neurath later accused him in the review with regard the mathematical counting of average. Two years earlier, however, in his *Personal Life and Class Struggle*, Neurath (1928/1973, 283) emphasized that "the shaping of life and world-view is closely linked with the social and economic order within which they arise." That's why he stuck to the idea that "the philosophy of a class depends on the position of the class" (1928/1973, 289). In his review, Neurath emphasized again and again that Mannheim's considerations reflect only *his* bourgeois stance: *his* neutrality is only pseudo-neutrality.

In Neurath's eyes, Mannheim pursued metaphysics by talking about the socially unattached intelligentsia and its neutral perspective. Without going into the question

[34] It is quite probable that Mannheim's position and ideas were transferred to Frank via the Harvard-sociologist Robert Merton, who was a friend of Frank, and for a while also a collaborator on a "sociology of science" project (which included Ernest Nagel too). Frank discussed Mannheim, Lukács and other sociologists in an unpublished book manuscript, entitled *Science, Facts, and Values* (now in preparation for publication). On Frank's relation to the sociology of science and the mentioned project, see George Reisch's chapter in the present volume.

of who was right, we might stress two interesting points: (1) In this one-sided debate, Neurath defended that position which became quite dominant in the second half of the twentieth century in the strong program of the sociology of knowledge: no one can erupt from social determinateness,[35] and (2) Neurath's rhetorical moves allowed him to translate theoretical questions into social ones, as the closing lines of the review suggest:

> Mannheim looks for a comprehensive viewpoint, that aspect of the "world", which is called metaphysics! Marxism, on the contrary, looks for the adequate statements about social processes. Marxism predicts the fate of proletariat and other classes! Metaphysics against science! Mannheim against Marxism, after all against friendship: the bourgeois front against the proletarian front! That is the old, very well known song! (Neurath 1930/1981, 356.)[36]

It is not known whether Mannheim was aware of this review; though in his later writings he tried to answer these charges. However, criticisms of Mannheim's work that were similar to Neurath's were already widespread and common so he might have become aware of them from other sources.

Nonetheless, viewing things from Neurath's critical stance, some later events might be explained as well. In 1937, Charles Morris suggested doing a monograph about the sociology of science in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*. He proposed the following authors: Louis Wirth (his colleague, the famous urban sociologist from Chicago), and Karl Mannheim.[37] While Neurath asked for some papers from Wirth (presumably thus he did not know his work), in the case of Mannheim he was able to formulate a stronger opinion:

> I have not read the last book of Mannheim. An older book of Mannheim is – what I would call – ful[l] of metaphysical formulations. But perhaps I would revise my opinion after my USA trip. I learned not always to act as a Torquemada. But I think we cannot decide this point in short time. (Neurath to Morris and Carnap, 12 March 1937. RC 102-51-60.)

Even though Neurath was exaggerating – Tomás de Torquemada was the first Spanish Grand Inquisitor in the fifteenth century, responsible for thousands of deaths that time – it is true that he was inclined towards harsh and extreme reactions.

By mentioning Hegel or Dilthey in a positive manner, Mannheim made an intolerable step towards metaphysics. In most cases, it is only Mannheim's language that reveals his philosophical past and tradition, but Neurath had a good eye to catch those supposedly dangerous words. Though Carnap's *Aufbau* does not belong to the tradition of *Geisteswissenschaften*, Neurath saw its allusion; Carnap wrote the followings in his diaries: "With Feigl to Neurath. Neurath grumbled over my presentation of the 'Geisteswissenschaften' in the 'Aufbau.' This is too idealistic for him; he

[35] On Neurath and the strong program, see Uebel (2000); on Frank and the sociology of science see Tuboly (2017).

[36] Recently Markus Seidel (2016) listed some reasons for thinking that Neurath's considerations did not apply to Mannheim. Even if he is right, it does not affect my main points, which are based on Neurath's internal (or so-called "emic") perspective.

[37] Morris to Neurath, copy to Carnap, 21 February 1937 (RC 102-51-63).

had some points to attack: he gets to name Dilthey: 'moral', 'state', 'manifestation.'"[38] Given Neurath's well-known opposition to that tradition, Mannheim's case was easily postponed for 2 years.

In 1939, however, something changed. With the increasing recognition of logical empiricism their congresses became more successful: after Prague, Paris, Copenhagen, and Cambridge, the next step was Harvard. Mannheim was invited to that Congress! He was happy to accept the invitation and proposed the following themes: (1) The Sociology of Valuations, (2) The Sociology of Knowledge and Logical Positivism, and (3) Specialization and Integration of Knowledge in the Social Sciences.[39]

Neurath liked all the three themes; the first could be related to John Dewey's (1939/1970) *Encyclopedia*-monograph on valuations that appeared the same year. The second session could have helped in understanding the context of the movement, and finally the third session would be a good match for the Social Sciences section. Mannheim promised, after all, to prepare a talk on the sociology of valuations. Even though at the congress there was a special section for the social sciences (with Neurath) and another for "Science and Society" (with Wirth and Zilsel), Mannheim did not deliver a lecture.[40]

Two years later Neurath approached Mannheim again to give a talk at the Sixth Congress, now in Chicago – again, unsuccessfully. But he did not give up. Because of the various war-restrictions, many European scientists were unable to travel, thus Neurath organized the aforementioned "Terminology" workshop for them in Oxford (October 1941). Due to his other commitments, however, Mannheim was not able to participate at the Oxford gathering either.[41]

After these conference-invitations, the line of events became blurry, but Neurath wrote the following to Mannheim 1 year later:

> I should like to meet you as far as our Encyclopedia is concerned. It is not urgent, you see we are now publishing the first 20 monographs, but on the other hand, we have to prepare carefully the next 60, too, and I should like to know a little, what, IN PRINCIPLE, of course, you would PERHAPS, assumed, you will have time, write on your own opinion as a representative one. (Neurath to Mannheim, 28 December 1942. In: Mannheim 1996, 183.)

Despite Neurath's idiosyncratic English, one might see that at the end of 1942, he brought himself to get Mannheim for the *Encyclopedia*. Actually, the final *Encyclopedia* would contain more than 100 monographs, some of them discussing the relation of science to society. By writing this one, Mannheim would indeed be a nice fit and a valuable contributor given his growing international reputation.[42] In Neurath's life, however, the ideal of the *Encyclopedia* was never realized: authors

[38] Carnap's diary entry, 19 December 1929 (RC 025-73-03). On the *Aufbau*'s relation to the Geisteswissenschaften, see Dewulf (2017) and Tuboly (2019)

[39] Mannheim to Neurath, 20 April 1939 (ONN).

[40] Neurath to Mannheim, 26 April 1939 and Mannheim to Neurath, 30 August 1939 (ONN).

[41] Neurath to Mannheim, 12 June and 15 September 1941 (ONN); Mannheim to Neurath, 19 September 1941, in: Mannheim (1996, 170).

[42] On the Encyclopedia see Reisch (1994), Dahms (1996).

were dropped, themes were changed, and monographs were delayed for years. Henceforth the discussions between Mannheim and Neurath were inconclusive. At the beginning Neurath planned for the *Encyclopedia* to have eight volumes, each volume consisting of ten monographs (that is eighty monographs), but only the first two volumes were published (twenty monographs in all), but only ten monographs in Neurath's life. Thus even if Mannheim had accept the invitation, he would have had to wait decades for his work to be published (his monograph would fit volumes seven or eight). The delays would have quickly become irrelevant as Mannheim died in 1947.

The story of Neurath and Mannheim's relation did not end here. Though Neurath's efforts to recruit Mannheim were unsuccessful, Mannheim approached Neurath too. Neurath wrote the following:

> I am also highly occupied, partly by writing books, partly by organizing our ISOTYPE INSTITUTE, which is now here at the British Institute of Visual Education. We are making educational Isotype Diagrams – Animated and illustrations for books and exhibitions. We think that the international educational situation after the war will need visual education much more than the prewar situation. And we think one should prepare something now. I do not speak of the visualization of my own ideas, but also of visualization of our contemporary knowledge as a whole. (Neurath to Mannheim, 28 December 1942. In: Mannheim 1996, 183.)

It is not known whether this letter kindled Mannheim's interest in Neurath's ISOTYPE (according to their letters, presumably they did not meet personally for months). However in March 1943 Mannheim wrote to Neurath to say that he is waiting for a detailed summary of Neurath's promised new book to close the deal. He also suggested a title for Neurath: "Humanisation and Popularization. New Ways of Visual Education and Humanisation of Scientific Knowledge." As Mannheim said, "[a] long title but provocative."[43]

What was the book, and where did Mannheim want to publish it? In 1942, Routledge & Kegan Paul started its *International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction* (ILSSR) series. The general editor was Mannheim, who held the position until his 1947 death. The series became quite well-known and successful: "its books were an important part of what there was to read" and their dark green dust-jacket "made what people in Britain thought a sociology book looked like" (Platt 2014, 236). ILSSR emerged as a fundamental tool in British sociological education and in the discipline's dissemination of knowledge. The particular books covered such themes as economic, town and country planning, sociology of crisis, art, and literature, criminology, foundations of thought, and, of course, sociology of knowledge.

Almost all of the ILSSR volumes were related to Neurath's earlier and present interests as well. Neurath advocated "planning" (the key category in British sociology) even before his active months in the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919.[44] The

[43] Mannheim to Neurath, 10 March 1943. In: Mannheim (1996, 187).

[44] For the significance and context of Neurath's ideas on planning, see George Reisch's and Thomas Uebel's chapters in the volume.

problems of *planning* and *reconstruction* turned out to be the two most important categories of British sociology during World War Two and even later. From that perspective, Neurath seemed to be a nice choice to publish a monograph in the series.

According to Mannheim's letter, Neurath indeed started to write a book for him. As Mannheim said, "[t]he longer I think about your proposed book the more I like its idea. I also feel that it would fit into the educational section of the International Library of Sociology, and Social Reconstruction admirably." Mannheim claimed that the book should be in agreement with the general idea of the series, namely that "from the platform of my Library the Educationalists and other people who will have to build up a new Europe should be informed about the best techniques." To that project, Neurath would contribute with his visual education and pictorial statistics.[45]

Since Neurath died unexpectedly in 1945, none of his works appeared in Mannheim's ILSSR, henceforth their common causes and aims surfaced only in their private correspondence. Nonetheless, a huge part of Neurath's manuscript turned up and was published partly in 1973, and wholly in 1996 – under the editorship of Juha Manninen – as "Visual Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation" (Neurath 1996).

One might raise the question: why and how did Neurath change his mind regarding Mannheim after the initial negative review? Since we cannot find any explicit trace of this in Neurath's (un)published works, we could only guess. One such guess may be Neurath's *brand building* as it was described in the previous two sections. In 1942, he wrote to Carnap:

> Collecting material on the second series of monographs I am preparing a survey on people who are related to us, but have some 'whims' – as it were – they should have an opportunity to express themselves with intensity (the first series of monographs stresses, what we have in common). (Neurath to Carnap, 29 July 1942. RC 115-07-58. See letter 13 in this volume.)

Neurath mentioned Feigl, Hempel, Tarski, Reichenbach, and the British psychologist Tom Hatherley Pear (who was the President of the British Psychological Society). But given the fact the Neurath refers to the second series of monographs (that is everything after volumes one and two), we can assume that the above remark in the letter applies to Mannheim as well. Although Mannheim's work fit into the tradition of *Geisteswissenschaften* by including metaphysical formulations, those differences (in theoretical commitments) could be overcome for the common goals. To give an example, see another letter by Neurath:

> Reichenbach […] made me emotional, because I thought it not brotherly, how he treated you in the various cases, we had to discuss. And, I cannot deny, that his theoretical remarks looked perhaps more strange to me than they perhaps would do, if he were not so far away from brotherhood in a community, in principle. He is very often charming and I know very well how to go on with him in the nicest way ….. but I fear him, not as a scientist or debater,

[45] Mannheim to Neurath, 15 March and 18 August 1943; see further Neurath to Mannheim, 18 September 1943. In: Mannheim (1996, 188, 192–193).

> but as a person, who is not interested in creating brotherhood in this world. (Neurath's unsent letter to Carnap, 22 September 1945. RC 115-07-66. See letter 34 in the volume.)

Seemingly Neurath would get over some of the theoretical differences with Reichenbach if they are counterbalanced in *actions* and *decisions*, i.e. practical matters. Nevertheless, after Neurath charged Reichenbach with "sabotage,"[46] even the ideal of common action, based on brotherhood, was lost. Reichenbach did not help the cause (that is, showing a unified and functioning picture of logical empiricism) by being reluctant to write a monograph for the *Encyclopedia*.

Mannheim, however, never hindered Neurath, but helped him during the English period. Education, pedagogy, social planning, organization, and finally reconstruction were such common ideas and ideals for both of them that made common work possible in a time that called for *direct and planned action*. Thus the case of Neurath and Mannheim, diverging between accusations of metaphysics, negative criticism and helping each other by various invitations, exemplifies nicely how Neurath's brand-building project worked. Acting together for the greater good overcomes the theoretical differences.

5.4 The Story of an Unsuccessful Project

Erwin Dekker (2014, 116) was right in emphasizing that important changes occurred in Neurath's approach to philosophical and scientific cooperation: "throughout the 1930s Neurath himself moved away from [the] revolutionary idea of the reconstruction of society." The reason for downplaying much of his radical socialist overtones was actually in support of a positive common cause: building the brand of logical empiricism for the greater good, i.e. reconstructing society from the bottom up using language and science on *as many* fronts and with *as many* comrades as possible.

These tendencies were hindered in the 1930s by in-the-house debates, published controversies, and personal attacks (which were often made behind each other's backs). Even though Neurath was often ready for compromise, working out issues using compromises was simply too slow and often did not pay off for him. One such example was Herbert Feigl, a former member of the Circle, who emigrated to the United States in 1930. In 1943, Feigl published a paper about "Logical Empiricism" in Dagobert R. Runes' *Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought*. In his paper, he aimed at summarizing the main tenets and original ideas of the movement, with some historical notes and a bibliography. Though he mentioned the Unity of Science Movement, the Congresses, and *Encyclopedia*, he never indicated that they were Neurath's core ideas. Neurath was mentioned only once, as one of the many non-philosophers who played an active role in the Circle. It is then not surprising that Neurath commented on this as follows:

[46] Neurath to Carnap, 22 July 1931 (RC 029-13-08).

> Feigl wrote a paper on Logical Empiricism. Do you think anybody reading this paper, will discover that I had a certain position in its history? […] Please, look to the article by Feigl. He just put me into SOCIOLOGY – that is all. He does not even mention me as the initiator and editor-in-chief of the encyclopedia. DO YOU THINK HE WOULD TREAT ME SO IF I WERE [A] PROFESSOR, not to ask the question, what he did with all that if I were Schlick. (Neurath to Carnap, 24 September 1945. RC 102-55-14. See letter 36 in this volume.)

It is not simply that Feigl did not give sufficient credit to Neurath. What was even worse for Neurath was that Feigl acted against the ideal of brotherhood: "I never complaint about Feigl. I am not regarding him as very important or influential, but for a long time I regarded him as a potential friend. I FEEL IRRITATED AS A FRIEND" (ibid.).

Neurath also recalled some meetings with Feigl in Europe, which were influential for the young Feigl but were never properly acknowledged. Neurath suggested to Hannes Meyer, the director of the Bauhaus, for example, that he invite Feigl to Dessau. Neurath also suggested that Feigl should participate at a pedagogical conference in Geneva in order to increase his chances in finding a job – Feigl happily acknowledged this in a letter to Schlick.[47]

Even though Neurath did everything to become friends and close colleagues with Feigl, he was grieved by the (recurring) actions of the latter, especially by not getting proper credit or help in disseminating Neurath's point of view. Actually, when Feigl (1943, 401) listed those logical empiricists who worked on the social sciences, he mentioned only Hempel, Paul Oppenheim, Felix Kaufmann, Edgar Zilsel, and the American sociologist, George Andrew Lundberg. There was no mention of Neurath in that section at all.

The fact that Neurath was well-received in England should not surprise us, however. In his book on the cultural-political history of analytic philosophy, Thomas L. Akehurst (2010, 2), emphasized that "[t]here was a 'deep seated similarity of attitude and outlook' among the British analysts; […] we can detect a clear pattern of cultural, political and philosophical beliefs shared by major British analytic philosophers." This shared worldview was centered partly on the idea that "a post-Kantian tradition of continental philosophy was the direct source of fascist ideology" (Akehurst 2010, 3). Relatedly, British philosophers had a positive program as well: the emerging analytic tradition was closely tied to liberalism and democracy. Neurath shared both of these characteristics.

In his last years, Neurath was busy with a larger project on Germany's education after the war, dealing with the sources, contexts, and future of Nazism and their interconnections. He thought that "in German literature, we find many elements, which fit together may form a pattern in harmony with the anti-democratic attitude."[48]

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[47] Feigl to Schlick, 21 July 1929. Moritz Schlick Nachlass. The same event is recalled in Neurath's unsent letter to Carnap, 22 September 1945 (RC 115-07-66) and in his 24 September 1945 letter (RC 102-55-14). See letters 34 and 36 in this volume. Though it should be admitted that later Feigl (1969/1981, 62) noted his debt to Neurath regarding the Bauhaus.

[48] See Neurath and Lauwerys, "Plato's Republic, German Education and Human Brotherhood," in the Neurath Nachlass, ONN, K. 73. On Neurath and his fears of German education, see Antonia Soulez's chapter in the present volume.

Neurath tried to identify certain patterns and schemes in German literature, scientific studies and traditional ways of argumentations. Emphasizing the role of Plato's *Republic*, Kant's categorical imperative, the ideal of the genius who is above all rules and customs, the inclination towards something "the" (like "the state," "the rule," "the nation," "the race," "the great past"), Neurath separated the German climate (or atmosphere) from the British (or more generally, the Western European) one:

> The human climate of the western countries is different. Here a certain critical attitude plays its part, in Britain based more on certain traditional traits, in the continental West based more on certain rational arguments. But so or so, what grows up in the west are individuals, who think more of common happiness and of co-operation than of subordination under some super-human structure, THE STATE or THE RACE. Of course also here are collective traits of importance, but they never consummate the whole of a person. (Neurath, "Meeting, Belgium committee…," ONN, K. 79.)

In that sense – even though he had some intense debates about Plato's influence on the German climate and on German traditions after writing an article with Joseph A. Lauwerys (1945) – Neurath found eventually a cooperative, friendly and receptive attitude. He did not have to add much to the intellectual climate of British analysts with respect to their criticisms of continental thought and Nazism. He could add, however, his own experiences and practical works on how to re-educate people after the war. As he wrote to Carnap, "I like to be with the British in these hard days. Being in a new environment is rather thrilling and stimulating – I feel like a second youth here. On our life boat I thought of the future activity here."[49]

Without emphasizing it much: democracy was indeed a major concern for Neurath throughout his entire life, but most explicitly during his English years. He stressed England's own tradition in democracy (or at least its customs and ideas that created a supporting pattern for the democratic way of life):

> In Germany there is a whole ideology of regulations. Not only do you have to have regulations, but you have to admire them. In England, you admire your lack of regulations, your 'muddle'. […] Your Court procedure is based on the right of a single Judge to give a definite answer. Thus different solutions are admitted: you have more differences in local decisions. Differentiation is contrary to German feeling, because in Germany there are thirty different States, needing a common activity and a common basis. In England you have your common basis well-established, and therefore you do not fear differences. Thus you have a democracy. The muddle is related to democracy. (Neurath, "Contributing features in the emotional and intellectual isolation of the German," ONN, K.48.)

For Neurath, democracy came with pluralism, tolerance and 'muddle': both in theories and actions, an old theme, he issued already from his famous 1913 Vienna lecture: "the lost wanderers of Descartes."[50]

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[49] Neurath to Carnap, 22 December 1942 (RC 115-07-61). See letter 16 in this volume. On the British analysts and Nazism see Akehurst (2010, 16–52).

[50] Actually Neurath emphasized this special continuity of his line of thought in "Universal Jargon and Terminology" (1941/1983, 216); but also in his "Argumentation and Action" manuscript (ONN, K39). See also Don Howard's chapter about the continuation of Neurath's thought regarding the practical relevance of philosophy, starting around the time of "The Lost Wanderers" article.

Neurath died on October 10, 1945, sitting, reading and laughing at his working desk after a usual walk in the streets around his house. In the recent literature, aiming at his rehabilitation, he emerged as an original thinker, often ahead of his time. Nonetheless, there was one thing he presumably did not see coming. Someone – according to Ayer's biographer, Ben Rogers (1999, 231), that someone was the journalist, Giles Romilly, who was the nephew of Churcill – under the pseudonym "Oxonian," described his experiences returning to Oxford in 1948:

> Since the end of the war, Professor Ayer's book [Language, Truth and Logic] has in Oxford acquired almost the status of a philosophic bible. […] There is of course, no direct connection between Logical Positivism and Fascism. Yet an anti-aesthetic Philistinism is encouraged by it, since it reduces intellectual activity to a kind of artisanship, in which one either has "skill" or hasn't. And I would make this point, that a climate of opinion, in which a negative and rather arid philosophy of this type can rise to such pre-eminence is one more likely to favour Fascism than not; since Fascism steps into the vacuum left by an abeyance of concern with fundamental human values. ("A Visit to Oxford," *The New Statesman and Nation*, June 26, 1948.)

Logical empiricists have been accused of many things: relativism, nihilism, intellectualism, and dogmatism. In the United States, in a "Letter to the Editor" (*The Saturday Review*, 3 September 1949, p. 26) it was said that logical empiricists, as nihilists, are worse than communists since "communism (albeit in a perverted fashion) holds some things to be good and others to be bad." Neurath, running from fascism and Nazism, fighting them with all his efforts on the theoretical, educational and practical levels, could hardly imagine a worse outcome than his approach being accused of creating an atmosphere (in England!) supporting Fascism! He would have been even more surprised to find out that that C. E. M. Joad (1950) – who he invited to his Chicago Congress and Oxford conference in 1941 – has devoted an entire book of accusation, criticism, and disinformation to the "Fascism and Logical Empiricism" theme arguing in favor of the position first outlined by Oxonian.[51]

Throughout this debate A. J. Ayer's book and thoughts were under suspicion: in the philosophical circles of England, Neurath was already forgotten. By 1941, he claimed to Carnap that "I think, if universities should be interested in me, it would be in connection with particular problems of social sciences, unified science or visual education."[52] Though his name surfaced for a few more years in the context of visual education (thanks to the efforts of his third wife, Marie), his other activities fell victim to various misleading and oversimplified accounts of his works and intentions.

[51] It should be mentioned though, that in the United States Horace Kallen accused Neurath's unified idea of totalitarianism already in 1939, and later in 1945. See Reisch (2005, 167–190).

[52] See Neurath to Carnap, 21 September 1941 (See letter 7. in this volume.).

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